


Nepal

Contemporary Political Situation – VI, VII & VIII

Opinion Poll Report



Sudhindra Sharma
Bal Krishna Khadka

Interdisciplinary Analysts

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December 2011

© Interdisciplinary Analysts, December 2011

ISBN: 978 9937 2 4221 9

This report can be obtained by contacting IDA in the address given below.

Published by



Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA)

GPO Box 3971

Kathmandu, Nepal

Phone: 5528111, 5542354

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Preface

This volume represents the second cycle of three public opinion polls conducted by Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) in 2010 and 2011. The earlier cycle (from 2004 till April 2008 before the Constituent Assembly elections) had seen five nationwide opinion polls. The successful conclusion of these efforts is also an occasion for some reflections on the broader background that necessitates this work of IDA.

Nepal is the oldest country in South Asia. Indeed, with its founding dated as 1769 AD, it is older by seven years than the other acknowledged new nation-state of the Western world, the United States of America (1776). While both the countries are also multi-ethnic entities, the similarities end quickly. The independence of the American colonies was heralded by the Puritan revolt in England and the Scottish Enlightenment. Its social evolution was the logical extension of capitalism bolstered by John Locke's liberalism, which eventually saw a socially inclusive American military-industrial power expand all over the globe. Nepal's was a move in the other direction, a desperate safeguarding of mostly elite values that would have been smothered by the expansion of capitalism. This reactive approach to British imperialism, unlike the active American one, ultimately led to a century of isolation and stagnation under Rana rule.

Since 1951, Nepali society (including its state, rulers, businesses, ethnicities and cultural entities) has been forced to engage with modernity, capitalism and development. Its larger polity has "managed" change, if that is the right word to describe frantic fire-fighting of the last half century, with mixed results. It has ranged from state management of the Panchayat to market reification in the 1990s. The former slowed down the pace of change to provide Nepal's social fabric (i.e. Prithvi Narayan Shah's multi-national flower garden) time for adjustment (as Karl Polanyi might have termed the "double movement"). It, however, could not meet the revolution of rising expectations, which led to the latter's unbridling of capitalism's progressive but socially destructive forces. This in turn quickly produced in its wake the violent Maoist reaction, which the polity is currently "managing".

The social upheavals that roil Nepal have roots that are deeper and not easily explained away with ease by existing theories in the social sciences. Neither Marxist nor neo-liberal explanations, while not without points of immense interest, comprehensively capture the nature of this dynamics. Part of the reason is insufficient and ineffective theorising, which will eventually be corrected by newer and more creative scholars. A more fundamental reason, however, is data deficiency that hampers proper theorising. Nepal's social reality is highly complex, its subaltern history still unexplored, its economy dominated by the unexamined informal, its legal system uniquely different from British or European traditions, and its politics convoluted. Empirical measurements of these intricacies do not have a long history.

Serious empirical data generation is coeval with modernization begun in earnest with the fall of the Rana regime and the entry of international development agencies. Their requirements were modulated by the particular social sciences that backed their enterprises. Mostly it was economics, and only when unexpected results or failures were encountered that recourse was made to other social sciences. Unfortunately, in such cases the efforts were dominated by qualitative data that, although they provided deep insights of the particular, could not be scientifically generalized for the country as a whole. In the worst of cases, such insights, when falsely generalized for the country, would lead to policy impasse such as is currently being experienced with the constitution making process.

In contrast, quantitative data generated by statistical approaches of random stratified sampling, a forte of IDA, provides information that can be used to draw general conclusions about the country or larger groups therein as a whole, of course within stipulated error margins. Nepal's rapid social transition can be explained with a different refractive lens by such data to provide some degree of better certainty, and hence better policy. The need for this type of data is occasioned by two major factors at play. With the democratic changes of 1990, the country has seen a surge in mass consumption economy. Examples abound in different sectors. Whereas previously quality English education could be had only in limited number of schools in Nepal, 1990 has opened a floodgate obviating the need for parents to send their wards to India. Similar has been the boom in growth of private hospitals, domestic and international airlines, processed food, construction materials, bottled or tanker water supply and so on. The second factor has been the mass politics that accompanies the mass market where the way the votes will swing is of critical importance to decision makers of all shades.

It is within this larger changing context that IDA began its thematic program of studying Nepal's social reality by applying and developing quantitative social science methods. Elections happen only after several years of interval when the will of the public is overtly expressed with immediate policy impact. It is more important for decision makers to be aware of the public mood and thinking in between: what happens with the public mood in the longer interim between the exercises of direct democracy regarding a host of concerns? Opinion polls and quantitative surveys thus provide a critical service to decision makers in many sectors where public opinion matters. We were fortunate to find support from international development agencies and foundations that shared our views on quantitative social sciences and were willing to support our ambitions. While we did begin with studies of social and consumption habits, our big endeavours were the political opinion polls. We began in 1998 but our efforts became more comprehensive, systematic and longitudinally continuous since 2004. It is only by a time series of measurements regarding the same question over time that not only the public opinion but also its changing dynamics can be captured. Proper theorizing can happen with the availability of such data.

Nowhere has the changing dynamics of Nepali public opinion been more dramatic than in series of snapshot pictures in this volume. For instance, the percentage of Nepalis who would like to be identified as Nepalis only (without their caste or ethnic appellations) has risen from 53 percent in 2008 before the CA elections to 71 percent in 2011. It not only highlights the pressures politicians must be feeling at the grassroots but also explains the deadlock in the CA on the pivotal theme of federalism for constitution making. There are many such bits of policy-relevant data in this volume that pertain to issues such as secularism, the sidelined monarchy, the direction which the country is taking, trust in institutions, and the changing popularity of prominent political figures and parties etc. that will have important consequences for the future of Nepali politics in the turbulent transition ahead. One interesting example is the swing in popularity of the two Maoist leaders, Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai. The former's

had declined dramatically and the latter's had risen dramatically at the time the survey was done, which was before Baburam Bhattarai became prime minister. However, judging from current media reports and commentaries, public's opinion of him has dipped; but that – and the reasons for it – is something that can be stated with quantitative confidence only in the next survey in the months ahead.

It is our hope that the readers of this volume will do so with a critical mind and come back to us with comments and suggestions. As stated earlier, psephology, together with quantitative surveys, is a new science in Nepal whose practice and methods need constant improving. We look forward to contributing to, as well as learning from, a more informed public discourse in this field with all who are interested in the days ahead.

Dipak Gyawali
Chairman
Interdisciplinary Analysts

Acknowledgement

Nepal Contemporary Political Situation (NCPS) is a longitudinal nationwide public opinion survey series that Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) began from 2004 onwards. The first five nationwide public opinion surveys were supported by The Asia Foundation (TAF), while Enabling State Programme (ESP) co-supported the fifth nationwide public opinion survey.

We have termed this volume the VI, VII & VIII in the NCPS series. IDA has been fortunate to have received the support of Nepal Transition Initiative (NTI), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the funds for which were administered by Chemonics International, for undertaking three nationwide public opinion surveys in 2010 and 2011. The results of these surveys have been published in Nepal Rastriya Saptahik in Nepali on November 21, 2010, April 17, 2011 and August 21, 2011 as well as in Spotlight Fortnightly in English on August 19, 2011. These published results have been used by many journalists and opinion writers in their column on issues of current Nepali debate in constitution-making. Since then we have had requests from researchers, academics, politicians, journalists, senior civil servants, and parliamentarians for print copies in a format and style similar to the earlier NCPS volumes.

What we have done in this single volume is to put together the data of the three surveys conducted in 2010 and 2011 into one single longitudinal format and where relevant, placed alongside the results of NCPS I-V for comparison. This was necessitated by the very reason for initiating the NCPS exercise in 2004, which was to measure and record changing public perceptions over time. It is hoped that those many mentioned above who made requests to us will find their needs met in this volume.

I am grateful to the following organizations and individuals, without whose support this volume would not have been published:

For the people of Nepal for sharing with us their views on contemporary politics. Without their willingness to be interviewed, this venture wouldn't even have begun.

Ryan Smith, Chief of Party, Chemonics International and Sarah Oppenheim, Governance and Stabilization Specialist, USAID for trusting us with the work.

Nilu Basnet and Kumar Kafle, Program Officers at Chemonics International, for their facilitating role.

Noelle Veltze – Deputy Chief of Party, Chemonics International, for facilitating the process towards the end.

Sabita Shrestha, Program Management Assistant, USAID for helping out with the presentations at USAID.

The support staff of IDA for being solidly behind me in this work.

Dipak Gyawali, Chairman, IDA, for his comments on the draft report. I also am grateful to Dipak Gyawali for agreeing to write a preface to this volume.

Bal Krishna Khadka, Data Analyst at IDA and the co-author of this study, for designing the sample frame and for his inputs in data analysis, interpretation and report writing.

Hiranya Baral, Fieldwork Manager at IDA, for his skills in managing all the three fieldworks.

All the supervisors and enumerators in each of the three surveys for doing fantastic fieldwork.

Pawan Kumar Sen, Consultant Statistician at IDA, for regular technical support and feedback.

Bandana Gyawali Gautam, Research Officer at IDA, for preparing initial write-ups of the executive summary and the conclusion. I sincerely appreciate the thoroughness with which Bandana has proof-read the text.

Kiran Prasai, Research Associate at IDA, for generating Figures and tables and for preparing power point presentations. I also appreciate his inputs in finalizing the write-up on the political context.

Shuvechha Ghimire, Apprentice at IDA, for her inputs in preparing the write-up on the political context.

Bhola Prasad Koirala for designing the software for the data entry program.

Prashanta Aryal, Editor, Nepal Rastriya Saptahik, and Keshav Poudel, Editor, Spotlight Fortnightly for agreeing to publish the main findings of the surveys in their respective magazines.

Perry Thapa for thoroughly copy editing the text.

Chiran Ghimire for layout, formatting and cover page designing.

Jagadamba Press for printing the report.

Sudhindra Sharma, PhD
Principal Investigator & Executive Director, IDA

Executive summary

General background

Nepal Contemporary Political Situation (NCPS) is a longitudinal, nationwide public opinion survey series that maps changes and continuities in the opinions of the public as these relate to contemporary politics. Upto 2008, Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) had carried out five public opinion surveys in this series.

In 2010 and 2011 IDA carried out three nationwide public opinion surveys with financial support from Nepal Transition Initiative (NTI) under USAID, and Chemonics International helped administer the grant. This volume puts together the data of the three surveys into one single longitudinal format for comparison with NCPS I to V. The first of the three surveys, which is the sixth in the series undertaken by IDA (regarded as NCPS VI), was carried out between August 19, 2010 and September 11, 2010. For the sake of simplicity this survey is referred to as the August 2010 survey. The second survey, the seventh in the series undertaken by IDA (regarded as NCPS VII), was carried out between January 31, 2011, and February 22, 2011, and is referred to as the February 2011 survey. The third survey, the eighth in the series undertaken by IDA (regarded as NCPS VIII), was carried out between June 10, 2011, and June 30, 2011, and is referred to as the June 2011 survey. This report compares the main findings of each of the three surveys, and, by doing so, maps the continuities and changes in public opinion. Where appropriate, comparisons between NCPS-VI, NCPS-VII, and NCPS-VIII, and earlier surveys undertaken in this series are made.

Country context and rationale

Five years have passed since the end of the Maoist conflict, and Nepal has been fortunate in that no new insurgency or full-fledged new conflict has erupted despite the fact that various armed groups, especially in the Tarai, have instigated sporadic violence.

The peace process, however, is not yet complete as several contentious issues have yet to be resolved. As of the period of writing this report i.e., September and October 2011, minors and late recruits among the PLA combatants have been discharged but are yet to be well-integrated into society and the question of what to do with the more than 19,000 combatants the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) ruled as genuine and who live in seven main cantonments across the country remains unanswered. Political parties have agreed in principle to the framework proposed by the Nepali Army for integrating

Maoist combatants into a fourth security apparatus, but the number and ranks of the Maoist combatants to be integrated and the modality of the process remain contentious issues.

There have been serious delays in the drafting of the constitution. Not only did the two-year mandate for the formulation of a new constitution lapse, but the Constituent Assembly (CA) used up the first one-year extension it gave itself and then a three-month extension to August 2011. It is currently working under a second three-month extension slated to end in November 2011.

Though the number of differences among political parties has been reduced drastically, serious differences remain, among them, the status of fundamental constitutional principles. The lack of consensus is one reason the constitution-formulation process has stalled.

Also worrisome is the fact that the past several months have witnessed serious rifts within all political parties and most serious among the UCPN-Maoist.

The three surveys were conducted during an important period in Nepal's history. NCPS-VI was conducted after the original two-year tenure of CA had expired (it did so in May 2010) and during the CA's first one-year extension. NCPS-VII was conducted in February 2011, still during the first extension, but when a caretaker government had been running the country for over six months and repeated elections for the position of prime minister were not yielding results. NCPS-VIII was held in June 2011, during the first three-months extension. Public opinion during this crucial historical juncture sheds light on how the people assessed the political situation and events of the day.

The main findings of each of these three surveys appeared as articles in Nepali in the weekly magazine, *Nepal Saptahik*, prepared soon after each of the surveys were underway. This report encapsulates the main findings of each of the three surveys in English.

Objectives

1. To delineate what the public identifies as the main problems at three levels – the personal, the local, and the national.
2. To document how the public evaluates the country's overall direction and situation.
3. To document how the public assesses the performance of the CA and CA representatives.
4. To identify the priorities of the public in the constitution-formulation process.
5. To map the public's perception of federalism.
6. To document how the public assesses the relationships among various peoples and communities in the areas they live in.
7. To gauge people's perception of the political parties and the issues associated with "new" Nepal.
8. To compare the findings of these three surveys with one another and with earlier NCPS surveys so that continuities and changes in the perceptions of the public on the above issues are clear.

Method

A pre-coded, structured questionnaire designed to address the survey's objectives was formulated, tested, and fine-tuned before it was administered to 3,000 respondents aged 18 and above employing random (probability) sampling technique. Sampling was done in five stages. In the first stage, 35 of Nepal's 75

districts were selected using stratified random sampling technique. In the second stage, proportional numbers of village development committees (VDCs) and/or municipalities were selected from every sample district through simple random sampling technique. Subsequently in the third stage, the VDC sample size was further distributed into wards. In the fourth stage, households in each sample ward were selected randomly by employing the Right-Hand-Rule technique. Finally in the fifth stage, a Kish grid was used to identify one member of the selected household to interview.

The margin of error is +/- 1.8 percent at a 95 percent confidence level at the national level. The survey does not claim the same level of precision at either the regional or the district levels.

Each survey employed about 50 field supervisors and enumerators with sufficient experience in survey methods.

Data was processed and analysed using the software programmes CPro, SPSS and MS Excel.

While for single response questions, the total percentage adds up to 100, for questions that ask for two responses or those that ask for multiple responses, the total exceeds 100 percent. The total percentage figure reflects the total of responses and not total of respondents.

The country's overall direction

An overwhelming majority of the people believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction and only a very small minority thinks the country is moving in the right direction – 59 percent and 6 percent respectively in June 2011. About 16 percent said that some things were moving in the right direction and some in the wrong and 19 percent did not know or could not say.

The most frequently mentioned reasons for respondents' negative assessment were that the nation's political parties had not formulated a new constitution, the country's situation had not stabilised, price were soaring, and the main political parties had not reached a consensus.

Problems identified at the personal, local and national levels

According to the June 2011 survey, the main problems that cause people anxiety personally were poverty (51 percent), price hike (28 percent), and unemployment (27 percent).

The major local-level problems identified were the lack of roads (38 percent), lack of a supply of domestic water (22 percent), unemployment (16 percent) and poverty (16 percent).

The major national-level problems identified were poverty (25 percent), unemployment (19 percent), price hikes (18 percent), uncertainty about the formulation of a new constitution (18 percent) and political uncertainty/instability (17 percent). While political uncertainty/instability is a fairly broad category and concern that the constitution will not be formulated is a very specific category, the two are closely interrelated: because of political instability, the constitution will not be formulated, and the constitution's not being formulated will add to political instability. About 35 percent of respondents were concerned about one or the other or both of these categories, making the interrelated concerns of political instability and non-formulation of a constitution the major national-level problem identified.

Assessment of the government of the day

Just under half of respondents to the June 2011 survey (49 percent) reported that the present central government did not have any positive features. In contrast, just 18 percent identified strengths – 5 percent commended the extension of the CA for another three months to formulate the draft constitution; 5 percent, progress in development activities; 4 percent, the introduction of a republic; and 4 percent, the increase in the prospects for a lasting peace.

About 30 percent said they thought that the major weakness of the present central government was its inability to complete the formulation of a new constitution. Other weaknesses include not controlling prices (16 percent), not normalising daily life (14 percent), not controlling corruption (14 percent), and not undertaking development activities (14 percent).

Expectations from the government

Over half of respondents to the June 2011 survey (52 percent) report that the government should prioritise constitution drafting, while 18 percent each said it should generate more employment and undertake development activities. Around 10-14 percent of respondents mentioned maintaining law and order, controlling price hikes, and overcoming poverty as key priorities.

Local government and its assessment

More people say that the performance of the present local government is bad (30 percent) or very bad (10 percent) than those who say it is good (30 percent) or very good (1 percent). A significant proportion, 22 percent, were unable to assess the local government and 5 percent said there was no local government in their areas.

Those who believe that the present local government is bad say so primarily because it has been unable to undertake local-level development activities and secondarily because the local government is unable to control corruption. Other, less popular reasons include the government's inability to maintain law and order (20 percent) and control price hikes (19 percent).

Those who believe that the present local government is good gave three key reasons, in order of descending preference – its undertaking of development activities, its provision of access to education, and its ability to maintain law and order.

The survey assessed peoples' perceptions of the district/local-level performance of political parties in general by asking respondents to score them on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being a very bad performance, 5 a neutral one, and 10 a very good one. The mean value was 4.1, a slightly negative assessment.

Constitutional issues

With regard to issues related to the peace process, respondents prioritise constitution-drafting followed by creating a national unity government, integrating Maoist combatants, and having Maoists return captured property. The proportion of respondents who say constitution-drafting is most important has been increasing rapidly, from 45 percent in August 2010 to 55 percent in February 2011 to 70 percent in

June 2011. Within a period of less than a year, those stating this reason increased by 25 percent points. Other issue related to peace process has remained same as in earlier surveys, though there have been some minor fluctuations.

With regard to the various issues being debated in the constituent assembly, the highest proportion – little less than one third - prioritized fundamental rights and directive principles. Around a quarter prioritized distribution of national/natural resources followed by restructuring the state. A sizeable proportion also identified preservation of national interest. The priorities received by the constitutional topics have been similar in all the three waves with the exception of distribution of national/natural resources. Those who mention distribution of national/natural resources has gone up by 7 percent in June 2011 compared to earlier two waves.

Source of information about constitutional issues

Over two third of respondents cited radio and another big majority cited television as the main source of information about constitutional issues being discussed in the constituent assembly. Third largest majority cited newspapers. Other sources cited are friends and relatives followed by people of own community, family members and other people in their community. A very small proportion of respondents mention the local political leaders (5 percent in June 2011). The survey underscores the fact that people get information about constitutional issues being debated in the CA through media rather than through the political parties.

Why the constitution has not been drafted

People blame the political parties for not formulating the constitution within the given time frame. The reason the constitution has not yet been drafted are: political parties focus on their own political goals rather than on focusing on drafting the constitution (48 percent); political parties are an irresponsible lot (42 percent); differences between political parties regarding important issues (20 percent); and the political parties focus on forming the government rather than drafting the constitution (21 percent).

Assessment of the CA representative

Majority of respondents (62 percent) reported that they consider the performance of the CA representative to be poor, including very poor (21 percent). Ten percent consider the performance of the CA representative to be good (including one percent who said it is very good). Over time, the proportion of those who hold the view that the CA is performing very badly has increased – it was 11 percent in August 2010 and increased by 10 percent points to reach 21 percent in June 2011.

As to why they consider the performance of the CA representative to be poor, the main reasons mentioned are: “they only consume state allowance and do not deliver anything” (41 percent), “unable to fulfill the expectations of the public” (40 percent), “inability to draft the constitution within the stipulated time frame” (40 percent), “political parties focus only on forming the government” (29 percent), “unable to promulgate the constitution within the given time frame” (20 percent) and “CA members do not have the technical known how to formulate constitution” (10 percent).

CA extension – the first three months

At a time when the CA was extended for the first three months (after the one year extension), a higher proportion disagreed with the extension than those who agreed (45 percent versus 26 percent). Significant proportions, 28 percent, were unable to disclose their opinion.

Those who disagreed with the extension of the CA did so because they thought that the constitution will not be formulated within the next three months; because the CA members only consume state allowance but do not deliver anything; and because a new constitution will never be formulated.

Those who agreed with the extension of the CA did so because they thought the new constitution will be formulated within the extended period, followed by those who were of the opinion that there is no other alternative.

When asked if the CA would be able to formulate the draft constitution within the extended three month period, 53 percent thought the CA would not be able to formulate the draft constitution within the extended three-month period. However, 9 percent of the populations thought the CA would be able to do so.

As to why the CA would not be able to formulate the draft constitution within the extended three months period, the reasons were: “political parties focus on their own political goals” (31 percent), “looking at their past performance it is unlikely that political parties will formulate the draft constitution” (23 percent) and “they have deliberately not formulated the new constitution so as to continually consume state allowances” (20 percent).

The survey asked, ‘To extend the duration of the CA for another three months, the three main political parties had entered into a 5-points agreement. If for some reason or the other, the 5-point agreement is not adhered to, what should be done - once again extend the CA duration or do not extend the CA duration?’ More people were against the extension of the CA (42 percent) than those who were for it (13 percent). Most of respondents (44 percent) reported that they cannot say anything regarding this issue.

Those who were of the opinion that the CA should not be extended, were asked an additional question. ‘If the duration of the CA would not be extended then it will collapse. In such circumstance, what should be done?’ A high proportion of respondents (36 percent) were of the opinion that in such circumstances, the date for the new elections for the CA should be announced. Around 12 percent were of the opinion that all contentious issues should be decided through referendum followed by the response ‘the people should revolt’ (10 percent), followed in turn by those who said ‘the king should come back and should begin to rule’ (9 percent).

The peace process

As to how the weapons of Maoist combatants/PLA should be managed within the extended 3 months, as high as 41 percent said that it should be given to the Nepal government, while 14 percent said it should be placed under the control of Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. Only 2 percent thought that it should remain under the control of the Maoists. A majority of the respondents, 43 percent, were unable to respond to this question.

In response to the question how many Maoist combatants/PLA should be integrated into the existing state security forces, 14 percent mentioned that Maoist combatants/PLA should not be integrated into state security forces. Some 7 percent opined that below 4,000 Maoist combatants/PLA should be integrated into the state security forces, followed by 4,001 to 6,000 (7 percent), 6,001 to 8,000 (3 percent), 8,001 to 10,000 (3 percent) and above 10,000 (11 percent). Over half (53 percent) of respondents were unable to give any response to this question. (This question had been asked in the June 2011 before the political parties had agreed on the number of Maoist combatants/PLA to be inducted into the Nepali Army.)

Local leadership

When taking all factors into consideration, the highest proportion of respondents said they trust family members (29 percent), followed by village/local elder (20 percent), followed in turn by those who said “I trust no one” (12 percent).

In response to the question ‘Who best do you think represents your political ideas?’ approximately one out of 5 respondents said that no one represents their own political ideas followed by one’s family member (13 percent), leaders of political party (11 percent) and important person in the village (9 percent).

The politics of identity

Those who like to identify themselves as Nepali only has increased significantly during the past three years. In response to the question, ‘How do you like to identify yourself?’ over two thirds of respondent (71 percent) mentioned in the survey undertaken in June 2011 that they like to identify themselves as Nepali only. Around one in five respondents reported they like to be identified equally as Nepali and with particular ethnicity/regions. Around 5 percent said they like to identify themselves with a particular ethnicity/region only. Two percent said they like to be identified as Nepali and a religious minority.

Respondents who like to be identified as Nepali only has increased from 53 percent in January 2008 to 58 percent in August 2010 to 70 percent in February 2011 to 71 percent in June 2011. Within the three year period those who like to be identified as Nepali only has increased by 18 percent points.

Federalism

Fifty four percent respondents reported hearing of federalism, 30 percent reported that they have not heard about it and 16 percent mention they don’t know or can’t say anything.

Proportion of those who said that they heard about federalism has been increasing - from 10 percent in September 2006 to 54 percent in June 2011 – an increase in 44 percent points in 5 years.

Majority of respondents cited radio (67 percent), television (50 percent) and newspaper (18 percent) as the main sources of information through which they get information about federalism. Seventy percent of those who said that they have heard about the federalism report that they know what federalism means.

The public’s level of support for federalism is 4.1 out of a scale of 0 to 10. Given that the score of 5

indicates an opinion that is neutral, average score of 4.1 indicates an opinion that is slightly negative towards federalism.

As to what they think should be the basis of federalism, over half of the respondents (57 percent) professed ignorance while a sizable proportion of 16 percent reported that Nepal should not be a federal state. Those who said it should be based on geography (east-west) are 7 percent followed by those who felt it should be based on geography (north-south) (6 percent). Some 4 percent thought that it should be based on ethnicity.

With regard to what they anticipate with the implementation of federalism, as high as 59 percent said that they were not able to say anything on this issue. The next big proportion, 21 percent, mentioned that the Nepali state would disintegrate followed by those who held the view that Nepal would be weakened (13 percent). Eight percent were of the opinion that various caste/ethnic groups will begin fighting against one another. Those who reported positive expectations from federalism are lower in proportion than those whose expectations are negative.

Relationships between various entities in the local area

The survey attempted to gauge the views of the people regarding various types of inter-personal and inter-community relationships between the people residing in a particular area. Majority of respondents mentioned that the various types of relationship have improved compared to the past 3/4 years. Of the various types of relationships, the proportion of those who said that the concerned relationship has improved, is relatively higher for the following - for members of same household, members of the same caste/ethnic community and between men and women in general. The proportion of those who say the relationship has improved is relatively low for the following - between people of hill-origin and Madhesi-origin, between rich and poor and between those who hold different political views.

Voting preference of the public

A large proportion reported not voting in the April 2008 CA election (25 percent). Around one out of five respondents (21 percent) reported voting for CPN-Maoist followed by NC (17 percent) and CPN-UML (11 percent). A sizable proportion (9 percent) of the population refused to divulge which party they voted for, while another 11 percent said they cannot say. The response to this question indicates that the political preference of the sample broadly matches that of the actual 2008 elections.

The reasons for voting for specific political parties are very different. For those who were voting for CPN Maoist, the main reason was “I want to try out this party once” followed by “it is a new political party”. For those who were voting for Nepali Congress the main reasons were: “This is an old political party”, “I was told to do so by my family members” and “I like the principles the party stand for”. The main reasons for voting for CPN UML were: “This is an old political party”, “I like the principles the party stand for”, and “I like the candidate who has stood from the political party”. The main reasons for voting for MJF were: “I was told to do so by my family members”, “It is a new political party” and “My friends are voting for it”.

With regard to the question, ‘If a new election were to be held today, which political party you would vote for?’ 57 percent said don’t know/cannot say and another 11 percent refused to answer this question.

Proportion of those who said they would vote for Nepali Congress is 10 percent, those who said they would vote for UCPN-M is 7 percent and CPN UML is 5 percent. A sizable proportion, 7 percent, emphatically said that they will not vote. Compared to August 2010 and February 2011, the proportion of respondents who said 'don't know/cannot say' has increased by as much as 10 percent points in June 2011.

Democracy with monarchical institution versus democracy without monarchical institution

More respondents preferred democracy without monarchical institution (52 percent) than democracy with monarchical institution (38 percent). Among those who preferred democracy with monarchical institution and among those who preferred democracy without monarchical institution, the mean support is the same - 7.8 in a scale of 0 to 10.

Hindu state versus secular state

Fifty six percent were of the opinion that Nepal should be a Hindu state, while some 37 percent were of the opinion that Nepal should be a secular state. Around 7 percent professed ignorance on this matter. The results of each of the three surveys are very similar – a comfortable majority expressed clear preference for a Hindu state. Among those who preferred Hindu state, in average, gave 8.6 points in a scale of 0 to 10, while those who preferred secular state allocated, in average, 8.1 points in a scale of 0 to 10. This indicates that there is a strong commitment among both the groups for the type of state of their choice.

People's level of trust towards organizations and institutions

The survey sought to examine the public's level of trust towards various institutions and organizations. The highest average level of trust was for the media in general – radio (mean value 6.5), T.V. (mean value 6.1) and newspaper (mean value 5.7). The lowest average level of trust was for political parties in general (mean value 2.6) and political youth groups (mean value 2.8). The average level of trust was relatively high for Nepali Army (5.3), civil society/NGOs (5.3) and religious organization (mean value 5.1) and Election Commission (4.9). Though the above mentioned figures are for the June 2011 survey, the pattern is similar for the February 2011 survey. However, the level of trust of the people towards all organizations and institutions, with the exception of the radio, has come down in June 2011 compared to February 2011.

1. Introduction

1.1 General background and context

After the People's Movement of April 2006 and elections to the Constituent Assembly (CA) in April 2008, two tasks headed Nepal's national agenda: the drafting of a new constitution and bringing the peace process to a logical conclusion. What the latter means in practice is integrating into the state security forces those Maoists combatants who were identified as being qualified by the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and rehabilitating in society those who were not. By the beginning of 2010 it was evident that there had been very little achievement on either front.

As the UNMIN's mandate drew near its end in February 2010, controversy over UNMIN's role intensified. While the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) supported the UNMIN's continued stay in Nepal, other political parties were of the opinion that the Nepali Army, because it was the national army of a sovereign nation could not be monitored by an international agency like the UNMIN indefinitely. The latter parties accused UNMIN of having a soft spot for the UCPN-M and of being incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities and mandate. Despite the controversy, Madhav Kumar Nepal's government extended the UNMIN's mandate until September 5, 2010.

On March 20, 2010, Girija Prasad Koirala, the president of the Nepali Congress, a many-time prime minister of Nepal, and the person who led the People's Movement of April 2008, passed away. His loss was great as he was one of the architects of the 12-point memorandum of understanding with the Maoists, the co-signer of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) agreed in November 2006, and the coordinator of a high-level political mechanism formed to assist in the peace process and constitution-writing. No other political leader had interacted with the Maoist leaders as closely as Koirala or had gained as much of their trust and confidence. After his demise, the rift between the UCPN-M and the other political parties grew.

Following Prime Minister Dahal's resignation on 25 May, 2009, the UCPN-M began holding street protests of various forms; these continued into 2010, when the party changed its slogan from "civilian supremacy" to "national independence/sovereignty." It later focused on securing the resignation of Prime Minister Nepal and the formation of a consensus government headed by the Maoists. In the name of this goal, it conducted a major six-day-long general strike from May 2 to 7, 2010.

On 28 May, 2010, the CA's tenure was extended for one year by an eleventh hour agreement among the major three political parties, UCPN-M, Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-

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United Marxist Leninists (CPN-UML). The agreement, penned as a three-point deal, stipulated that Prime Minister Nepal resign and that a national consensus government be formed.

Four weeks later, on 30 June, 2010, Prime Minister Nepal resigned. The CA was unable to form a consensus government and agreed instead to elect a majority government. However, the country continued to remain headed by a caretaker government for more than six months, during which time the CA tried and failed to elect a new prime minister 18 times. Their failure saw a rise in critical press and public anger. After the 17th unsuccessful attempt, on November 10, 2010, the Supreme Court asked the speaker of the CA to end the inconclusive polling by, as it put it, 'reconsidering the constitutional provision regarding the election'. An election bylaw was adjusted to ensure that a prime minister would be elected at least in the second attempt, and Jhala Nath Khanal became Nepal's new prime minister on 6 February, 2011.

With regard to the constitution-drafting process, the political parties have been able to narrow down their differences in part through the formation of a high-level task force which functions as a sub-committee within the constitutional committee on October 11, 2010. Out of the 220 issues identified as disputable among the political parties, about 200 have been resolved. The remaining few difference continue to remain very contentious. The concerned sub committee's tenure has been repeatedly extended – to little avail.

When the UNMINS's twice extended mandate terminated on 5 September, 2010, debates about whether or not to extend it again intensified once again. The debate concluded in a four point agreement in which Nepal's political parties agreed to ask the UN Secretary General to extend the UNMIN for four months, to 15 January, 2011, in order to tie up its remaining work.

The twelfth general convention of the Nepali Congress, held in Kathmandu in September 2010, elected a new central committee with Sushil Koirala as its president. The convention was seen as particularly important since, after the demise of NC top figure Girija Prasad Koirala six months before, the party's stand on peace process, constitution drafting and its general behavior with Maoists would largely be determined by it. In the following months, the new central committee emphasized that past accords made with the UCPN-M be implemented, a demand that saw the serious differences it had with the UCPN-M with regards to peace and constitution come to the fore.

Madhav Kumar Nepal's caretaker government announced the budget for the fiscal year 2010/11 through an ordinance on November 20, 2010. Government's preparation to table a full budget in parliament ended with a confrontation with Maoist lawmakers in the house. The country was already running on advance budget presented on July 12, 2010.

UCPN-M's plenum meet in Palungtar, Gorkha in November 2010 highlighted the sharp ideological divisions among the top leadership. A document stating 'people's revolt' as the ultimate goal of the party and 'peace and constitution' as short term strategy was passed. Those leaders who believed that the only line the party ought to adopt was 'peace and constitution' wrote a note of dissent to the plenum decision.

On January 14, 2011, just one day before UNMIN's scheduled exit, the government and the UCPN-M agreed to set up a six-member mechanism headed by the prime minister to take over the responsibilities of the UNMIN. A week later, the chain of command of the UCPN-M's People's Liberation Army (PLA) was handed over to the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) on January 22, 2011 amid a grand ceremony organized at Shaktikhor cantonment site in Chitwan. The handing over of the chain

of command of the PLA has since remained controversial with major political parties saying that this has been ceremonial with de-facto control still in Maoist hands. Among the Maoists, a faction disagreed on principle with the handover itself.

On February 3, 2011, Jhala Nath Khanal was elected prime minister as the head of a coalition government with the UCPN-M and a few other small parties. The coalition was made possible when the UCPN-M and a faction of the CPN-UML struck, what others allege to be a “secret” seven-point deal just before the election. The deal, besides ensuring the election of Jhala Nath Khanal as the new prime minister with Maoist support, had clauses that guaranteed future cooperation between the two parties in the formation of a government and the integration of Maoist combatants. Once the nature of the deal was made public after the election, heated debates erupted within the CPN-UML and among other parties.

On February 27, 2011, the Nepali Army proposed setting up a separate directorate inside its organisational structure for the integration of PLA combatants. The directorate, as proposed, was to draw its personnel from the Nepali Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police and PLA in different proportions. The UCPN-M and other major stakeholders in the peace process cautiously welcomed this proposal while expressing minor reservations regarding its details. As of the end of June 2011, differences still remain regarding the mode of integration (whether to accept bulk entry or require every individual to meet, with a few adjustments, the Nepali Army’s criteria) as well as the number and rank of those integrated.

While intra-party rifts have been common in most of Nepal’s political parties, two major madhesh-based parties split formally over differences regarding their participation in Jhala Nath Khanal’s government: the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Nepal (MJF-N) split off on 23 May, 2011; five months earlier, a faction of the Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP) had split off and registered a new party.

On February 23, 2011, in response to a writ filed against the extension of CA tenure by one year, the SC had issued a verdict: it stated that the two year deadline for drafting the new constitution mentioned in the Interim Constitution was not a mandatory provision, but a directory one. On 25 May, 2011, the Supreme Court issued an order stating that the tenure of the CA could be extended only by six months and that making such an extension indefinitely would be against the spirit of the Interim Constitution, and in doing so, overruled the earlier decision.

CA’s one year extension came to an end on 28 May, 2011. On that very day, the parties reached a last minute deal to extend the CA tenure by another three months; just as it had the previous year, the deal stipulated that the prime minister would resign and that a national consensus government would be formed. The fact that the extension was only three months seemed to be in part in response to the Supreme Court’s verdict of the previous month.

As a first move to implement the five-point deal signed before the CA tenure extension, UCPN-M, on June 1, 2011 decided to put an end to dual security enjoyed by its top leaders and in the subsequent days, majority of PLA combatants deployed for the security of party leaders were sent back to camps. One faction of the UCPN-M led by Party vice-chairman Mohan Baidhya refused to do so arguing relieving the fighters of this duty would humiliate the PLA.

The government presented its annual budget for the fiscal year 2011/12 on July 15, 2011. The government had to work hard to assure the Samyukta Lokantrik Madhesi Morcha that the latter’s demands will be addressed before the budget could be presented in the parliament. The Morcha demanded the

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incorporation of infrastructure projects in the Tarai, including the East West Railway and some relief packages to families of martyrs of the Madhesi movement.

As of the end of June 2011, the two tasks identified as Nepal's national agendas – the drafting of a new constitution and the closure of the peace process – remained incomplete. In spite of repeated extensions of the deadlines for their completion, the political parties currently represented in the CA were unable to deliver.

One key feature marking Nepali politics subsequent to the April 2008 CA election is political instability. Though the Interim Constitution initially called for a consensus government this provision was amended to allow for the competitive election of the position of the president and a prime minister. The amendment has meant that the governments formed through a majority of votes in the legislative-parliament have not been able to last for long, for the simple reason that no single political party commands a majority. Governments that have been formed subsequent to the CA election have been coalition, not consensus, governments and all have been ephemeral because of the opposition of other political parties and factionalism within political parties. Moreover, political parties' attention towards making and unmaking of governments has resulted in shifting their attention away from the twin tasks of constitution drafting and wrapping up the peace process. In this way, political instability served to accentuate the delay in accomplishing the national agenda.

1.2 Objectives

The main objectives of the three surveys undertaken in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 were to document the public's perceptions of contemporary politics and political issues. The specific objectives were as follows:

- To delineate what the public identifies as the main problems at three levels –the personal, the local, and the national.
- To document how the public evaluates the country's overall direction and situation.
- To document how the public assesses the performance of the constituent assembly and constituent assembly representatives.
- To identify the priorities of the public in the constitution-formulation process.
- To map the public's perception of federalism.
- To document how the public assesses the relationships among various peoples and communities in the areas they live in.
- To gauge people's perception on the political parties and the issues associated with "new" Nepal.
- To compare the findings of these three surveys with one another and with earlier waves of NCPS so as to map continuities and changes in the perceptions of the public on the above issues.

1.3 Method

The method and sample size for the opinion polls which were conducted in August 2010, February 2011 and June 2011 were the same. A nationwide survey with a sample size of 3,000 respondents aged 18 and above was undertaken by employing random (probability) sampling technique. These 3,000 respondents


were spread across 35 districts. This size of sample produces results with +/- 1.8 percent of the error margin at a 95 percent confidence level at the national level.

As is outlined below, sampling for the selection of respondents was done in five stages.

Nepal can be divided along its north-south and east-west axis. Along the north-south axis fall the three ecological regions - mountains, hills and the Tarai. Along the east-west axis lie its five development regions: the eastern, central, western, mid-western and far western. Considering both parameters – ecological region and development region – the country can be grouped into 15 distinct eco-development regions. Kathmandu valley can be treated as a separate region because it is the seat of the capital city and it has a large population. These 16 eco-development regions constituted the “strata”: every stratum tends to have distinct physical, cultural-linguistic and social features. Within any given stratum there is a high degree of homogeneity, while across strata there is some degree of heterogeneity.

In the first stage, 35 of Nepal’s 75 districts were selected using stratified random sampling technique (i.e., representing all the 16 strata outlined above). The number of districts from a particular stratum was decided by employing proportional allocation. The total sample size of 3,000 respondents was proportionally distributed across these sample districts.

Figure 1.1: Sample design



In the second stage, proportional numbers of village development committees (VDCs) and/or municipalities were selected from every sample district using the simple random sampling technique. The numbers of sample VDCs selected varied according to the size of the sample districts. One VDC was selected for every 20 respondents. Thus, if, for example 40 respondents were to be selected from a sample district, two VDCs, each with around 20 respondents, were selected.

In the third stage, each selected VDC was divided into wards. For a VDC sample size of 20, two wards were selected using simple random sampling. Then, 10 respondents were selected from each ward. Urban respondents were selected from all the municipalities in each of the sample districts. (See Annexes IIIA, IIIB and IIIC for the lists of districts, VDCs, wards and number of respondents in each ward which each of the three studies surveyed.)

In the fourth stage, households in each sample ward were selected randomly by employing the Right-Hand-Rule technique¹. Finally in the fifth stage, a member of each selected household was selected using a Kish-grid². Using the grid ensures that each eligible member in a selected household has an equal and probable chance of being selected.

VDC/Municipality and their replacements

The sampling frame of the survey conducted in June 2011 consisted of 152 VDCs/Municipalities spread across 35 districts. None of the originally sampled VDCs or municipalities had to be replaced in this wave.

The sampling frame of the survey conducted in February 2011 consisted of 150 VDCs/Municipality spread across 35 districts. Of the originally sampled 150 VDCs, six had to be replaced, three because the field team grew ill and three because they were so remote it would not have been possible to cover them within the stipulated time frame. The six VDCs that had to be replaced were sampled once again and then surveyed.

In the survey conducted in August 2010, the sampling frame consisted of 151 VDCs/Municipalities spread across 35 districts, eight of which had to be replaced because heavy monsoon rains had either washed away the access road or trail to that VDC or inundated the concerned VDC.

Questionnaire

A pre-coded structured questionnaire was formulated with the help of experts within the team, first in English and then, for administration in the field, in Nepali. A trial run was carried out and the questionnaire fine-tuned before its actual administration. The length of the questionnaire was restricted so that administering it would not take more than 30 minutes. In regions and communities where the mother tongue is a language other than Nepali, interviewers were asked to translate the questions into the local language (without however deviating from the meaning underlying the question.)

Fieldwork

Field supervisors and interviewers with sufficient experience were employed for the fieldwork. In the selection of field supervisors and interviewers, local people conversant in the local language were given preference. While selecting the districts, ecological regions, local ethnic-caste makeup and gender balance were taken into consideration. The interviewers were supervised by field supervisors.

Before deploying the field supervisors and the enumerators in the field, they participated in a two-day orientation training program to familiarize them with the survey research methodology, their roles and responsibilities, the plan of field operations, and the sampling techniques used. They were also briefed about the structured questionnaire so that they become fully familiar with the intention of

1 The starting point for the “Right-Hand-Rule” are recognizable location such as a school, crossroad, *chautara*, or bazaars. From a given starting point the interviewer walks in a random direction until he or she reaches an ending point counting the number of households along the route. If there are fewer than 20, the interviewer will select the first 10 households on the right hand side to interview. If there are 20 to 29, the interviewer selects the first household and every third household on the right hand side until 10 have been interviewed and if there are 30 or more households, he or she interviews the first and every fourth household.

2 Kish-grid is a table of random numbers where one individual is randomly selected for the interview from a list of all household members above 18 years of age.

each of the questions. They were instructed on how to add clarification to a question and encourage the respondents if they are confused or hesitant to answer during the interview. To test their capacity, they conducted a mock survey on each other. The field supervisors were provided additional training in field supervision.

1.4 Data processing and analysis

Data was processed and analysed using the software programmes Epi-Info, SPSS and MS Excel. A data entry programme was created using the Epi-info software. In order to maintain the data clean, legal codes, authorised range check, consistency check, and extreme case check systems was developed in the data entry programme. Once entered, the data was imported into the SPSS software for analysis and presentation in a tabular form. MS Excel was then used to produce figures and graphs from the analysed data.

1.5 Schedule

The schedule of the survey which was conducted in June 2011 is as given below:

- Pre-test : June 2, 2011
- Training for field staff : June 7 & 8, 2011
- Fieldwork commencement : June 10, 2011
- Fieldwork completion : June 30, 2011

The schedule of the February 2011 survey is given below:

- Pre-test : 21 January 2011
- Training for field staff : 26 & 27 January 2011
- Fieldwork commencement : 31 January 2011
- Fieldwork completion : 22 February 2011

The schedule of the August 2010 survey is given below:

- Pre-test : August 8, 2010
- Training for field staff : August 16 & 17, 2010
- Fieldwork commencement : August 19, 2010
- Fieldwork completion : September 11, 2010

1.6 Organisation of the report

This report, which covers NCPS VI, VII, and VIII, presents a longitudinal analysis of the latest three surveys, which were conducted in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 respectively. Their findings are also compared with surveys conducted by IDA at different time periods in the past. The findings obtained from the analysis of both single and multiple response questions are presented as percentages whereas the findings obtained from the analysis of the questions where people's feelings are measured on a scale of 0 to 10 are presented as mean values. Where a significant relationship exists, they have been disaggregated by various variables such as development regions, ecological regions, urban-rural settlement, sex, age, educations and caste/ethnicity.

While for single response questions, the total percentage adds up to 100, for questions that ask for two responses or those that ask for multiple responses, the total exceeds 100 percent. The total percentage figure reflects the total of responses and not total of respondents.

The report is divided into 12 chapters.

Chapter 1 outlines the general background and context, the objectives, and the methodology of the study. Chapter 2 describes the demographic, geographic and social composition of the sample populations as well as the educational and occupational status of the respondents and their household expenditure. Wherever possible, the characteristics of the sample are compared with those of the general population of Nepal as reported in the census of 2001. Chapter 3 discusses the major problems facing the people of Nepal at the personal, local and national levels, while Chapter 4 highlights perceptions of the people regarding the country's overall direction and situation and the reasons for thinking so. It also presents their assessment of central and local government. Chapter 5 discusses the CA and constitutional issues, in particular how people assess the CA representatives and, the peace process, how they acquire information about the CA, and why they think the constitution has not been formulated within the given time frame. This chapter also includes people's views regarding the integration and rehabilitation of PLA combatants and the management of weapons/arms of Maoist and as well as 5-point agreement signed by the three main political parties. Chapter 6 explores perceptions of identity – how people chose to identify themselves – and of local leadership, while Chapter 7 discusses issues related to peace, particularly the status of PLA combatants and whether or not people think the peace will be enduring. Chapter 8 highlights the surveys' findings about federalism; it includes public's perceptions of, expectations for, support for, and basis of the establishment of federated units. Chapter 9 discusses relationships between various entities in the local area, including relationships between men and women, among various caste/ethnic and religious groups, between people of hill and madhesi origin, between the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated, and the so called high and low castes. It also examines relationships among members of the same household and the same caste/ethnic community. Chapter 10 highlights the findings related to issues associated with "new" Nepal and Nepal's political parties. It discusses the people's preference for political parties and the reasons behind their preference, for democracy with or without a monarchy, and for a Hindu versus a secular state. This chapter also discusses how much people trust various institutions and organisations as well as how popular various political leaders are. Chapter 11 concludes the study.

The various annexes of the report include a map of Nepal highlighting the districts sampled in each survey, a digital version of the survey's cross-tabulations (see the attached CD), the distribution of the sampled VDCs/municipalities in each survey, lists of the researchers involved in each survey, and the digital version of the questionnaire administered during the survey (see the attached CD).

1.7 Limitation

Since the last nationwide public opinion in this series was undertaken in June 2011, the findings of this report reflect the opinions of the public only till June 2011 and not of subsequent political events.

2. Sample characteristics

2.1 Social composition

The latest three waves of the NCPS, i.e., NCPS VI-VIII, were administered in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 respectively to three thousand respondents spread across Nepal's three ecological regions and five development regions and thirty five districts of Nepal. The first wave covered 151 VDCs/municipalities; the second, 150; and the third, 152.

The sample characteristics of the survey conducted closely reflect those of the general population as recorded during the census of 2001. However, since some caste/ethnic groups are slightly over-or under-represented in the August 2010 and June 2011 samples, a weighting¹ factor was assigned to each group in order to make it representative of the general population. No weighting factor was assigned to the February 2011 sample as it already was representative as far as caste/ethnic representation was concerned. A detailed breakdown of the caste/ethnic groups of both the June 2011 sample and the general population as recorded in the census of 2001 is presented in Table 2.1.

To facilitate analysis, the over five dozen caste/ethnic communities surveyed were categorised into eight broad groups: Hill Caste (Chhetri, Bahun, Thakuri, Sanyasi, etc.), Hill Ethnic (Magar, Tamang, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sherpa, etc.), Hill Dalit (Kami, Sarki, Damai, etc.), Newar, Madhesi Caste (Yadav, Teli, Tarai Brahman, Rajput, etc.), Tarai-Madhesi Ethnic (Tharu, Rajbanshi, etc.), Madhesi Dalit (Chamar, Musahar, Dusadh, etc.) and Muslim. Table 2.2 shows the composition of each broad group in the sample of all waves.

These eight broad caste/ethnic groups were further collapsed into two broad categories of origin: Non-Madhesi (Hill Caste, Hill Ethnic, Hill Dalit and Newar) and Madhesi (Madhesi Caste, Tarai-Madhesi Ethnic, Madhesi Dalit and Muslim) to facilitate further comparison and analysis (see Table 2.3).

¹ If the constituent populations of a sample are not perfectly consistent with those of the general population, weightage can be used to make them consistent. All three samples were consistent with variables such as age, sex, religion, rural-urban settlement, ecological region, and development region, but caste and ethnicity are not entirely representative in two. To adjust them, those groups which are over-represented, under-represented and perfectly represented received weighting factors of less than 1, more than 1 and 1 respectively. All further statistical analysis was done on the basis of the weighted samples.

Table 2.1: Sample composition by caste/ethnic groups

Caste/Ethnic group	Actual Sample (%)	Weighted Sample (%)	Population (%)	Caste/Ethnic group	Actual Sample (%)	Weighted Sample (%)	Population (%)
Chhetri	12.3	15.8	15.8	Kanu	0.2	0.4	0.4
Bahun	12.0	12.7	12.7	Rajbansi	0.7	0.4	0.4
Magar	7.9	7.1	7.1	Sudhi	1.3	0.4	0.4
Tharu	5.6	6.8	6.8	Lohar	0.5	0.4	0.4
Tamang	6.3	5.6	5.6	Tatma	0.4	0.3	0.3
Newar	5.2	5.5	5.5	Khatwe	0.3	0.3	0.3
Muslim	3.9	4.3	4.3	Majhi	0.0	0.3	0.3
Yadav	4.8	3.9	3.9	Dhobi	0.5	0.3	0.3
Kami/BK	2.8	3.9	3.9	Nuniya	0.1	0.3	0.3
Rai	3.2	2.8	2.8	Kumhar	0.5	0.2	0.2
Gurung	2.1	2.4	2.4	Chepang	0.0	0.2	0.2
DamaiPariyar	1.4	1.7	1.7	Halwai	0.8	0.2	0.2
Limbu	3.9	1.6	1.6	Rajput	0.5	0.2	0.2
Thakuri	2.0	1.5	1.5	Kayastha	0.2	0.2	0.2
Sarki/Mijar	0.9	1.4	1.4	Marwadi	0.1	0.2	0.2
Teli	2.8	1.3	1.3	Satar	0.1	0.2	0.2
Chamar	1.6	1.2	1.2	Jhangar	0.3	0.2	0.2
Koiri	0.7	1.1	1.1	Bantar	0.1	0.2	0.2
Kurmi	1.3	0.9	0.9	Barai	0.4	0.2	0.2
Sanyasi	0.2	0.9	0.9	Kahar	0.3	0.2	0.2
Dhanuk	0.7	0.8	0.8	Gangai	1.1	0.1	0.1
Musahar	0.3	0.8	0.8	Lodha	0.0	0.1	0.1
Sherpa	0.1	0.8	0.8	Rajbhar	0.0	0.1	0.1
Dusadh	0.9	0.7	0.7	Dhimal	0.0	0.1	0.1
Sonar	0.1	0.6	0.6	Bhote	1.3	0.1	0.1
Kewat	1.2	0.6	0.6	Yakha	0.0	0.1	0.1
T. Brahman	0.9	0.6	0.6	Darai	0.1	0.1	0.1
Baniya	0.9	0.6	0.6	Tajpuriya	0.3	0.1	0.1
Gharti/Bhujel	0.2	0.5	0.5	Thakali	0.0	0.1	0.1
Kalwar	0.9	0.5	0.5	Mali	0.1	0.1	0.1
Mallaha	0.7	0.5	0.5	Bangali	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kumal	0.4	0.4	0.4	Gandharva	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hajam	0.3	0.4	0.4	Badi	0.1	0.0	0.0
Sunuwar	0.6	0.4	0.4	Others	0.3	3.0	3.0
				Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2.2: Sample composition by broad caste/ethnic group

Broad caste/Ethnic group	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Hill Caste	30.9	32.3	30.9
Hill Ethnic	21.1	21.8	21.2
Hill Dalit	8.1	8.4	8.1
Newar	5.5	6.6	5.5
Madhesi Caste	17.6	15.9	17.7
Tarai-Madhesi Ethnic	8.2	7.5	8.2
Madhesi Dalit	4.3	3.1	4.2
Muslim	4.3	4.3	4.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2.3: Caste/ethnicity of the respondents by origin

Sample	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Non-Madhese	65.6	69.2	65.6
Madhese	34.4	30.8	34.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

The religion wise breakdown of samples reflects the actual concentration of the population in terms of various religions. In the June 2011 survey, Hindu respondents constituted 83 percent of the sample, while another 8 percent of the sample is constituted of Buddhist respondents. Similarly, Muslims are 4 percent, Christians are 2 percent and Kirat are 3 percent of the sample. In the sample of all three waves, Hindu respondents are slightly over represented and Buddhist are underrepresented compared to the national figure as specified in the 2001 census.

Table 2.4: Sample composition by religion

Religion	Population (%)	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Hindu	80.7	83.5	84.3	82.7
Buddhist	10.7	8.3	8.1	8.0
Muslim	4.2	4.1	4.6	4.2
Christian	0.5	1.6	1.0	1.8
Kirat	3.6	2.3	1.7	2.9
Atheist	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

2.2 Demographic composition

Out of total three thousand respondents interviewed in the survey, 85.5 percent were from rural areas and 14.5 percent from urban areas. The comparison of sample by rural urban settlement of all three waves is presented in table 2.5.

Table 2.5: Sample composition by settlement pattern

Residence	Population (%)	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Rural	86.1	85.4	86.0	85.5
Urban	13.9	14.6	14.0	14.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Equal numbers of males and females were surveyed as the general population of 2001 showed a balanced sex ratio.

Table 2.6: Sample composition by sex

Sex	Population (%)	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Female	50.1	49.7	50.0	49.5
Male	49.9	50.3	50.0	50.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In each survey, roughly one-quarter of the respondents were from each of four broad age groups: 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, and over 45 (see Table 2.7).

Table 2.7: Sample composition by age group

Age group	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
18-25	26.0	23.0	25.3
26-35	26.5	26.1	27.0
36-45	20.3	21.5	20.9
Above 45	27.2	29.3	26.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

For all three surveys, the distribution of respondents was representative of the age group composition of the general population of 2001, which was recorded in 10-year age cohorts. In June 2011, the adjusted age composition included 31 percent of respondents aged 20-29; 26 percent aged 30-39; 19 percent aged 40-49; 12 percent aged 50-59; 8 percent aged 60-69; 3 percent aged 70-79; and 1 percent aged 80 or above.

Table 2.8: Sample population by 10 years age group

Age group	Population (%)	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
20-29	33.9	32.0	29.3	30.8
30-39	24.7	24.8	24.3	26.1
40-49	17.4	19.8	21.0	19.2
50-59	11.9	11.3	13.4	11.9
60-69	7.5	8.5	8.6	8.1
70-79	3.6	2.7	2.8	3.2
80 +	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The disaggregation of the sample by marital status of the respondents is presented in the table below. In the sample, overwhelming majority of respondents, 80 percent, were married and around 15 percent were unmarried and 5 percent widowed. As Table 2.9 below indicates, there was little change in these proportions over the course of the three surveys.

Table 2.9: Sample composition by marital status

Marital Status	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Married	79.8	82.4	79.9
Unmarried	15.0	12.8	14.9
Widowed	4.7	4.5	4.7
Divorced	0.3	0.1	0.2
Separated	0.2	0.2	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

2.3 Geographic composition

As tables 2.10 and 2.11 below indicate, in all three surveys, the composition of the sample in terms of ecology and development regions closely matches that of the general population.

Table 2.10: Sample composition by ecological region

Ecological Region	Population (%)	Aug 2010 Sample (%)	Feb 2011 Sample (%)	Jun 2011 Sample (%)
Mountain	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.4
Hill	44.3	43.3	44.2	45.1
Tarai	48.4	49.5	48.5	47.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2.11: Sample composition by development region

Development Region	Population (%)	Aug 2010 (%)	Feb 2011 (%)	Jun 2011 (%)
EDR	23.1	21.5	23.1	21.1
CDR	34.7	38.6	34.6	33.9
WDR	19.7	18.4	19.7	20.8
MWDR	13.0	12.3	13.0	13.2
FWDR	9.5	9.2	9.5	10.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

2.4 Educational status

In all three surveys, the composition of the respondents in terms of educational achievement was similar though the proportion of respondents who have completed at least the School Leaving Certification (SLC) is slightly higher in the first and third wave surveys than in the second wave. Table 2.12 below presents the details.

Table 2.12: Sample composition by educational status

Educational status	Aug 2010 (%)	Feb 2011 (%)	Jun 2011 (%)
Illiterate	29.4	28.3	28.3
Literate	16.8	16.9	15.1
Primary	9.0	10.5	11.9
Lower sec	10.2	11.6	11.1
Sec	8.4	11.8	6.6
SLC	14.6	9.5	14.6
Inter	9.2	8.7	9.0
Bachelor	2.3	2.7	3.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

2.5 Occupation and income composition

Table 2.13 below shows the main occupations of the respondents. In all three surveys, around half of all respondents work in agriculture, one-tenth work in business or industry, and one-tenth are homemakers.

Table 2.13: Sample composition by occupation

Main occupation	Aug 2010 (%)	Feb 2011 (%)	Jun 2011 (%)
Agriculture	51.4	49.5	51.3
Industry/Business	8.9	11.2	10.7
Service	7.0	6.9	8.1
Labour	6.9	7.6	7.2
Student	9.0	6.7	7.3
Home maker	12.4	15.1	12.5
Retired	1.1	1.1	1.2
Unemployed	3.3	1.9	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

With regard to the main source of household income, the composition of all three surveys was similar: the majority of respondents report agriculture, followed by industry and/or business, service in the country and wage labour in the locality. In June 2011 about 5.5 percent reported that remittance was their main source of income.

Table 2.14: Sample composition by main source of income

Main source of income	Aug 2010 (%)	Feb 2011 (%)	Jun 2011 (%)
Agriculture	62.6	56.5	61.2
Industry/Business	11.3	13.6	13.1
Service within the country	9.3	11.0	10.4
Remittance (service outside the country)	5.1	6.7	5.5
Wage-labour in the locality	10.4	10.9	8.3
Retirement pension	1.3	1.4	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2.15 below shows the monthly household expenses of respondents. The proportions of respondents who fall into one of five categories – less than Rs. 5,000 a month; Rs. 5,001-10,000; Rs. 10,001-20,000; Rs. 20,001-40,000; and more than Rs. 40,001 – are similar in all three surveys, with two-thirds to three-quarters spending Rs. 5,000-20,000.


Table 2.15: Sample composition by average monthly household expenditure

Monthly household expenses	Aug 2010 (%)	Feb 2011 (%)	Jun 2011 (%)
Less than Rs. 5,000	18.4	10.2	18.6
Rs. 5,001 - 10,000	34.3	38.3	40.5
Rs. 10,001 - 20,000	33.5	41.0	30.5
Rs.20,001 - 40,000	6.8	8.6	6.2
More than Rs. 40,000	0.9	0.9	0.7
Other	6.2	1.0	3.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

2.6 Quality of data

The enumerators were requested to monitor the actual interview process in order to ascertain the quality of data generated. An analysis of the concerned questions indicates that the majority of respondents showed no fear of responding to the questions (85%) and was not distracted during the interview process (90%). These two findings in conjunction suggest that the data generated was of high quality (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Fear and distraction during the interview
Respondent's condition during interview
(J5 and J6, Base=3,000)



3. Identification of problems


3.1 Personal level problems

The survey sought to explore the main problems facing the public at three levels – personal, local and national. The first question asked to all the 3,000 respondents was ‘What causes you anxiety personally?’ Respondents were allowed to identify up to two main problems. The possible choices of responses were not read out to respondent. Slightly over half – 51 percent – identified poverty as their major concern and equal proportions of respondents identified price hikes and unemployment (28 percent and 27 percent respectively) as their second and third most pressing concern. A significant proportion, 11 percent, claimed that the lack of development and infrastructure worries them. The lack of safety, political uncertainty/instability and uncertainty about the formulation of a new constitution were mentioned by a small proportion of respondents (7 percent for each response). Figure 3.1 below compares the respondents’ sources of anxiety across the three surveys.

Figure 3.1: Sources of personal anxiety in August 2010, February 2011, June 2011

What causes you anxiety personally?

(B1, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The issues that cause people personal anxiety is broadly the same in each of the three waves – poverty followed by price hikes and unemployment. Mention of the concern most cited, poverty, increased 6 percent from August 2010 to June 2011, while the mention of both unemployment and price hikes fell, by 6 percent and 3 percent respectively, between February and June 2011.

There are some variations in public’s views to this question across rural-urban settlements (see Figure 3.2) and educational level. The majority of respondents living in rural areas (55 percent) identified


poverty as their major personal problem while the majority of those living in urban areas (34 percent) identified price hikes. Poverty was in second place in urban areas while price hikes (28 percent) and unemployment (28 percent) were tied for second place in rural areas. The lack of safety was identified as a much more significant problem in urban areas (17 percent) than it was in rural areas (5 percent).

In terms of educational level, most respondents who are illiterate, literate and have attained education up to the secondary level identified poverty as a main source of anxiety, while those who have completed SLC or attained educational levels above this, identified unemployment as the issue that causes them the most anxiety.

Figure 3.2: Sources of personal anxiety by place of residence

What causes you anxiety personally?

(B1, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



3.2 Local level problems


Respondents were next asked about problems at the local level. In response to the question ‘What are the two major problems at the local level?’ the lack of road ranks the most frequently mentioned (38 percent) followed by the lack of domestic water (22 percent). Equal proportions of respondents, 16 percent, identified unemployment and poverty as the greatest local problems. Around the same proportion identified the lack of irrigation facilities (15 percent), price hikes (14 percent) and the lack of a regular supply of electricity (12 percent). Slightly fewer pointed to a lack of health (10 percent) and education (9 percent) facilities.

The major problems reported at the local level by the majority of respondents in June 2011 are similar to those they reported in the earlier two surveys (see Figure 3.3). Even though the lack of roads remains at the top, its priority has decreased gradually over time.

Figure 3.3: Local problems in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011


What are the two major problems at the local level?

(B2, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The local problems identified varied according to which type of settlement and which development region respondents live in (See Figure 3.4). In all development regions except in the Mid-West, where poverty was mentioned by the greatest proportion of respondents (26 percent), the lack of roads was identified as the foremost problem. Most respondents living in rural areas – 41 percent – also identified the lack of roads their biggest problem, while most living in urban areas – 32 percent – complained of a shortage of domestic water supply. The second major problems in rural and urban areas respectively were the lack of domestic water supply (20 percent) and price hikes (20 percent).


Figure 3.4: Local problems by development region
 What are the two major problems at the local level?
 (B2, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



3.3 National level problems

The third question in this series asked respondents to identify two major national-level major problems. In order of frequency they were poverty (25 percent), unemployment (19 percent), price hike (18 percent), uncertainty about the formulation of a new constitution (18 percent), political uncertainty/instability (17 percent) and lack of development and infrastructure (15 percent). Over one-third of all respondents identified politics – whether articulated as uncertainty/instability or as the lack of a constitution – as the greatest problem. Of note is the fact that poverty is identified as a significant problem at both the personal (51 percent) and the national (25 percent) level. See Figure 3.5 for details.

Figure 3.5: National-level problems in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011
 What are the two major problems at the national level?
 (B3, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




The survey findings of June 2011 are consistent, despite some minor fluctuations, with those of the previous two surveys with the notable exception of a dramatic increase in worry over the formulation of the constitution, from 1 percent to 18 percent, and a sharp decline in those who see political uncertainty as a problem, from 21 percent to 17 percent. As the two problems are interrelated, the increase in the former might account for the decrease in the later. In addition, while the August 2010 and February 2011 surveys were conducted during the first one-year extension of the Constituent Assembly (CA), the June 2011 survey fell during the second, three-month extension. Thus, during the first two surveys, people expected to see a new constitution by May 28, 2011, but during the third, the fact that there had been a second extension made this possibility seem unrealistic.

Responses to the question about national-level problems differed by ecological region, development region, sex, caste/ethnicity and educational level. Among the people of the hills, most (30 percent) identified poverty as the major problem, while in the mountains, most (28 percent) said nothing and the second largest proportion (24 percent) pointed to the lack of development and infrastructure. In the Tarai, equal proportions (22 percent) identified poverty and uncertainty about the formulation of a new constitution.

Comparing by development region (see Figure 3.6), the most common response in the East was the lack of development and infrastructure (27 percent) while that in the Central (23 percent) and Far-Western (32 percent) development regions was uncertainty about the formulation of the constitution. Poverty was the response most reported in the West (41 percent), while price hikes were most commonly cited in the Mid-West (24 percent).


Figure 3.6: National-level problems by development region
What are the two major problems at the national level?
(B3, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



Majority of respondents living in rural areas (27 percent) identified poverty as the major national-level problems while majority of respondents living in urban area identified price hikes (24 percent). Poverty is more often cited by women (28 percent) than men (21 percent), as are price hikes (21 percent versus 16 percent), but men are far more concerned about both the formulation of a new constitution (26 percent) and political instability (21 percent) than women (10 percent and 12 percent respectively). See Figure 3.7 for details.

Figure 3.7: National-level problems by residence and sex


What are the two major problems at the national level?
 (B3, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



As the educational level of respondents increases, so does the proportion of those who believe that political uncertainty/instability is Nepal’s major problem. Among those who have at least an Intermediate degree, this was the most frequently mentioned problem.

Figure 3.8: National-level problems by education level

What are the two major problems at the national level?
 (B3, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




4. Country's overall direction

4.1 Country's direction

The surveys probed the respondents' assessment of the country's overall direction and situation, asking all respondents whether they think the country is moving in the right or the wrong direction. In all three surveys, an overwhelming majority opine that the country is moving in the wrong direction—69 percent in August 2010, 65 percent in February 2011, and 59 percent in June 2011. The declining trend does not necessarily translate into an increase in the proportion who think that the country is moving in the right direction. In fact, in June 2011, only 6 percent entertained this belief, while 19 percent did not know and 16 percent believed that progress was both in the right and the wrong direction. See Figure 4.1 for details.

Figure 4.1: Opinions about the country's direction in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011


Generally speaking, do you think the country is moving in the right direction, or do you think it is moving in the wrong direction? (C1, Base=3,000)



Disaggregating the June 2011 data reveals that the proportion of respondents in the mountains who believe the country is moving in the right direction is twice as high (12 percent) as it is in the other two ecological regions. Correspondingly, the proportion of those in the mountains who think the country is moving in the wrong direction is lower (34 percent) than in the hills (53 percent) and the Tarai (68 percent). There are far more people with mixed views in the mountains (27 percent) and the hills (23 percent) than in the Tarai (9 percent).

Figure 4.2: Opinions about the country’s direction by ecological region

Generally speaking, do you think the country is moving in the right direction, or do you think it is moving in the wrong direction? (C1, Base=3,000)




4.2 Reasons for optimism and pessimism

The 6 percent of respondents to the June 2011 survey who said that the country is moving in the right direction were asked why they think so. They were allowed to mention more than one answer (see Figure 4.3). Over half (51 percent) cited improvements in law and order as the major reason, while 15 percent each gave the presence of the Maoists in mainstream politics and progress in development activities as reasons. About 11 percent each cited the three-month CA extension or were unable to provide any reasons. About one in twelve respondents were sanguine because they feel political parties are working together on key issues.

Figure 4.3: Reasons given by those who think the country is headed in the right direction

If you think the country is moving in the right direction, why do you think so? (C2, Base=186, Percentages based on multiple responses)




The 59 percent of respondents who said that the country is moving in the wrong direction were also asked to provide reasons. In this case too, they could give more than one (see Figure 4.4). The reasons given were several, with none predominant. The most frequently mentioned reasons were the inability of the political parties to formulate a new constitution (43 percent), the lack of stability (36 percent), price hikes (32 percent) and the lack of consensus among the main political parties (29 percent). Around a quarter of respondents (26 percent each) were pessimistic because they feel that there are no employment opportunities and that development activities have come to a halt.

Figure 4.4: Reasons given by those who think the country is headed in the wrong direction

If you think the country is moving in the wrong direction, why do you think so?

(C3, Base=1,758, Percentages based on multiple responses)




4.3 National government

The survey also sought to gauge the public's perception towards the activities of the present central government's activities (see Figure 4.5). They were asked to mention up to two of its most important strengths. A little less than half (49 percent) reported that the government has no positive features at all and significant proportions (29 percent) were unable to assess its activities. A small proportion—about 5 percent each—considered the extension of the CA and progress in development activities moving ahead as strengths. Equal proportions (4 percent each) said that the government had ushered in a republic and that it had increased prospects for lasting peace. Public responses to this question were consistent over the span of the three surveys.

Figure 4.5: Strengths of the central government in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

What are the strengths that you value in the present central government?


(C4, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The survey also inquired what respondents thought were the weaknesses of the present central government, allowing them up to two main responses (see Figure 4.6). Slightly less than one-third (30 percent) stated that the government's inability to complete the formulation of a new constitution was its major weakness and 16 percent cited its inability to control prices as its second major weakness. The proportions of people who variously said that the government had not normalised daily life, controlled corruption, or undertaken development activities were all around 14 percent.

Figure 4.6: Weaknesses of the central government in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

What are the weaknesses you are concerned about in the present central government?
(C5, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




Of the different weaknesses respondents pointed out, the proportion reporting that the government was unable to complete the formulation of constitution went up significantly in June 2011, reaching 30 percent compared to 21 percent and 18 percent respectively in August 2010 and February 2011.

The survey also reveals the public’s expectations of the present central government. All 3,000 respondents were asked what they thought ought to be the priority of the current government and were allowed to give up to two answers (see Figure 4.7). In June 2011 over half (52 percent) reported that it should give priority to constitution-drafting, a substantial increase from the 38 percent who said so in February 2011. Equal proportions, 18 percent each, said the central government should prioritise employment generation and development activities and around 10-14 percent mentioned maintaining law and order, controlling price hikes and overcoming poverty as key priorities.

Figure 4.7: Desired priorities of the central government in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

In your opinion what should be the priority of the current government?
(C6, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




4.4 Local government

The survey also sought to assess respondents’ opinions of the performance of their local governments, asking if their performance was very good, good, bad, or very bad. More said it was bad (30 percent) or very bad (10 percent) than good (30 percent) or very good (1 percent) and a significant proportion (22 percent) were unable to assess the performance of their local government. About 6 percent reported not having any local government. See Figure 4.8 for the trends over time.

Figure 4.8: Performance of local governments in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present Local government – very good, good, bad, or very bad? (C7, Base=3,000)




People's responses to this question in June 2011 are similar to those of August 2010 and February 2011, though the proportion of those unable to answer increased by 12 percent to 22 percent between August 2010 and February 2011 and remained that high in June 2011.

People's view regarding the performance of local governments varies across ecological regions, development regions and caste/ethnicity by origin. In June 2011, a significantly higher proportion of people in the hills (41 percent) reported that the performance of their local government was good or very good than the national average (31 percent) while in the mountains a higher proportion of people (37 percent) were unable to assess the performance of their local government than the national average (22 percent). In terms of development regions, the majority of the people in the West (51 percent) and the Mid-West (54 percent) said they thought that the performance of their local governments was good. Looking at caste/ethnicity by origin, twice as many non-Madhesi (38 percent) as Madhesi (18 percent) opined that the performance of local government was good.

Figure 4.9: Performance of local governments by ecology and caste/ethnicity by origin

Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present Local government – very good, good, bad, or very bad? (C7, Base=3,000)




The 31 percent of respondents to the June 2011 survey who said that the performance of their present local government was good or very good were asked to say why they thought so and allowed to mention up to two main reasons (see Figure 4.10). The majority (54 percent) said their local government was good because it undertook development activities, followed by 25 percent who said it provided access to

education, 18 percent that it maintained law and order, 14 percent that it provided a supply of domestic water, and 8 percent that it generated local employment opportunities.

Figure 4.10: Reasons why the present local government is good or very good

If you think performance of the present local government is good or very good, could you mention two reasons why you think so? (C8, Base=936, Percentages based on multiple responses)




People’s responses to their local government’s ability to undertake development activities varied by both ecological and development regions. Nationally, 54 percent said that their local government promoted development activities, but the rate was significantly higher in the mountains (72 percent) than in the hills (55 percent) or Tarai (47 percent) and in the West (72 percent) than any other development region.

The 40 percent of June 2011 respondents who claimed that the performance of their present local government was bad or very bad were asked to give up to two reasons why they thought so. Ironically, the majority (44 percent) cited the opposite reason given for a good evaluation of performance--that the local government was unable to undertake development activities. Other significant reasons included the inability to control corruption (25 percent), maintain law and order (20 percent), curb price hikes (19 percent), generate local employment opportunities (14 percent), provide a supply of domestic water (11 percent), provide irrigation facilities (10 percent), reduce local poverty (10 percent), and provide access to education (7 percent) and health facilities (6 percent).

Figure 4.11: Reasons why the present local government is bad or very bad

If you think performance of the present local government is bad or very bad, could you mention two reasons why you think so? (C9, Base=1,207, Percentages based on multiple responses)




As was the case for good performance, the reasons for bad performance varied across ecological and development regions. Higher proportions of people in the mountains (64 percent) than in the hills (47 percent) and the Terai (41 percent) said they thought local governments were bad because they did not undertake development activities. With regard to development regions, people in the East (59 percent) and the West (58 percent) were more likely than people in other development regions to make this complaint.

5. Constituent assembly and constitutional issues

5.1 Constitutional issues

The survey also attempted to ascertain the perceptions of the respondents with regard to the CA and the constitutional issues it is debating. The first question asked them to rank a number of issues related to the peace process by degree of importance. Respondents were allowed to choose up to two of the issues mentioned (see Figure 5.1). Most people assigned constitution-drafting top priority, followed by creating a national unity government. About one-fifth had no response. Similar trends were recorded for each of the three surveys.

Figure 5.1: Peace priorities in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011
Of the following issues related to the peace process how would you rank them in importance?
(D1, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




The proportion of respondents who said constitution-drafting was the most important issue increased rapidly, shooting up 25 percent in less than a year, from 45 percent in August 2010 to 55 percent in February 2011 to 70 percent in June 2011. Other responses, in contrast, did not vary over three surveys beyond some minor fluctuations.

Among June 2011 survey respondents, those in the Far-West (80 percent) were most likely to cite constitutional-drafting 10 percent more than the national average.

The response to CA priorities varied in terms of educational level, with the more educated more likely to state that constitution-drafting should receive priority.

Figure 5.2: Peace priorities by education


Of the following issues related to the peace process how would you rank them in importance?
(D1, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The survey also sought to gauge people’s thoughts about the various topics being debated in the CA by inviting them to pick the top two most important issues from a list of possibilities read out to them (see Figure 5.3). A little less than one-third cited fundamental rights and directive principles and around a quarter each cited the distribution of national/natural resources and the restructuring of the state. A sizeable proportion also identified the preservation of national interest. One-quarter of respondents were unable to identify any important topics of debate.

Figure 5.3: The most important issues of debate in the CA in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

Of the following constitutional topics being debated by the Constituent Assembly, pick the top two that are most important to you.
(D2, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The constitutional topics prioritized were similar in all three surveys with the exception of the distribution of national/natural resources, which saw 7 percent more respondents identify it in June 2011 than had in earlier surveys.

As it did regarding the peace process, the response to this question varied by educational status. In general, the proportion of those who reported that restructuring the state, fundamental rights and directive principles were most important increased as educational level increased.

The survey examined the awareness of respondents about the constitutional issues being debated in the CA by asking them about their sources of information. Each respondent was invited to give multiple answers (see Figure 5.4). Over two-thirds cited radio and almost half cited television. Newspapers were the third most commonly cited source, followed by friends and relatives, and then by other people in

their community. A very small proportion of respondents mentioned local political leaders (5 percent in June 2011). The survey findings, which are consistent over time, underscore the fact that people get information about the constitutional issues being debated in the CA through the media rather than through political parties.

Figure 5.4: Sources of information about constitutional issues being debated in the CA in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

How do you get your information on the constitutional issues being debated in the Constituent Assembly?
(D3, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




Responses to the question about sources of information vary by development region, rural-urban settlement, and educational level. In terms of development region, even though radio is the source of information most frequently mentioned across the country, the proportion of respondents who cited it was significantly higher in the Far-West (83 percent) than in other regions. Television was the second most popular source nationwide, but it came in third in the Mid-West (19 percent), after people in the community (26 percent). The proportion of those who said local political leaders provide information was twice as high in Mid-West (10 percent) and Far-West (8 percent) than in other development regions.

Most rural residents get information on constitutional issues from the radio (68 percent), while most urban residents (79 percent) rely on television though for them, too, radio is important, ranking a second 69 percent. Newspapers are three times more important in urban areas (40 percent) than they are in rural areas (14 percent).

Figure 5.5: Sources of information about constitutional issues being debated in the CA by residence


How do you get your information on the constitutional issues being debated in the Constituent Assembly?
(D3, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The survey sought to gauge people’s opinions about why the constitution has not yet been drafted. Respondents were allowed to mention more than one reason. Analysis of the findings of the June 2011 survey indicates that response is pointing to a common direction. If 48 percent attribute this to political parties focusing on their own political goals, 42 percent attribute this to the fact that political parties are irresponsible. Around one in five respondents each accounted for the delay by citing differences among political parties regarding important issues (20 percent) and by noting that political parties are focused on forming governments rather than on drafting the constitution (21 percent). Around 25 percent were unable to identify any reasons why the constitution has not been drafted.

Figure 5.6: Opinion about why the constitution has not been drafted in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

In your opinion, what are the major reasons why the constitution has not been drafted yet?
(D4, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




5.2 Assessment of CA representatives

All three surveys asked respondents to assess the performance of their CA representative (see Figure 5.7). In June 2011, the majority (62 percent) reported that they considered his or her performance to be poor (41 percent) or very poor (21 percent), and the proportion claiming that the CA’s performance was very poor almost doubled from 11 percent in August 2010 to 21 percent in June 2011. This response is consistent with the reasons given for the delay in the formulation of a new constitution: that political parties are irresponsible (42 percent) and that they focus on their own political goals (48 percent).

Figure 5.7: Performance of CA representatives in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

On the whole, how would you assess the performance of your CA representative? (D5, Base=3,000)




In contrast, only 10 percent of those surveyed in June 2011 reported that the performance of their CA representative was good (9 percent) or very good (1 percent) and more than one-quarter (28 percent) were unable to assess the performance of their CA representative.

The survey data clearly point to growing skepticism about, if not antipathy towards, CA representatives, perhaps unsurprisingly as term of the CA has been extended twice, the first time for one year, the second for three months, and still there is no constitution.

While the proportion of those who assess the performance of their CA representative positively is relatively small across the country (10 percent), it is slightly higher in the hills (11 percent) than in the mountains (8 percent) and the Tarai (7 percent). In terms of development region, it is much higher in the West (18 percent) than in other regions.

Figure 5.8: Performance of CA representatives by development region

On the whole, how would you assess the performance of your CA representative? (D5, Base=3,000)




The 10 percent of June 2011 respondents who said that their CA representative was performing well or very well were asked why they thought so. They were allowed to mention more than one response (see Figure 5.9). Around one-third (33 percent) said that they attributed the good evaluation to the fact that various issues have been discussed in the CA while another sizeable proportion (22 percent) said that CA was able to bring about a lasting peace to some extent. Approximately equal proportions of respondents were pleased that various concept papers have been formulated (19 percent) and that CA members have conducted surveys of public opinion (18 percent). The CA’s ability to develop the

Figure 5.9: Reasons why CA representatives were given a good evaluation

If you think the CA representative is performing well or very well, why do you think so?


(D6, Base=274, Percentages based on multiple responses)



country to some extent and to formulate some policies were mentioned by 16 percent and 12 percent of respondents respectively. In considering these figures, however, it is important to keep in mind that these responses represent the view of only around 10 percent of the total respondents.

Similar type of follow up question ‘If you think the CA representative is performing poorly or very poorly, why do you think so?’ was asked to those respondents who said that CA representative is performing poorly or very poorly (which in the June 2011 survey was 62 percent). In this case too, these respondents were allowed to mention more than one answer. The most often cited reasons were that their earning of state allowance without delivering anything (41 percent), their inability to fulfill the expectations of the public (40 percent), inability to draft the constitution within the stipulated time frame (40 percent), their exclusive focus on forming a government (29 percent), their inability to promulgate the constitution within the given time frame (20 percent), their inability to bring about development (14 percent), and their lack of technical know-how about how to formulate a constitution (10 percent).


Figure 5.10: Reasons why CA representatives were given a bad evaluation
 If you think the CA representative is performing poorly or very poorly, why do you think so?
 (D7, Base=1872, Percentages based on multiple responses)



5.3 Perceptions of the CA extension

The CA was unable to provide a new constitution for the country despite the fact that its term was extended by one year until 28 May, 2011. On 29 May, 2011, the three main political parties signed a five-point agreement to extend the tenure of the CA again; this time by three months. In the June 2011


Figure 5.11: Opinion regarding the extension of the CA
 The CA has been extended by another three months. What is your opinion with regard to this extension – strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree? (D8, Base=3,000)



survey respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the extension and how strongly. More people disagreed or strongly disagreed (45 percent) than agreed or strongly agreed (26 percent) and 28 percent had no opinion.


Opinion regarding the extension of the CA varied by both ecological and development region (see Figure 5.12), with fewer agreeing with it in the Tarai (22 percent) than in either the hills (30 percent) or the mountains (29 percent) and with less agreement or strong agreement in the far-western (16 percent), central (18 percent), and mid-western (24 percent) development regions than the eastern (34 percent) and western (37 percent).

Figure 5.12: Opinion regarding the extension of the CA by development region
The CA has been extended by another three months. What is your opinion with regard to this extension – strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree? (D8, Base=3,000)



Views about the extension also varied by the educational level of the respondent (see Figure 5.13): the less educated a respondent was, the more likely it was that he or she was not able to answer the question. Among those with at least a Bachelor’s degree, 41 percent agreed with the extension and 57 percent did not.


Figure 5.13: Opinion regarding the extension of the CA by educational level
The CA has been extended by another three months. What is your opinion with regard to this extension – strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree? (D8, Base=3,000)



Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the three-month extension of the CA were further asked a follow up question: if you strongly agree or agree, why? (See Figure 5.14) The most common view, held by 41 percent, was that the new constitution would, in fact, be formulated. The second most popular response was that there was no alternative (33 percent), followed by approximately equal


proportions reporting variously that the CA would be able to bring about development (7 percent) or lasting peace (7 percent) in the country or that if it had not been extended the country would have descended into chaos (8 percent).

Figure 5.14: Reasons for agreeing with the extension of the CA
If you strongly agree or agree, why? (D9, Base=782)



The 45 percent of all respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the three-month extension of CA were also asked to provide reasons. The most common view, held by 58 percent, was that the constitution would not be formulated within the next three months. About 18 percent reported that CA members get state allowances but deliver nothing, 10 percent said that a new constitution would never be formulated, and 7 percent and 5 percent respectively that the CA would not be able to bring about either development or peace in the country.

Figure 5.15: Reasons for disagreeing with the extension of the CA
If you strongly agree or agree, why? (D9, Base=1,359)




When asked if they thought the CA would be able to formulate a draft constitution within the three-month extension, over half (53 percent) responded in the negative and just 9 percent in the affirmative. Over one-third (37 percent) did not provide a response. The proportion of those who thought that the CA would draft a constitution was highest in the western development region (13 percent) and least in the far-western (6 percent).

The 9 percent who said they believed that the CA would be able to able to formulate a draft constitution were asked to state why they thought so (see Figure 5.17). Just below one-third (32 percent) said that they believed the political parties were committed to completing the draft constitution while about one


Figure 5.16: Opinion about whether a draft constitution would be formulated within the three-months extension

Do you think the CA would be able to formulate the draft constitution within the extended three month period? (D11, Base=3,000)




in five said that there is no other way to formulate the new constitution (21 percent) and that political parties have no way out except to formulate the new constitution (22 percent). It is important to keep in mind that this question was asked to only 9 percent of the respondents.

Figure 5.17: Reasons for believing that a draft constitution would be formulated
If yes, what makes you think so? (D12, Base=273)



The 53 percent who claimed that no draft constitution would be formulated during the extension were also asked to give a reason (see Figure 5.18). Just below one-third (31 percent) attributed the impasse to the focus of political parties on their own political goals, while 23 percent made this assessment based on

Figure 5.18: Reasons for believing that a draft constitution would not be formulated
If no, what makes you think so? (D13, Base=1,589)




the past performance of the CA. Another 30 percent believed that CA representatives would deliberately not formulate the new constitution so they could continue to get a state allowance (20 percent). About 10 percent said that Nepal’s political parties focus on forming governments rather than on drafting the constitution and 7 percent said that parties would not adhere to the five-point agreement.

The June 2011 survey also attempted to gauge public perception of the five-point agreement, in which the country’s three main political parties came to a consensus about extending the CA for another three months. Respondents were allowed to provide more than one answer to a question about what they thought of the agreement (see Figure 5.19). Most respondents (47 percent) did not know or could not say. Of those who did express an opinion, some 23 percent said that they had only heard of the agreement but did not know its contents, followed by 8 percent who said they were hearing about it for the first time. Another 8 percent said that the agreement was only a ruse to extend the CA (8 percent) and 7 percent noted that no time frame had been given for complying with any of the five points.

Figure 5.19: Opinion about the five-point agreement


The UCPN (Maoist), Nepali Congress and UML signed a five-points agreement before the tenure of the CA was extended for another 3 months. What do you think of the five-points agreement?
(D16, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



Respondents to the June 2011 survey were also asked if they thought the tenure of the CA ought to be extended again if, for some reason, the five-point agreement was not adhered to. While 44 percent had no opinion, 42 percent were against an extension and just 13 percent for extension once again. The proportion of respondents who were in favor of an extension was slightly higher in the hills (16 percent)

Figure 5.20: Opinion about a second extension, overall and by ecological and development region


To extend the CA duration for another three months, the three main political parties had entered into a 5-point agreement. If for some reason or the other, the 5-point agreement is not adhered to, what should be done?
(D17, Base=3,000)



than in the other regions. In terms of development regions, 24 percent of respondents in the mid-western but only 4 percent in the central development region favored an extension.


Those who were against extending the CA were reminded that it would collapse and asked what should then be done. The majority (36 percent) opined that a date for new elections to the CA should be announced. Around 12 percent suggested that all contentious issues be decided through a referendum and 10 percent suggested that the people revolt. Other suggestions were that the constitution-writing process be handed over to experts (7 percent) and some even said that ‘the country should be ruled by the president’ (7 percent). The proportion of respondents reporting that the king should come back and begin to rule is also significant (9 percent).

Figure 5.21: Opinion about what to do if the CA collapses, overall and by ecological region
 If the duration of the CA would not be extended then it will collapse.
 In such circumstance, what should be done? (D18, Base=1,263)



Respondents’ views about the next step to take if the CA collapsed vary by both ecological and development region. The proportion who mentioned announcing a date for new elections to the CA was highest in the Tarai (40 percent) and lowest in the mountains (21 percent).

Figure 5.22: Opinion about what to do if the CA collapses by development region
 If the duration of the CA would not be extended then it will collapse.
 In such circumstance, what should be done? (D18, Base=1,263)



6. Perceptions of identity and local leadership

6.1 Local leadership

The surveys attempted to identify which individuals and institutions people trust, who they think represents their ideas, and how they like to identify themselves. Regarding trust, interviewers asked respondents whom they trusted most and read out a number of possible choices. Family members were most trusted, with 32 percent and 29 percent giving this response in August 2010 and June 2011 respectively. Second preference cited by about one-fifth of respondents went to village/local elders and the third largest response (about 10 percent) was “I trust no one”. In June 2011, these choices were followed by social workers (7 percent), people of the respondent’s own community (6 percent), and, among a very few, political leaders (2 percent). See Figure 6.1 for details.

Figure 6.1: Individuals trusted most in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011
When taking all factors into consideration, whose suggestions do you trust the most? (E1, Base=3,000)




Respondents were also asked who they thought best represented their political ideas and were given a number of possible responses to select from. The order of responses is similar in all three surveys. To cite the most recent, in June 2011, 23 percent said that no one represents their political ideas, while 13 percent said a family member, 11 percent said leader of a political party, 9 percent said an important person in the village, and 7 percent each said an elder of their own caste/ethnicity or a member of civil society. A significant proportion, 17 percent, professed ignorance on this matter.

Proportion of respondents who report leader of a political party as their answer dropped 6 percent from 17 percent in August 2010 to 11 percent in February 2011 and remained at the lower figure of 11 percent in June 2011. This result is no surprise as the majority of respondents blame political leaders and political parties for not formulating the constitution—the people’s priority—within the given time frame.

Figure 6.2: Individual who best represents respondents' political ideas in August 2010, February 2011 and June 2011

Who best do you think represents your political ideas? (E2, Base=3,000)




They think that rather than focusing on constitution drafting and the public's problems, the parties focus on forming governments and politicians on fulfilling their own personal and political goals. The fact that people hold politicians in low esteem is also reflected in their turning to the media rather than to political parties for information on various issues.

6.2 Identity

The proportion of people who like to identify themselves as Nepali only has increased significantly over time, from just 53 percent in January 2008 to 71 percent in June 2011, with a large increase registered between August 2010 (58 percent) and February 2011 (70 percent). At the same time, the proportion who mentioned that they like to be identified both as a Nepali and as a member of a particular ethnicity/caste/region has halved, declining steadily from 41 percent in January 2008 to just 18 percent in June 2011. Just 5 percent said that they like to identify themselves with a particular ethnicity/caste/region only and 2 percent said they like to be identified as both a Nepali and a member of a religious minority. These findings show that, at this point in time, Nepalis are united by their sense of national identity. See Figure 6.3 for details.

Figure 6.3: Opinions about identity in January 2008, August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011


How do you like to identify yourself? (E3, Base=3,000)



Respondents' view about their identity varied across caste/ethnicity groups (see Figure 6.4). Looking at caste/ethnic groups by origin, in June 2011, 77 percent of non-Madhesis but just 59 percent of Madhesis


reported liking to identify themselves as Nepali only. In terms of the survey's eight broad ethnic/caste groups, 81 percent of hill caste, 74 percent of hill ethnic, 76 percent of Newar, 70 percent of hill Dalit, 63 percent of Madhesi caste, 54 percent of Tarai-Madhesi ethnic, 58 percent of Madhesi Dalit, and 57 percent of Muslim respondents prefer to identify themselves as Nepalis only.

Figure 6.4: Identity by caste/ethnicity
How do you like to identify yourself? (E3, Base=3,000)



The increase in the proportion of those who like to be identified only as Nepali only is due to a higher proportion of those belonging to hill ethnic, Madhesi caste, Tarai-Madhesi ethnic, Madhesi Dalit and Muslim identifying themselves as Nepali only during 2010 and 2011. Among the hill castes, hill dalits and Newars, those saying they like to be identified as Nepali only had been high consistently; it is not a change in their self-identity that has created this shift. The shift in fact is due to the opinions of the hill ethnics, Madhesi caste, Tarai-Madhesi ethnic, Madhesi Dalit and Muslims. That these groups are increasingly identifying themselves as Nepali only could indicate that a significant proportion of people in these groups are becoming disillusioned with identity-based politics.

Figure 6.5: Proportion of the people who like to be identified as Nepali only by caste/ethnicity




7. Peace process and management of arms

7.1 Integration and rehabilitation

It is important that Maoist combatants/PLA be properly managed in order to settle the peace process successfully. In response to a question about what the government of Nepal should do with Maoist combatants/PLA, respondents to the June 2011 survey were allowed to give more than one answer, but, as it turns out, 43 percent were unable to give any specific opinion at all. Around 21 percent said that Maoist combatants/PLA should be integrated into the Nepal Army, 15 percent that they should be encouraged to take up other professions, 13 percent that they should be utilized to carry out development work within the country, 11 percent that they should be provided with vocational training, 8 percent that they should be integrated into the Armed Police Force, and 7 percent that they should be provided employment opportunities abroad.

Figure 7.1: Opinion about what to do with Maoist combatants/PLA in June 2011


There is a discussions going on with regards to the Maoist combatants/Peoples Liberation Army. In your opinion, what should the Nepal Government do with Maoist combatants/Peoples Liberation Army?
(F1, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



Responses to this question varied by party preference of respondents: those who voted for the UCPN-M were significantly more likely to think that Maoist combatants/PLA should be integrated into the existing state forces, whether the Nepal Army (33 percent versus 21 percent overall), the Armed Police Force (12 percent versus 8 percent overall), or the Nepal Police (8 percent versus 6 percent overall).

Figure 7.2: Opinion about what to do with Maoist combatants/PLA in June 2011

There is a discussions going on with regards to the Maoist combatants/Peoples Liberation Army. In your opinion, what should the Nepal Government do with Maoist combatants/Peoples Liberation Army?
(F1, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)




7.2 Perceptions towards Maoist combatants/PLA

A series of questions were asked to gauge the public’s attitude toward Maoist combatants/PLA. First, they were asked if any Maoist combatants might return to their village or district. In June 2011, over half of respondents (56 percent) said there would be no returnees, 14 percent said there might be, and 29 percent did not know or could not say. The findings of June 2011 are consistent with Feb. 2011. However, those who mention ‘Yes’ have gone up by 2 percent (12 percent in Feb. 2011 to 14 percent in June 2011).

Figure 7.3: The possibility that ex-Maoist combatants might return to respondent’s locality in February 2011 and June 2011


Is there any Maoist combatant/PLA in your local area who might return to your village/district?
(F2, Base=3,000)



In comparison with other development regions, a much higher proportion of respondents in the Far-West (72 percent) said that no Maoist combatants would return and fewer respondents in the West (9 percent) said that they would return. Disaggregating data by ecological region reveals that in comparison with the hills and the Tarai, a slightly higher proportion of the people living in mountains (16 percent) said that Maoist combatants would return.

Figure 7.4: The possibility that Maoist combatants might return to respondent's locality by ecological and development region


Is there any Maoist combatant/PLA in your local area who might return to your village/district?
(F2, Base=3,000)



The 14 percent of respondents to the June 2011 survey who reported that Maoist combatants/PLA who might return to their village or district were asked how they felt about this. Around 15 percent said they felt nervous, whether slightly (11 percent) or very (4 percent). In comparison with the results of the February 2011 survey, 4 percent fewer people felt slightly or very nervous.

Figure 7.5: Feelings about a possible return of Maoist combatants to respondents' locality in February and June 2011


If yes, how do you feel about this? (F3, Base=418)



Respondents were also asked to respond to the leaving of cantonments by and return of Maoist combatants to their villages in general. Slightly under two-thirds of respondents said they were not worried, but 20 percent were either slightly worried (16 percent) or very worried (4 percent). A significant proportion 14 percent had no response. Disaggregating data by development region (see Figure 7.7), it was clear that


Figure 7.6: Concern about the ex-Maoist combatants' return in February and June 2011

Are you worried about Maoist combatants/PLA leaving the cantonments and returning to their villages?
(F4, Base=3,000)




more respondents in the Mid-West (28 percent) were worried than respondents in other regions. There was little change in responses between February and June 2011 (see Figure 7.6). The opinion on this question in February and June 2011 are very similar.

Figure 7.7: Concern about the Maoist combatants’ return by development region
 Are you worried about Maoist combatants/PLA leaving the cantonments and returning to their villages?
 (F4, Base=3,000)



The 20 percent of respondents to the June 2011 survey who reported being worried or very worried were asked why. They were allowed to give multiple reasons (see Figure 7.8). The main reasons had to do with fear: 56 percent said that the Maoist combatants might threaten people, 46 percent that they would be involved in criminal activities, and 39 percent that they would engage in armed violence. Respondents did not seem to fear that there would be a return to the decade-long conflict.


Figure 7.8: Reasons for being worried in June 2011
 If you are very worried or worried, why do you think so?
 (F5, Base=619, Percentages based on multiple responses)



7.3 Perceptions towards semi-armed political youth groups

Respondents were asked what they thought ought to be done with the semi-armed political youth groups associated with various political parties. They were allowed more than one response (see Figure 7.9). In all three surveys the greatest proportion said that they had no idea what to do, while the next most popular response was that the groups should be disbanded. About equal proportions—12-13 percent in June 2011—said that they should be involved in various social or development activities and that they should act as a political wing (of political parties), not a paramilitary force.

Figure 7.9: The future of semi-armed political youth groups in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011
 The various political parties have semi-armed youth groups. In your opinion, what should be done with the semi-armed political youth groups? (F8, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



7.4 Peace process

The February and June 2011 surveys asked respondents if they thought that the peace process would hold. Of those who responded in June, 50 percent said that it would not last and just 15 percent said that it would. Just over one-third (34 percent) had no opinion. Respondents in the western development region were most sanguine, with twice the national average of (30 percent) claiming peace that will hold while those in the central development region were most pessimistic, with just half the national average (7 percent) stating that peace would hold. See Figure 7.10 and 7.11 for details.

Figure 7.10: The likelihood that the peace process will endure in February 2011 and June 2011
 Do you think if in the present circumstances, the peace process will hold in Nepal? (F9, Base=3,000)






Figure 7.11: The likelihood that the peace process will endure by development region
 Do you think if in the present circumstances, the peace process will hold in Nepal? (F9, Base=3,000)




The 15 percent respondents to the June 2011 survey who thought that the peace process would hold in were asked why they thought so. Most (43 percent) gave the Maoists’ renouncement of violence as their reason. Equal proportions cited the fact that political parties are trying to reach a consensus (11 percent) and that there would be a consensus government (11 percent) and another 9 percent pointed to the signing of an agreement which allows for a special committee to monitor the arms and members of the Nepal Army and the PLA (9 percent).

Figure 7.12: Reasons for thinking the peace process would hold
If yes, why do you think so? (F10, Base=444)



The 50 percent respondents to the June 2011 survey who said they thought that the peace process would not hold were also asked to give a reason. A large majority (40 percent) ascribed the likely failure to the political parties’ inability to forge a consensus. About one-fifth were pessimistic because they believed at that time that political parties are interested only in fulfilling their personal interests (19 percent) or that there was not going to be a consensus government (17 percent). While a sizeable proportion, 8 percent, opined that peace would not hold because the Maoists want to capture state power through violent means, most did not think that the armed conflict between the Maoists and the state would resume if the peace process does not hold. The results also suggest that they did not believe that all the contentious issues in the peace process would be resolved due to bickering among political parties.

Figure 7.13: Reasons for thinking the peace process would not hold
If no, why do you think so? (F11, Base=1490)



7.5 Management of Maoist arms and combatants

Respondents were asked how they thought Maoist arms should be managed during the three-month extension of the CA, one of the key points under the five-point agreement. A majority (43 percent) of the respondents to the June 2011 survey were unable to respond, but 41 percent said that Maoist arms should be given to the government of Nepal, while 14 percent said they should be placed under the control of the Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. Only 2 percent said they thought Maoist arms should remain under the control of the Maoists, though this proportion was significantly higher in the mid-western development region (8 percent) than in other development regions. Disaggregating the data by political affiliation revealed that 7 percent of those who voted for the UCPN-M believed that the Maoists should retain control of their arms. See Figure 7.14 and 7.15 for details.

Figure 7.14: Management of Maoist arms in June 2011, overall and by development region

In your opinion, how should the weapon/arms of Maoist combatants/PLA be managed within the extended 3 months? (D14, Base=3,000)





Figure 7.15: Management of Maoist arms by political affiliation


In your opinion, how should the weapon/arms of Maoist combatants/PLA be managed within the extended 3 months? (D14, Base=3,000)



When asked how many Maoist combatants they thought should be integrated into the existing state security forces, 53 percent of the respondents to the June 2011 survey had no answer while 14 percent thought that they should not be integrated at all. Among those who gave numbers, 7 percent said fewer than 4,000, 7 percent said 4,001-6000, 3 percent said 6,001-8000, 3 percent said 8,001-10,000 and 11

percent said above 10,000. Disaggregating this question by party preference shows that 20 percent of those who voted for the UCPN-M, almost double the national average, said that over 10,000 ex-Maoist combatants should be integrated.

Figure 7.16: The number of ex-Maoist combatants to integrate according to the June 2011 survey
 In your opinion how many Maoist Combatants/PLA should be integrated into the existing state security forces?
 (D15, Base=3,000)



8. Federalism

8.1 Awareness about federalism


Though the CA voted to make Nepal a federal state in May 2008, there remains considerable divergence among political parties as to the nature and structure of Nepal’s particular form of federalism. As of June 2011 the political parties were yet to agree on either the basis on which the federated state should be demarcated or the division of responsibilities among the centre, the federal unit, and the local level.

At this time marked by a lack of consensus among political parties about federalism in Nepal, the survey sought to ascertain the opinion of the public about federalism by asking them a series of questions. Earlier surveys also asked questions on federalism once the concept had gained salience in the public discourse, which was a few years earlier than its endorsement. The first survey to ask respondents about federalism was conducted in September 2006.

Respondents were asked first whether or not they had heard of federalism. While one might presume that everyone would at least have heard the word, this was not the case: three years after the CA designated Nepal as a federal state, only slightly more than half (54 percent) reported that they had heard the term. However, the proportion of respondents who have heard of federalism has increased steadily over time, from 10 percent in September 2006 to 16 percent in May 2007 to 23 percent in January 2008 to 32 percent in July 2009 to the current 54 percent. At the same time, there continues to remain a significant proportion—30 percent in June 2011—who report that they have not heard about federalism and 16 percent said that they did not know or could not say anything about federalism.

Figure 8.1: Trend in awareness of federalism between September 2006 and June 2011

Have you ever heard about federalism?
(G1, Base=3,000)




Around 70 percent of the 54 percent who have heard about federalism report that they know what federalism means.

Knowledge about federalism varied in terms of sex, age and educational level. In June 2011, far more men (69 percent) than women (38 percent) and far more young people (63 percent of those aged 18-25) than old people (just 42 percent of those above 45) reported that they had heard about federalism.

Figure 8.2: Awareness of federalism by sex and age


Have you ever heard about federalism?
(G1, Base=3,000)



Education was an important variable, too: the proportion of those who reported that they had heard about federalism increased with the education level of the respondent.

Figure 8.3: Awareness of federalism by educational level

Have you ever heard about federalism?
(G1, Base=3,000)



The 54 percent of respondents who said that they had heard about federalism were asked to identify the two main sources from which they got information about federalism. Two-thirds named radio as their source of information, while about half named television. Newspapers, people of the respondent’s own community, community meetings, and other people in the community follow in decreasing order. For each of the last three surveys, in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011, the order of precedence is the same though there are some fluctuations in percentages.

Figure 8.4: Sources of information about federalism in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011
If you have heard about federal system, what are the main sources from where you get information about federalism? (G2, Base=1,604, Percentages based on multiple responses)



8.2 Perceptions towards federalism

The 54 percent of respondents who said that they had heard about federalism, irrespective of whether they knew what it meant, were asked to rate their support for it on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being totally against federalism, 5 being neutral, and 10 being totally supportive of federalism.

In June 2011, the mean score that respondents gave federalism was 4.1, a somewhat negative score indicating that people are slightly ill-disposed toward this system. The scores have not varied considerably over the last three surveys, with mean scores at 3.8, 4.2 and 4.1 in August 2010, February 2011 and June 2011 respectively. However, while the national mean is similar, when the data is disaggregated by both ecological and development region, differences emerge (see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1: Mean support for federalism by ecological and development region in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

G4, Base = 1249	All	Ecological region			Development region				
		Mountain	Hill	Tarai	EDR	CDR	WDR	MWDR	FWDR
June 2011	4.1	3.3	3.0	5.1	4.1	5.1	3.5	3.2	3.0
February 2011	4.2	5.1	4.5	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.7
August 2010	3.8	6.5	3.9	3.4	4.1	3.6	2.1	5.4	5.6

In terms of caste/ethnicity, the mean support for federalism was higher among Madhesi than non-Madhesi community (6.1 versus 3.1). Federalism also received relatively high scores from Limbu, Yadav, Teli, and Tharu and relatively low scores from Newar, Bahun, Chhetri, Magar, Gurung and Thakuri respondents (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.2: Mean support for federalism by caste/ethnicity in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

Mean support by caste/ethnicity	Aug. 2010	Feb. 2011	Jun. 2011	Mean support by caste/ethnicity	Aug. 2010	Feb. 2011	Jun. 2011
Chhetri	4.0	4.2	2.8	Kami/BK	4.5	3.9	3.5
Bahun	3.1	4.0	2.7	Gurung	3.3	4.5	3.6
Magar	4.0	3.4	3.3	Rai	5.1	4.1	4.7
Newar	3.3	4.5	2.4	Damai/Pariyar	4.4	3.9	5.8
Tamang	4.4	4.8	4.1	Limbu	5.5	5.4	4.8
Tharu	4.0	4.4	5.1	Thakuri	5.1	4.8	3.4
Yadav	3.8	4.7	6.7	Sarki/Mijar	3.0	3.1	4.7
Muslim	2.9	3.1	5.5	Teli	4.0	5.0	5.8

What is consistent across the three waves is the attitude towards federalism disaggregated by political affiliation. Support for federalism is higher among voters for the MJF and the UCPN-M, but even among these groups the mean score is just slightly above or below neutral and is not high.

Table 8.3: Mean support for federalism by party preference in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011


Mean support for federalism	Political party			
	UCPN-M	NC	CPN-UML	MJF
June 2011	4.5	3.3	4.3	5.4
February 2011	5.2	3.6	4.1	4.6
August 2010	4.9	3.7	3.5	4.3

8.3 Basis for federalism

All respondents, regardless of whether they said that they had heard of federalism or not, were asked what they thought ought to be the basis for establishing federal units and were read a number of possible choices (see Figure 8.5). Over half (57 percent) said that they did not know and 16 percent said that Nepal should not be a federal state. Those who said it should be federal suggest that federal units be demarcated on the basis of east-west geography (7 percent) and north-south geography (6 percent). The proportions of respondents who said it should be based on the present districts and zones, on ethnicity, on language are 4 percent, 4 percent, and 2 percent respectively. Clearly, the UCPN-M position, that ethnicity should form the basis for the demarcation of Nepal's federated states, has little support.

Figure 8.5: The basis of federal units in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

Nowadays, there is a debate going on regarding what the basis of federations should be. In your opinion, what should be the basis for the establishment of federations? (G6, Base=3,000)




8.4 Expectations from federalism

All respondents to the June 2011 survey, regardless of whether or not they had heard of federalism, were asked their expectations from its implementation. They were allowed to mention more than one answer. Not surprisingly, 59 percent had nothing to say. Another one-third foresaw negative consequences, 21 percent fearing that the Nepali state would disintegrate and 13 percent that Nepal would be weakened. Eight percent opined that various caste/ethnic groups would begin fighting against one another. A much smaller percentage of people foresaw positive outcomes, including 10 percent who said that there would be more local-development, 7 percent that said people would not have to go to Kathmandu for small things, 5 percent that ethnic/caste groups would have their identities assured, 4 percent that local governments would be strengthened, and 4 percent that employment opportunities would be provided to all those living in a given federal unit.

This response is consistent with the fact that around half of all respondents had not heard about federalism and is similar to the findings of the August 2010 and February 2011 surveys, which also suggest that people's attitudes toward federalism are negative.

Figure 8.6: Expectations from federalism in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011


What do you anticipate with the implementation of federalism (what is your expectation from federalism)?
(G5, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



Response to this question varied across caste/ethnicity. Twice as many non-Madhesi (25 percent) than Madhesi (13 percent) claimed that the Nepali state would disintegrate. Similarly, 15 percent of non-Madhesi but only 9 percent of Madhesi believed that the state would be weakened. Positive expectations from federalism were also higher among Madhesi than non-Madhesi. More specifically, twice as many Madhesi (15 percent) as non-Madhesi (7 percent) said that they believed that there would be more local-development and almost five times as many Madhesi (14 percent) as non-Madhesi (3 percent) said that they believed that people would not have to go to Kathmandu for small things. The fact that Madhesi expect more than non-Madhesi from federalism helps account for why their mean score is higher (6.1 for Madhesi versus 3.1 for non-Madhesi).

Figure 8.7: Expectations from federalism by caste/ethnicity by origin


What do you anticipate with the implementation of federalism (what is your expectation from federalism)?
(G5, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



The final question in the series on federalism asked respondents to identify what they thought were the most important responsibilities for the federal units. Respondents were able to give more than one answer. As was the case with the question about expectations from federalism, majority of respondents (58 percent) were unable to give any answer and a significant proportion (13 percent) stated that Nepal should not be a federal state at all. Of those who did identify responsibilities, 9 percent each reported maintaining law and order and taxing all residents in the federal unit as most important. Other responses included providing employment opportunities to all residents (7 percent), undertaking development

activities more effectively (6 percent), providing access to education to all residents (6 percent), and adopting policies that benefit the main caste/ethnicity group of the federal unit (6 percent).

Figure 8.8: Responsibilities of federal units in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011
 What do you think are the most important responsibilities for states under the federal system?
 (G7, Base=3,000, Percentages based on multiple responses)



9. Relationships

9.1 Relationships between various entities in the local area


Each survey – that of August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 – attempted to gauge people’s views about various types of inter-personal and inter-communal relationships among the people residing in a particular area. Respondents were read various statements about relationships and asked to judge whether that relationship had remained the same, improved, or deteriorated in comparison to three or four years earlier. Figure 9.1 summarizes the results of all three surveys.

The June 2011 survey recorded an improvement at the household level, with the majority of respondents (64 percent) saying that they thought that the relationships among the members of their household had improved, 29 percent said that they were the same and 6 percent said that they had deteriorated.

The majority of respondents to the June 2011 also said that various types of communal relationships had also improved, including those among members of the same caste/ethnic community (63 percent), between men and women (68 percent), and among various caste and ethnic groups (60 percent). In three cases, among various religious groups, among so-called high and low castes and between the educated and uneducated, 58 percent noted an improvement. However, less than a majority said that relationships had improved between people of hill origin and Madhesi origin (32 percent), between the rich and the poor (48 percent), and among those who hold different political views (42 percent).

The proportion of those who said that relationships had deteriorated in June 2011 is one-fifth or less for all statements, but highest in the case of relationships among those who hold different political views (20 percent), and between the rich and the poor (14 percent).

Figure 9.1: Improvement in relationships in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 (Base=3,000)




10. Public perception of political parties and “new” Nepal

10.1 Voting preferences

The three surveys of August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 explored people’s perceptions of political parties and issues surrounding “new” Nepal. Respondents were first asked which party they had voted for in the CA election in April 2008 in order to identify their political affiliation and to ascertain the extent to which the political preferences of sample match the outcome of the election. The largest proportion (25 percent) reported that they had not voted and 21 percent said that they had voted for the CPN-M (which, at that point in time, had not yet affixed “United” to its name). Those saying they voted for NC was 17 percent and the CPN-UML 11 percent. A sizable proportion (9 percent) of the population refused to divulge which party they had voted for, while another 11 percent said that it did not know or could not say. In comparison, in the actual election, 38 percent did not vote, and of those that did 29 percent voted for the CPN-M, 21 percent for the NC, 20 percent for UML, 6 percent for the MJF, and 3 percent for TMLP. It is clear that in the order of the results though not the exact percentages, the political preferences of the sampled respondents do indeed broadly correspond with the results of the election held in April 2008 (see Figure 10.1)¹.

Figure 10.1: Political parties voted for by respondents to the August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 surveys


Which political party did you vote for in the Constituent Assembly election held on April 2008?
[Proportional System, Light red ballot paper/box] (I1, Base=3,000)



1 If the proportion of those who said they did not vote in the April 2008 CA election i.e., 25 percent is excluded, and the proportion of those who said they voted, adjusted accordingly, the voting preference of the sample matches closely that of the actual 2008 elections. Those voting for CPN-M was 28.3 percent, NC 22 percent, UML 15.2 percent and MJF 2.8 percent.

Disaggregating this question by age group reveals that the CPN-M got most of its votes from respondents aged 26-35 (24 percent), while the NC got most votes from those aged 45 and above (22 percent). A relatively high number of those who voted for the CPN-UML were aged 36-45 (15 percent). See Figure 10.2 for details.

Figure 10.2: Political parties voted for by age group
 Which political party did you vote for in the Constituent Assembly election held on April 2008?
 [Proportional System, Light red ballot paper/box]
 (11, Base=3,000)



The 55 percent of the respondents who voted were asked why they had chosen the party they did. They were allowed to mention more than one reason.

Those who voted for the CPN-M gave wanting to try out the party once (45.7 percent) as their main reason. The second most common reason was the fact that it was a new political party (40.2 percent).

Those who voted for the NC had three different reasons for their choice: the fact that the NC is an old political party (43.1 percent), that the respondents’ families has told them to vote for the NC (21.6 percent), and fondness for the party’s principles (19.7 percent).

Two main reasons respondents gave for voting for the CPN-UML were similar to those for the NC – its age (38.5 percent) and its principles (26.6 percent) but 23 percent said that they liked the candidate.

The three main reasons respondents voted for the MJF were – being told to do so by family members (21.3 percent), its newness as a political party (20.7 percent), and the fact that the respondent’s friends voted for it (20.1 percent).

Clearly, the rationale for voting for various parties differed greatly. Those who voted for the CPN-M did not do so because they liked its principles or its candidates or because it is known, tried and tested but precisely for the opposite reason—that it stands for something new.

In contrast, those who voted for the NC and the CPN-UML did so because they knew what these parties stood for. They put a premium on the parties’ age, principles, and candidates, not on their newness.

Table 10.1: Reasons for voting for political parties (Base=1,662)


Reason for voting for political parties	CPN (UML)	CPN (Maoist)	NC	MJF
Because it is an old political party	38.5	2.2	43.1	6.3
Because I like the principles the party stands for	26.6	7.6	19.7	10.5
Because I like that party’s candidate	23.0	6.4	16.0	17.4
Because I was told to do so my family members	16.8	12.3	21.6	21.3
Because I want to try out this political party once	8.6	45.7	4.5	14.7
Because this party will create a “new” Nepal	8.0	17.7	7.9	6.6
Because this party has fought for democracy	7.8	4.1	16.9	2.0
Because it is a new political party	4.2	40.2	1.7	20.7
Because my friends are voting for it	2.7	2.8	4.0	20.1

The surveys endeavored to examine the support base of various political parties by asking the respondent a hypothetical question: what party he or she would vote for if a new election was held the day of the survey. In June 2011, majority (57 percent) said they did not know or could not say and 11 percent refused to answer. Ten percent said they would vote for the NC, 7 percent for the UCPN-M and 5 percent for the CPN-UML. A sizable proportion, 7 percent, said emphatically that they would not vote at all.

The proportion of respondents who said that they did not know or could not say increased by 10 percent in just ten months, from 47 percent in August 2010 and February 2011 to 57 percent in June 2011. The percentages of respondents who reported that they would vote for the NC, the UCPN-M, and the CPN-UML remained stable over the 10-month period, with only minor fluctuations.

Figure 10.3: Choice of political party if a new election were held according to the August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 surveys

If a new national election were to be held today, which political party would you vote for? (I3, Base=3,000)



The surveys also sought to examine the public’s views towards a republic vis-a-vis a monarchy. The phrasing of this question was reformulated after the August 2010 survey from ‘If you could vote for a monarchy or a republic, which would you vote for?’ to ‘If you could vote for a democracy with a monarchical institution versus a democracy without a monarchical institution, which would you vote for?’ The reason for the change was because the original question did not capture the opinions of those who wanted a constitutional or a ceremonial monarchy, in which a monarch reigns but does not rule. Instead, for many respondents, the juxtaposition of a monarchy with a republic without specifying the


nature of the monarchy implied a political system in which the monarch rules as an absolute ruler. Since this was not the intention of the question, it was reformulated into one that made explicit the co-existence of democracy with a monarchical institution. Respondents to the February 2011 and June 2011 surveys were also asked to allocate marks indicating the strength of their support for either democracy with a monarchical institution or democracy without a monarchical institution. The marks ranged from 0 to 10, with 0 representing weak support, 5 representing average support and 10 representing strong support.

In August 2010, 60 percent said they would vote for a republic and 27 percent for a monarchy; another 7 percent said they did not know or could not say while 6 percent refused to answer the question.

The survey administered in February 2011 and in June 2011 asked ‘If you could vote for democracy with monarchical institution versus democracy without monarchical institution, which would you vote for?’

The response to the question about democracy with and without a monarchical institution was different in June 2011 than it had been in February 2011 survey and, since the wording was different, the findings of both of the later surveys differed from that held in August 2010. In the February 2011 survey, 48 percent said they preferred democracy with a monarchical institution to one without, while in the June 2011 survey, the percentage preferring democracy with a monarchical institution had fallen to 39 percent (see Figure 10.4).

Figure 10.4: Preference for democracy with or without a monarchical institution in February 2011 and June 2011
If you could vote for democracy with monarchical institution versus democracy without monarchical institution, which would you vote for? (I6, Base=3,000)



In terms of respondents’ intensity of support for democracy either with or without a monarchical institution, among both those who prefer democracy with a monarchical institution and those who prefer democracy without a monarchical institution the mean support was equally high, 7.8 on a scale of 10 (see Table 10.2). This finding suggests that both groups are equally committed to their position.


Table 10.2: Preference for democracy with or without a monarchical institution (Base=3,000)

	Percent	Mean support
Democracy with monarchical institution	38.5	7.8
Democracy without monarchical institution	51.9	7.8
Refused to answer	0.8	NA
Don’t know/can’t say	8.9	NA

Disaggregating the question about democracy with or without a monarchical institution across ecological and development region and educational and income levels reveals sharp discrepancies (see Figure 10.5). The proportion of those who favour democracy with monarchical institution is higher in the Tarai (43 percent) than in the hills (35 percent) or mountains (27 percent). In terms of development region, those who prefer democracy with monarchical institution are relatively high in the central (48 percent) and eastern (41 percent) development regions. In the Far-West, in contrast, just 16 percent favor democracy with a monarchical institution.

Figure 10.5: Preference for democracy with or without a monarchical institution by ecological and development regions


If you could vote for democracy with monarchical institution versus democracy without monarchical institution, which would you vote for? (I6, Base=3,000)



The majority (69 percent) of those who prefer secular state also prefer democracy without a monarchical institution and just 28 percent prefer democracy with a monarchical institution. In contrast, just 46 percent of the people who prefer a Hindu state also prefer democracy without a monarchical institution. Slightly more (48 percent) of those who favor a Hindu state prefer democracy with a monarchical institution. See Figure 10.6 for details.


Figure 10.6: Preference for democracy with or without a monarchical institution by preference for a Hindu or secular state

If you could vote for democracy with monarchical institution versus democracy without monarchical institution, which would you vote for? (I6, Base=3,000)



The higher the level of education of a respondent, the more likely he or she was to favor democracy without a monarchical institution, with 38 percent of the illiterate and 71 percent of those with at least a Bachelor's degree favoring democracy without a monarchical institution. See Figure 10.7 for details about each educational level.

Figure 10.7: Preference for democracy with or without a monarchial institution by educational level
 If you could vote for democracy with monarchial institution versus democracy without monarchial institution, which would you vote for? (I6, Base=3,000)




Preference for democracy with monarchial institution and democracy without monarchial institution also varied by income level. The majority of respondents belonging to the lowest and highest categories (earnings of less than Rs. 5,000 and more than Rs. 40,000 a month) prefer democracy with a monarchial institution while all the income groups in between prefer democracy without a monarchial institution. Over the past few years several public opinion surveys have sought to measure people’s preference for the monarchy, but each has worded the question somewhat differently and recorded a different level of support, as is summarised in Table 10.3.

Table 10.3: Comparison of surveys asking respondents’ views on monarchy

S.N.	Wording	Survey	Fieldwork	Support
1.	What do you think about monarchy – should it be retained or abolished?	SDN II	April 2007	41 (retained)
2.	Should there be or should there not be a place for monarchy in the Nepal of the future?	NCPS V	Jan. 2008	49 (there should be)
3.	On 28 May, 2010 it will be two years that the CA has removed monarchy and declared Nepal a republic. How do you assess this event?	Himal Media	April 2010	22 (not right)
4.	If could vote for a monarchy or a republic, which would you vote for?	NCPS VI	Aug. 2010	27 (monarchy)
5.	If you could vote for democracy with a monarchial institution or democracy without a monarchial institution, which would you vote for?	NCPS VII	Feb. 2011	48 (with a monarchial institution)
6.	If you could vote for democracy with a monarchial institution or democracy without a monarchial institution, which would you vote for?	NCPS VIII	June 2011	39 (with a monarchial institution)

Figure 10.8: Preference for democracy with or without a monarchial institution by income
 If you could vote for democracy with monarchial institution versus democracy without monarchial institution, which would you vote for? (I6, Base=3,000)



10.2 Performance of political parties at the local level

The survey also tried to assess the performance of Nepal’s political parties at the district/local levels. Respondents were to rank the performance of the political parties at the district/local level using a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 being a very bad performance, 5 an average performance and 10 a very good performance. All three surveys had similar mean values – 4.1, 4.2 and 4.1 respectively in June 2011, February 2011, and August 2010.

Table 10.4: Mean performance of political parties at the district/local level? (I5, Base=2552)

	August 2010	February 2011	June 2011
Mean performance of political parties at the district/local level	4.1	4.2	4.1

10.3 Hindu versus secular state

In all three surveys, respondents were asked to indicate their preference for a Hindu or a secular state and to rank their level of support on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 representing weak support, 5 representing average support and 10 representing strong support.


The results of each survey were similar: a comfortable majority expressed a clear preference for a Hindu state, with 55 percent, 57 percent and 56 percent favoring a Hindu state in August 2010, February 2011 and June 2011 respectively (see Figure 10.9). In June 2011, some 37 percent thought that Nepal should be a secular state and around 7 percent said they did not know. Interestingly, in June 2011 proponents of both camps were equally stalwart in their beliefs, with mean support for a Hindu state 8.6 and for a secular state, 8.1 (see Table 10.5).

Table 10.5: Preference for a Hindu or a secular state in June 2011

	Percent	Mean support
Nepal should be a Hindu state	55.6	8.6
Nepal should be a secular state	37.1	8.1
Refused	0.2	NA
Don’t know/can’t say	7.1	NA


Figure 10.9: Preference for a Hindu or a secular state in August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011

Do you think Nepal should be a Hindu state or a secular state?
(I7, Base=3,000)



Opinions about secularism differ by development region (see Figure 10.10). The proportion of people who think that Nepal should be a Hindu state is highest in the central (64 percent) and far-western (60 percent) development regions and lowest in the eastern (46 percent) and mid-western (41 percent). Secularism was most favoured in the Mid-West (47 percent) and the East (43 percent).


Figure 10.10: Secularism by development region
Do you think Nepal should be a Hindu state or a secular state?
(17, Base=3,000)



When disaggregating the response to the question about democracy with a monarchical institution or democracy without monarchical institution, an interesting pattern emerges: among those who favour democracy with a monarchical institution, 69 percent think Nepal should be a Hindu state. Among those who favour democracy without a monarchical institution, opinion is divided: 49 percent think Nepal should be a secular state and the same proportion think it should be a Hindu state.

There is a clear division among caste/ethnic communities on the question of the state's relationship with religion: the majority of certain caste/ethnic groups prefer a Hindu state while the majority of others prefer a secular state (see Figure 10.11). More particularly, the majority of respondents belonging to hill ethnic (58 percent), Tarai-Madhesi ethnic (52 percent) and Muslim (74 percent) groups prefer that Nepal be a secular state while a majority of respondents from each of the remaining caste/ethnic groups prefer that Nepal be a Hindu state.

Figure 10.11: Secularism by caste/ethnicity
Do you think Nepal should be a Hindu state or a secular state?
(17, Base=3,000)



10.4 People’s level of trust towards organizations and institutions

The survey explored the people’s level of trust for various institutions and organisations, including the CA, the Cabinet, the judiciary, political parties (in general), the police, the Nepali Army, the PLA, the government civil service, television, radio, newspapers, civil society/NGOs, local government, religious organizations, ethnic organizations, the Election Commission, the private sector and political youth organization. The name of each of these organizations and institutions was read out to respondents and they were requested to rank each on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 represented very untrustworthy, 5 represented neither untrustworthy nor trustworthy, and 10 represented very trustworthy.

In Table 10.6 below, the first column lists the names of various institutions and organizations and the second column documents the base. The percentages in the second column indicate what percentage of respondents had heard of or know about the institution or organization in question. In June 2011, people were most familiar with the police and the radio, with 95 percent professing awareness. The organisations and institutions least known about were civil society/NGOs, the private sector and political youth groups, with just 69 percent professing awareness of each of them in June 2011. Only those respondents who reported knowing about the concerned organisation and institution were asked to give their rating.

Table 10.6: Trust in various institutions and organisations in February and June 2011

Institution/Organization	February 2011		June 2011		Mean Difference
	Base (%)	Mean level of trust	Base (%)	Mean level of trust	
Constituent Assembly	75	4.9	75	4.4	-0.5
Cabinet	72	4.0	72	3.4	-0.6
Judiciary	71	5.4	72	5.0	-0.4
Political parties (in general)	91	3.6	86	2.6	-1.0
Police	97	5.4	95	4.5	-0.9
Nepali Army	95	5.9	92	5.3	-0.6
Maoist combatants/PLA	90	3.6	87	3.1	-0.5
Government civil service	65	5.0	71	4.5	-0.5
Television	90	6.7	91	6.1	-0.6
Radio	81	6.1	95	6.5	+0.4
Newspapers	97	7.1	81	5.7	-1.4
Civil society/NGOs	69	5.8	68	5.3	-0.5
Local government	79	4.7	78	4.1	-0.6
Religious organizations	73	5.4	76	5.1	-0.3
Ethnic organizations	72	4.9	74	4.5	-0.4
Election Commission	72	5.8	72	4.9	-0.9
Private sector	65	5.4	69	4.7	-0.7
Political youth Organizations	69	3.9	69	2.8	-1.1

In June 2011, the highest mean levels of trust were for the media–radio (6.5), television (6.1) and newspaper (5.7). The lowest mean levels of trust were for political parties in general (2.6) and political youth groups (2.8). The mean level of trust is slightly above neutral for the Nepali Army (5.3), civil society/NGOs (5.3) and religious organization (5.1) and slightly below neutral for the Election Commission (4.9). The figures for the February 2011 survey are similar, but the mean level of trust towards all organizations and institutions, with the exception of the radio, declined in June 2011 from the levels in February 2011. The greatest decrease in trust – 1.4, 1.1, and 1.0 points – were recorded for newspapers, political youth groups, and political parties respectively.

Needless to say, the mean rating for each of the institutions and organizations is relative. The media received fairly high ratings because vis-à-vis other institutions and organizations it is perceived to be performing its role in a vibrant manner. Political parties, in contrast, have been unable to formulate the new constitution within the stipulated time frame, to the disappointment of the 70 percent of respondents who ranked constitution-drafting as a high priority, and their performance at the local/district level is considered to be very weak (with a mean value of 4.1 on a scale of 0 to 10 with 10 being a strong performance). For these reasons, people may perceive political parties to be untrustworthy.

At the end of the questionnaire, all respondents were requested to rate their trust of various political leaders. The names of leaders of different political parties were read out and respondents were requested to rank each on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 representing no trust at all, 10 representing a great deal of trust, and 5 representing neither extreme. Only Baburam Bhattarai and President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav received above-average marks–5.7 and 5.2 respectively. All other leaders received below average ratings.

The first column of Table 10.7 below shows the mean score in January 2008 and the second column shows the mean score in June 2011, two-and-one-half years later. The final column measures the difference except in those cases in which a political leader was not included in the January 2008 survey. The average ratings of some leaders have increased, but those of most political leaders have decreased.

The ratings have increased for Baburam Bhattarai, Kamal Thapa, Ram Chandra Poudel and former king Gyanendra Shah by 1.3, 0.6, 0.3 and 0.2 points respectively. The ratings for Madhesh-based political party leaders, in contrast, have dropped significantly. To name a few, Hridayesh Tripathy lost 1.7 points; Mahanta Thakur, 1.5; and Upendra Yadav, 1.2. The ratings of Madhesh-based political party leaders went down not because of a decline in the ratings of non-Madheshis but because of a decline in the ratings of Madhesis themselves. To give an example, in January 2008 Upendra Yadav received a rating of 2.1 from non-Madhesis and of 5.8 from Madhesis, giving him a national average of 3.9. In June 2011, non-Madhesis rated him the same, 2.1, but Madhesis rated him just 3.8, two points less than they had two-and-a-half-year earlier (though still higher than non-Madhesis), giving him a national average of 2.7. The fact that Madhesis rate Madhesh-based political party leaders lower than before is linked to the fact that a larger proportion of Madhesis now say they like to be identified as Nepali only.

The ratings of the political leaders of the CPN-UML, NC, RJP and NEMKIPA went down marginally in the two-and-half-years between the surveys of January 2008 and June 2011.

What the ratings given by the Nepali people to their political leaders underscore is that no political leader is rated highly by the people. Even Baburam Bhattarai, who, with a mean score of 5.7, has the highest rating does not enjoy an exceptionally high score given that 10 is the highest. And this was in June 2011 before he became prime minister. It remains to be seen how he has fared since.

Table 10.7: Trust in various political leaders in January 2008 and June 2011

Political leaders	Mean [Jan. 2008]	Mean [Jun. 2011]	Difference
Baburam Bhattarai [UCPN-M]	4.4	5.7	+1.3
Bijay Kumar Gachhedar [Forum Loktantrik Nepal]	-	2.5	-
Chittra Bahadur K.C. [Rastriya Jan Morcha]	-	3	-
Gyanendra Shah [former king]	2.8	3	+0.2
Hridesh Tripathi [Tarai Madhesh Loktantric Party]	4.0	2.3	-1.7
Jay Krishna Goit [Madhesi Mukti Morcha]	-	2.1	-
Jay Prakash Gupta [Forum Ganatantrik]	-	2.4	-
Jhahnath Khanal [CPN-UML]	-	3.9	-
K. P. Oli [CPN-UML]	3.9	3.5	-0.4
Kamal Thapa [RPP Nepal]	2.3	2.9	+0.6
Madhav Kumar Nepal [CPN-UML]	4.9	4.3	-0.6
Mahanta Thakur [TAMLOPA]	4.3	2.8	-1.5
Matrika Yadav [CPN-Maoist]	-	3.5	-
Mohan Baidhya [UCPN-M]	-	3.7	-
Narayan Man Bijukchhe [NEMKIPA]	3.6	3.1	-0.5
Pasupati Shamsher Rana [RPP]	3.1	2.8	-0.3
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) [UCPN-M]	4.4	4.3	-0.1
Dr. Ram Baran Yadav [President]	-	5.2	-
Ram Chandra Paudel [NC]	3.8	4.1	+0.3
Sher Bahadur Deuba [NC]	4.2	4.1	-0.1
Surya Bahadur Thapa [Rastriya Janshakti]	3.5	3.2	-0.3
Sushil Koirala [NC]	-	4.1	-
Upendra Yadav [MJF]	3.9	2.7	-1.2

Figure 10.12: Ratings of leaders in January 2007, May 2007, January 2008, and June 2011




Figure 10.12 shows the long-term trends in the ratings received by five political leaders – Baburam Bhattarai, Gyanendra Shah, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Prachanda and Sher Bahadur Deuba. It reveals a recent steep increase in the trustworthiness of Baburam Bhattarai from 4.4 in January 2008 to 5.7 in June 2011, but respondents were not asked to rate him in surveys prior to January 2008 so the comparison is limited and his rating is still not as high as Prachanda's at his zenith (6.0 in January 2007). The former king, Gyanendra Shah, is the least popular among the five, but though his rating is low, it hovers steadily around 3 in a scale from 0 to 10. Sher Bahadur Deuba's rating has also shown little fluctuation, not more than 0.3 points; it was 4.1 in June 2011. The political leader who has seen the steepest decline in his rating is Prachanda: in the last four years he has slipped 1.7 points from 6.0 in January 2007 to 4.3 in June 2011. Madhav Kumar Nepal's rating has also declined though not as precipitously as Prachanda's: he has lost 1.1 points since January 2007 and stood at 4.3 in June 2011.

11. Conclusions

1. The public mood

The public mood is shifting from one of disappointment to one of despair. A large majority of people have said repeatedly that the country is headed in the wrong direction, and, regardless of which political party is in government, they have not changed their essential pessimism. The reason for their pessimism is that the nation's political parties have been unable to draft a new constitution, a failure attributable to their inability to reach a consensus. In addition, no government has been able to address any of the three issues of primary concern to the people – poverty, price hikes, and unemployment. Given these inadequacies, it comes as no surprise that the people evaluate the central government negatively and claim that it has bought about little progress or development.

2. Constitution-drafting is the people's number one priority

The public sees drafting a new constitution as the top priority of the CA and a sizeable proportion identified the lack of a constitution as the key national-level problem. In fact, they expressed their doubts whether the CA will ever draft the constitution. A majority think that the country is headed in the wrong direction and give as their primary reason for this evaluation the fact that political parties have been unable to formulate a new constitution. In fact, a significant proportion identify this inability as the main reason they assess the government negatively. Likewise, a clear majority identify constitution-drafting as the issue the government should prioritise and as the core issue of the peace process. Together, these responses clearly underscore the fact that the public sees constitution formulation as the number one priority of the government.

3. Hold new elections if you cannot draft a constitution

Twice as many people oppose the three-month extension than those who support it. The reason for their disagreement is their belief that the extension will not see the formulation of a new constitution. More worrisome is the fact that a clear majority is certain that the CA will not formulate a constitution at all. Resentment towards CA representatives is growing, with 62 percent ranking the performance of their CA representative as poor and many accusing that representative of simply consuming state allowance and not delivering anything. Three times as many people think the CA should not be extended than

those who think that it should. Since the political parties now represented in the CA are seen as incapable of formulating a new constitution, more and more people believe that a date for fresh election to a new CA should be announced. In short, frustration over the CA's inability to agree on a constitution is seeing public opinion gravitate increasingly towards calling for the announcement of a date for new elections.

4. Many undecided voters

Even as new elections to the CA are becoming increasingly preferred, 57 percent of respondents are undecided about which political party they will vote if indeed an election is held. In fact, the proportion of undecided voters went up 10 percent between February and June 2011.

If an election were held today, 10 percent would vote for the NC, 7 percent for the UCPN-Maoist, and 5 percent for the CPN-UML. These proportions are only a small fraction of those that voted for these political parties in the CA election held in April 2008 and it is likely that they represent the most committed of voters. Since so few are decided it is not possible to predict the likely outcome of an election held in the immediate future.

How the undecided will vote if an election is held will depend on how the political parties conduct their election campaigns. People will want to know what agenda the political parties will sell during the election and will pay attention to how they go about selling it. We know that people's expectations of and reasons for voting for the UCPN-M, the NC, the CPN-UML and Madhesh-based political parties in the April 2008 elections were quite different (see chapter 10) and we might expect these differences to persist though the UCPN-M is no longer so new and may have lost the edge which novelty gave it. How people vote will also depend heavily on whether political parties are able to build their momentum such that it peaks on the day of the election itself or whether it peters out prematurely and the extent to which each party is able to convince its supporters to go to the polling station to cast their votes in spite of possible threats and intimidations.

5. Expectations from the peace process

One of the core issues related to the peace process is the management of the weapon/arms of Maoist combatants/PLA. People favour managing the weapon/arms of Maoist combatants/PLA by these being handed over to the Nepal government (41 percent) or placing these under the control of Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist combatants (14 percent). Only 2 percent think that the weapon/arms of the Maoist combatants/PLA should remain under their own control.

One out of every five persons reports being worried about the return of ex-Maoist combatants to their villages and districts. The reason they are apprehensive is because they predict that ex-Maoist combatants will threaten people, engage in criminal activities, and participate in armed violence. At the same time, however, only 4-5 percent believe that ex-Maoist combatants who want to stop being soldiers and return to their villages as civilians should not be welcome in or should be rejected from their localities. An overwhelming majority believe that the best way to make sure that ex-Maoist combatants who return home are not tempted to take up arms again is by providing them either with jobs or with the training they need in order to find jobs.

In view of the continuing stalemate among political parties, half of all respondents do not think that the peace process will hold. However, they also do not think that there will be a resumption of armed hostilities between the former rebels and the state.

6. The attributes of the new state remain contentious

Though the elected CA endorsed the principles of republicanism, secularism, and federalism in its declaration of Nepal as a federal, democratic, and secular republic in May 2008, at the level of the ordinary person, this characterisation of the new state remains contested. No clear and significant majority supports any of these three principles.

Republicanism does not have a clear and significant majority emphatically behind it. In the February and June 2011 surveys respectively, a little fewer than one-half and a little more than one-third of the respondents expressed a preference for democracy with a monarchical institution. The proportion of respondents who preferred a democracy without a monarchical institution, i.e., for a republic, is higher but not by a big margin.

Secularism is also not favoured. The majority of the population – 55 percent, 57 percent, and 56 percent in August 2010, February 2011 and June 2011 respectively – supports a Hindu state. What this implies is not only that secularism is contested at the level of the common person but also that the preference for a Hindu state clearly surpasses that for a secular state.

Finally, the three surveys underscore the public's continuing apathy towards federalism. The mean support of the Nepali people towards federalism in the August 2010, February 2011, and June 2011 was 3.8, 4.2 and 4.1 respectively. Given that a score of 5 on a scale between 0 and 10 is a neutral opinion, average scores below 5 demonstrate that the people are somewhat ill-disposed towards federalism. That the average Nepali has negative feelings about federalism is underscored by people's expectations from federalism, with more respondents anticipating negative outcomes such as that the disintegration or weakening of the Nepali state, the domination of one caste/ethnic group or fighting among those groups than positive ones like more and stronger development at the local level and not having to go to Kathmandu for small things. Moreover, the positive expectations of federalism reflect the public's desire to be able to avail state services at the local level, a desire associated more with decentralisation than with federalism per se.

In short, for the average Nepali, each of the CA-proclaimed attributes of the new Nepali state – federalism, secularism and republicanism – remains contentious.

7. The feeling of being a Nepali first and foremost is ascendant

It is not people's allegiance to the republic or adherence to secularism or commitment to federalism that unites them at this historical juncture. In fact, all three of the key attributes of the new Nepali state are contentious and divisive. What does unite the people of Nepal is a sense of being Nepali. This identity transcends various other identities, including caste, ethnic, regional and religious identities. In fact, the surveys of August 2010 and February and June 2011 highlight that the tendency for people to identifying themselves as Nepali only is growing.

Given that identity-based politics, whether it is based on caste/ethnicity or on region, has been on the ascendant, this finding may come as a surprise. The present trend is in sharp contrast with the surveys of 2007 and 2008, which recorded an increase in the proportion of people identifying themselves as being both Nepali and belonging to a particular caste/ethnic group or region. In January 2008, just 52 percent said they liked to be identified as Nepali only; in August 2010 58 percent said so; in February 2011, 70 percent; and in June 2011, 71 percent. Within just two-and-a-half years, the proportion of people who like to be identified as Nepali only increased by 18 percent.

The fact that more and more people identify themselves as Nepali only indicates a growing fatigue with identity-based politics.

8. Relationships at the local level have not deteriorated

People reported that relationships between various people and communities had either improved or remained the same in comparison to those same relationships three or four years ago. The percentage who reported that relationships have deteriorated was very small, but nonetheless significant (though smaller than those who noted improvements) in the case of relationships between those who hold different political viewpoints and between the rich and the poor in the respondents' localities. Overall, however, relationships between various peoples and communities have not deteriorated over the past three or four years.

There are two likely reasons behind the improvement or at least maintenance of relationships between various communities: first, people are growing disenchanted with identity-based politics at the local level, and, second, the media has played a positive role in fostering amicable relationships among communities.

9. Negative assessment of organisations and institutions

People rated various organisations and institutions, ranging from the CA to the civil service to political youth organisations, unfavorably, with most receiving scores of less than 5, the neutral rating, on a scale of 0 to 10. While this is worrying, it is even more worrisome that political parties received the lowest rating (2.6), followed by youth organisations associated with various parties with the second lowest (2.8). These low scores contrast very unfavorably with the scores of other national institutions such as the Nepal Army (5.3), the judiciary (5.0) and the police (4.5). The institutions which received the most favourable ratings are all media: radio (6.5), television (6.1), and newspapers (5.7). The ratings of most organisations and institutions were lower in June 2011 than they were in February 2011.


The fact that people have given various organisations and institutions low ratings should not, however, come as a surprise given that an overwhelming majority of respondents thinks that the country is headed in the wrong direction.

10. Mismatch between political discourses and public priorities


The fact that political parties received low ratings, that people believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction, and that the attributes of the “new” Nepali state are all contended raises questions about the relationship between the discourses of the nation’s political parties and the preferences of the public. In normal circumstances, political parties articulate the priorities of the public (or at least those of a broad constituency) and go about formulating policies and programmes that reflect those priorities. When there continues to be a chasm between what the public consider to be its priorities and the agendas of the political parties, the question of whether the political parties do indeed reflect the concerns of the wider public or whether, instead, narrow constituencies have unduly molded their agendas should be raised. If the gap between the agendas of political parties—imposed, we must assume, by narrow constituencies or by interest groups with disproportionately loud voices—and the concerns of the common individual continue to diverge over an extended period of time, a new political force (or one that is at present marginal) could seek to transform the public’s despair and discontent into overt dissent, which would manifest itself in a new movement.

Annexes


Annex Ia: Sample districts in the map of Nepal of survey conducted in August 2010



Annex 1b: Sample districts in the map of Nepal of survey conducted in February 2011



Annex 1c: Sample districts in the map of Nepal of survey conducted in June 2011



Annex IIa, IIb & IIc: Frequency tables and cross-tabulation
(available in the CD)

Annex IIIa: Sample distribution of survey conducted in August 2010

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size	Replaced by	
Eastern Mountain	Sankhuwasabha	Siddhapokhari	20		
		Yafu	19		
		Khandbari Mun.	12		
Eastern Hill	Okhaldhunga	Mulkharka	22		
		Kuntadevi	24		
	Udayapur	Beltar	24		
		Khanbu	24		
		Jogidaha	24		
		Triyuga Mun.	12		
	Ilam	Samalbung	24		
		Chulachuli	24		
		Phuyatappa	23		
		Ilam Mun.	12		
Eastern Tarai	Jhapa	Sharanamati	20		
		Satasidham	20		
		Gauradaha	20		
		Duwagadhi	20		
		Jyamirgadhhi	22		
		Shantinagar	22		
		Damak Mun.	16		
		Morang	Pathari	20	
	Sijuwa		20		
	Drabesh		20		
	Dainiya		20		
	Madhumalla		20		
	Jhurkiya		20		
	Matigachha		22		
	Biratnagar Mun.		30		
	Saptari	Pipra (Purba)	20		
		Goithi	20		
		Inarwa Fulpariya	20		
		Mauwaha	22		
		Kachan	22		
		Rajbiraj Mun.	12		
	Central Mountain	Sindhupalchok	Bhote Namlang	24	Jyamire
			Kadambas	24	
Thum Pakhar			24		

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size	Replaced by
Central Hill	Nuwakot	Bageswori Chokade	20	
		Beteni	20	Thansing
		Charghare	20	
		Samundratar	21	Narjamandap
		Bidur Mun.	12	
	Makwanpur	Palung	20	
		Hatiya	20	
		IPA Panchakanya	22	
		Kankada	22	
		Shreepur Chhatiwani	22	
		Hetauda Mun.	14	
Kathmandu Valley	Kathmandu	Indrayani	20	
		Gonggabu	20	
		Pukhulachhi	20	
		Balambu	20	
		Goldhunga	18	
		Kirtipur Mun.	12	
		Kathmandu Mun.	54	
	Lalitpur	Ashrang	15	
		Gimdi	16	
		Lalitpur Mun.	18	
	Bhaktapur	Tathali	17	
		Bhaktapur Mun.	16	
	Central Tarai	Chitawan	Chandi Bhanjyang	20
Patihani			20	
Madi Kalyanpur			18	
Kumroj			18	
Sukranagar			18	
Bharatpur Mun.			16	
Mahottari		Bhatauliya	20	
		Sisawakataiya	20	
		Ramnagar	20	
		Gonarpura	20	
		Banauli Donauli	19	
		Mahottari	18	
		Jaleswor Mun.	12	
Parsa		Pokhariya	20	
		Biranchibarba	20	
		Ghoddauda Pipra	20	
		Chorni	20	
		Bahauri Pidari	20	
		Birgunj Mun.	16	

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size	Replaced by
	Dhanusa	Aurahi	20	
		Andupatti	20	
		Sinurjoda	20	
		Satosar	20	
		Bhuchakrapur	20	
		Basahiya	20	
		Thilla Yaduwa	21	
		Janakpur Mun.	14	
Western Mountain	Manang	Bhraka	3	Dhara pani
Western Hill	Myagdi	Singa	21	
		Jhin	22	
	Parbat	Falamkhani	20	
		Saligram	20	
		Bitalawa Pipaltari	19	
	Syangja	Khilung Deurali	20	
		Fedikhola	20	
		Manakamana	20	
		Pakwadi	22	
		Sekham	22	Malyangkot
		Waling Mun.	14	
	Kaski	Lwangghale	18	
		Puranchaur	18	
		Mijuredada	18	
		Lahachok	20	
		Deurali	20	
		Thumakodada	20	
		Pokhara Mun.	28	
Western Tarai	Nawalparasi	Benimanipur	22	Dumkibas
		Upallo Arkhale	22	
		Bulingtar	22	
		Tribenisusta	22	
		Sanai	22	
		Ramgram Mun.	12	
	Kapilbastu	Banganga	20	
		Chanai	19	
		Kushhawa	18	
		Bedauli	18	
		Ganeshpur	18	
		Kapilbastu Mun.	12	
MW Mountain	Kalikot	Manma	20	
		Malkot	20	

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size	Replaced by
MW Hill	Rolpa	Harjang	24	
		Fagaam	24	
		Aresh	24	
	Salyan	Tharmare	24	
		Tribeni	24	
		Karagithi	25	
	Jajarkot	Salma	24	
		Jagatipur	22	
MW Tarai	Bardiya	Khairi Chandanpur	20	
		Manpur Mainapokhar	20	
		Deudakala	20	
		Gulariya Mun.	12	
	Dang	Syuja	24	
		Satbariya	24	
		Gangapraspur	25	
		Tulsipur Mun.	14	
FW Mountain	Bajhang	Daulichaur	26	Sunkunda
		Kanda	26	Bhairabnath
FW Hill	Baitadi	Sikash	20	
		Gujar	18	
		Nwadeu	18	
		Dasharathchanda Mun.	12	
	Dadeldhura	Sirsha	24	
		Amargadhi Mun.	12	
FW Tarai	Kailali	Ratanpur	22	
		Chaumala	22	
		Pandaun	24	Ramshikharjhala
		Dhangadhi Mun.	12	
	Kanchanpur	Kalika	17	
		Sankarpur	18	
		Mahendranagar Mun.	14	
Total	35	125 VDCs/26 Mun.	3,000	

Annex IIIb: Sample distribution of survey conducted in February 2011

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
Eastern Mountain	Sankhuwasabha	Nundhaki	20
		Mamling	21
		Khadbaari Mun.	10
Eastern Hill	Khotang	Kharmi	20
		Nunthala	20
		Suntale	20
		Dandagaun	20
		Saunechaur	20
		Baspani	21
		Damarkhushivalaya	22
	Terhathum	Piple	24
		Thoklung	24
		Oyakjung	22
Eastern Tarai	Jhapa	Shantinagar	24
		Gauriganj	24
		Kumarkhod	20
		Khudunabari	20
		Bhadrapur Mun.	20
	Morang	Sorabhag	20
		Lakhanntari	20
		Kaseni	20
		Bayarban	20
		Amahibariyati	22
		Biratnagar Mun.	30
	Sunsari	Bakalauri	20
		Madhesa	20
		Purbakushaha	20
		Dhuskee	18
		Inaruwa Mun.	20
	Saptari	Joginiya -2	20
		Rayapur	20
		Khadgapur	20
		Bhangaha	20
Rajbiraj Mun.		10	
Central Mountain	Sindhupalchok	Thulo Dhading	16
		Choukati	20
		Tatopani	20
		Piskar	16
Central Hill	Ramechhap	Saipu	20
		Gumdel	20
		Goswara	18
		Chisapani	20
		Farpu	20
	Nuwakot	Belkot	20
		Deurali	20
		Barsunchet	20

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
		Bageswori Chokade	20
		Kalikalhalde	20
		Madanpur	22
		Bidur Mun.	10
Kathmandu Valley	Kathmandu	Tokha Sarswoti	20
		Mulpani	20
		Bhimdhunga	20
		Suntol	24
		Sundarjal	24
		Gothatar	22
		Khthamandu Mun.	60
		Bhaktapur	Nankhel
	Thimi Mun.	16	
	Central Tarai	Dhanusa	Bharatpur
Bhutahipaterwa			24
Bhuchakrapur			20
Balabakhar			21
Janakpur Mun.			12
Parsa		Bahuarbamatha	20
		Harpatagunj	20
		Supauli	19
		Birgunj Mun.	16
Chitawan		Korak	20
		Chainpur	18
		Gunjanagar	18
		Bharatpur Mun.	16
Bara		Inarwasira	20
		Raghunathpur	18
		Mahendra Adarsha	18
		Bishrampur	18
		Kalaiya Mun.	10
Sarlahi		Bahadurpur	20
		Kabilasi	20
		Karmaiya	24
		Gamhariya	22
		Malangawa Mun.	10
Rautahat		Dumriya (Paroha)	24
		Auraiya	24
		Basatpur	24
		Gaur Mun.	10
Western Mount		Mustang	Chhonhup
Western Hill	Lamjung	Ghanpokhara	20
		Samibhanjyang	20
		Nalma	16
	Tanahu	Ramjakot	24
		Kahu Shivapur	24
		Arunodaya	22
		Chhang	20

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
	Kaski	Bays Mun.	10
		Kalika	24
		Hansapur	24
		Puranchaur	23
		Lwangghale	20
	Baglung	Pokhara Mun.	30
		Tara	24
		Rajkut	24
		Bowang	25
		Kalika (Baglung) Mun.	12
Western Tarai	Nawalparasi	Narayani	20
		Bulingtar	20
		Rakuwa	21
		Ramgram Mun.	12
	Rupandehi	Chhipagada	24
		Khudabagar	24
		Gangoliya	20
		Butwal Mun.	24
	Kapilbastu	Jayanagar	25
		Krishna Nagar	25
Kapilbastu Mun.		12	
MW Mount	Dolpa	Sahartara	20
		Majhgal	20
MW Hill	Surkhet	Gadi Bayalkada	20
		Kafalkot	20
		Guthu	20
		Ratu	20
		Ghumkhahare	18
		Birendranagar Mun.	12
	Pyuthan	Ramdi	20
		Naya Gaun	20
		Lung	20
MW Tarai	Dang	Bhingri	21
		Goltakuri	20
		Manpur	20
		Dhikpur	18
		Pawan Nagar	17
	Tulsipur Mun.	12	
	Banke	Bageswari	20
		Raniyapur	20
Betahani		20	
Nepalganj Mun.	12		
FW Mount	Bajhang	Gadaraya	24
		Lekhgau	28
FW Hill	Baitadi	Sarmali	24
		Raudidewal	24
		Dehimandau	24
		Gajari	20
		Dasarat Chand Mun.	12

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
FW Tarai	Kailali	Pahalmanpur	24
		Ratanpur	24
		Mohanyal	22
		Tikapur Mun.	10
	Kanchanpur	Sankarpur	20
		Jhalari	17
		Mahendranagar Mun.	12
Total	35 Districts	124 VDC/26 Mun.	3,000

Annex IIIc: Sample distribution of survey conducted in June 2011

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	Sample VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
Eastern Mountain	Shankhuwasabha	Khadbaari Mun.	12
		Bala	20
		Siddhapokhari	20
Eastern Hill	Panchthar	Lungrupa	20
		Aangna	20
		Luwamfu	20
		Rabi	20
		Olane	20
		Embung	20
	Terhathum	Morahang	20
		Dangapa	18
		Hwaku	18
		Hamarjung	18
		Samdu	18
Eastern Tarai	Jhapa	Damak Mun.	18
		Rajgadh	20
		Gauradaha	19
		Jyamirgadhi	16
		Tagandubba	16
	Morang	Birtnagar Mun.	22
		Drabesa	20
		Dulari	20
		Mahadewa	23
		Pokhariya	24
	Sunsari	Dharan Mun.	22
		Madhuwan	20
		Barahachhetra	20
		Sahebganj	20
	Saptari	Rajbiraj Mun.	12
		Bhirawa	20
		Theliya	20
		Pansera	22
	Siraha	Siraha Mun.	12
		Devipur	20
		Bhawanipur	20
		Bishnupurkatti	22

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	Sample VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
Central Mountain	Sindhupalchok	Thanpalkot	24
		Marming	24
		Thulo Dhaning	24
Central Hill	Makwanpur	Hetuda Mun.	20
		Ambhanjyang	24
		Basamadi	20
		Sarikhet Palase	20
		Bhimfedi	20
		Dhimal	20
	Kavrepalanchok	Banepa Mun.	18
		Chyasing Kharka	20
		Kaver Nitya Chandeswor	20
		Foksingtar	20
		Budhakhani	20
		Bhimkhori	24
Kathmandu Valley (Central Hill)	Kathmandu	Kathmandu Mun.	60
		Bhimdhunga	20
		Gothatar	20
		Nayapati	20
		Tokha Chadeswori	20
	Lalitpur	Lalitpur Mun.	22
		Sainbu	24
		Thaiba	26
Central Tarai	Rautahat	Gaur Mun.	12
		Pipariya (Paroha)	20
		Bhalohiya (Pipra)	20
		Khesarhiya	20
		Maryadpur	24
	Parsa	Birgunj Mun.	16
		Dhore	24
		Bahuarbamatha	24
		Belwa Parsouni	23
	Mahottari	Jaleswor Mun.	12
		Manara	20
		Etaharwakatti	20
		Sundarpur	22
		Loharpatti	23
	Dhanusa	Janakpur Mun.	12
		Aurahi	20
		Raghunathpur	20
		Manshingpatti	20
		Nanupatti	22
		Bindhi	24

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	Sample VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
	Sarlahi	Malangawa Mun.	12
		Jingadawa	20
		Jamuniya	20
		Laxmipur Kodraha	20
		Bahadurpur	20
		Laxmipur SU.	20
Western Mount	Manang	Manang	3
Western Hill	Arghakhanchi	Dhikura	20
		Argha	20
		Juluke	20
		Pali	21
	Tanahu	Byas Mun.	12
		Kahu Shivapur	20
		Chhipchhipi	20
		Majhakot	20
		Virlung	20
		Anbukhaireni	21
	Gorkha	Prithivinarayan Mun.	12
		Palumtar	24
		Bhirkot	24
		Chumchet	23
		Thumi	20
	Myagdi	Histhan Mandali	20
		Malkwang	24
		Dagnam	21
Western Tarai	Nawalparasi	Ramgram Mun.	12
		Agryouli	21
		Banjariya	20
		Swathi	20
	Rupandehi	Butwal Mun.	16
		Pajarkatti	20
		Samera Marchwar	20
		Bogadi	20
		Harnaiya	16
	Kapilbastu	Kapilbastu Mun.	12
		Hathausa	18
		Kajarhawa	16
		Barakulpur	16

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District 1st Stage	Sample VDC/Mun. 2nd Stage	Sample Size
MW Mount	Humla	Bargaun	20
		Kalika	20
MW Hill	Rukum	Kholagaun	20
		Purtime Kanda	20
		Baflikot	19
		Pyaugha	16
	Surkhet	Birendranagar Mun.	12
		Rakam	20
		Ramghat	20
		Garpan	20
		Dahachaur	20
		Bidyapur	24
MW Tarai	Banke	Nepalgunj Mun.	12
		Manikapur	24
		Saigaun	24
		Kanchanapur	20
	Bardiya	Gularia Mun.	12
		Jamuni	24
		Deudakala	24
		Manpur Mainapokhar	20
FW Mount	Darchula	Ranisikhar	24
		Khalanga	28
FW Hill	Dadeldhura	Amarghadi Mun.	14
		Bhageswor	20
		Bagarkot	20
		Gankhet	18
		Ashigram	16
		Ajayameru	16
FW Tarai	Kailali	Dhangadi Mun.	12
		Kota Tulsipur	20
		Sadepani	20
		Pathariya	17
	Kanchanpur	Mahendranagar Mun.	12
		Dekhatbhuli	24
		Daijee	24
Total	35 Sample Dist.	126 VDCs / 26 Mun.	3000

Annex IVa: Research team of survey conducted in August 2010

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Annex Va, Vb & Vc: Questionnaire
(available in the CD)

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