


# Nepal Contemporary Political Situation-V

Opinion Poll Report



**Sudhindra Sharma**  
**Pawan Kumar Sen**

*Interdisciplinary Analysts*

# Foreward

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Historically, surveys and public opinion polls have been used to collect social information and to gauge the public “mood” under a variety of political systems ranging from totalitarian to fully democratic polities. Systematic opinion polling and democracy have evolved jointly after the 1940s to the point where today democratic leadership is unthinkable in the absence of access to regular and reliable public opinion snapshots. On the other hand, unelected, non-democratic rulers and the political systems they erected have had little use for polls where free citizens voiced their opinions on a range of issues that directly and indirectly affected their lives. Hence, under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the meaning, conduct and uses of public opinion surveys (when they are undertaken) tend to be associated with the state and state elites’ desire to exercise detailed and continuous control over the lives of the citizens. But in free political systems polls provide an important avenue for the expression of popular sovereignty and for leaders to govern with the consent of the governed.

The resurgence of democracy in Nepal after 1990 has fueled an impressive parallel growth in the institutional infrastructure wherein a democratic polity, in theory, might gain traction and perpetuity. The rapid spread of formal and professional higher education; the remarkable quantitative (and in some part qualitative) leap in the reach of the private media; unprecedented growth and power of civil society entities; the ubiquity of issue and advocacy-based non-government organizations (NGOs); quantum change in the scale of opportunities available to Nepalis for exposure to the outside world (foreign employment, internet, and such) have made Nepal a qualitatively different country than it was merely 25 years ago. All these changes have made Nepalis individually and collectively far more aware of the social, political and economic issues and environment around them compared to their fathers and grandfathers.

With increased awareness comes not only the ability to form and debate opinions, but also a pressing civic urge to see leadership address the concerns reflected in popular opinion. Open political systems where citizens’ awareness consistently outpaces the political leadership’s ability to recognize and respond are susceptible to frequent internal crises, and Nepal has seen its share of that condition. All democratic systems were instituted to replace some form of non-consensual rule where leadership was sustained on factors other than determinate popular support. Even after the passage to a system of formal democratic government, leadership styles and governance strategies in new democracies may retain many features of the traditional polity. Disinterest, disregard, and disparagement of real and palpable public opinion are associated with a strain of ‘elitist’ leadership which has cohabited comfortably with many a formal democracy. An elitist leadership and governance style within democracies is quick to assume that it has an intuitive and automatic grasp of public opinion and interest. Hence, it is liable to place little stock on seeking, recording, debating the public’s preferences and reinventing itself based on public opinion obtained through systematic polling.

The average educated South Asian personality faces considerable difficulty with accepting ignorance or error, even when the reputation stakes are minimal. Few educated people in the streets of any South Asian capital will respond with a, "I don't know," to a simple query about directions, even when in fact they truly don't know the answer. Among South Asians with the advantage of ripe age and power this handicap is still more pronounced. Hence, it should not be surprising if South Asian leadership remains at best ambivalent about being guided by genuine public opinion. For all their avowed exterior populism and incessant claims to speak for the "masses," contemporary Nepali leadership and intellectual community is still relatively unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the basic idea behind opinion polling —that the interests and opinions of the "masses" can be reliably identified and measured and furthermore, that such a collective voice has a distinct existence independent of the representational claims of those who purport to speak for the "people" in national discourse.

It is in this intellectual and leadership setting that one must understand the work and role of Interdisciplinary Analysts and their Nepal Contemporary Political Situation (NCPS) longitudinal sample surveys. Public opinion polls have always served the subversive purpose of confronting comfortable leaders with uncomfortable new information. On its part, NCPS has pioneered the science and art of seeking and uncovering the direct opinions of Nepalis on a wide range of important contemporary issues. And the NCPS's injection of systematic data into the Nepali body politic comes not a moment too soon. Anyone familiar with recent history of Nepal knows that this is a nation in the throes of a self-conscious exercise to exorcise the past and to redefine the very tenets of its nationhood. "Transformation," "restructuring" and "New Nepal" are some of the key ideas that have consumed the Nepali political community over the past two years.

Leaving aside the underlying political and ideological motivations behind this, the NCPS offers perhaps the most rational basis to link the Nepali elite's transformative discourse with the opinions and interests of the Nepali "masses." In the past fourteen years, Nepali political party leaders and the political intelligentsia have had sporadic and limited contacts with the "masses" owing largely to the direct and indirect impact of the armed conflict between the state and Maoist insurgents. Two years after the formal signing of a peace accord between the state and the Maoists, full access and contact between the political elite and the Nepali public spread out across the rugged nation still remain problematic and are fraught with risk. During the crucial past half a decade period of social and political upheaval, the NCPS survey was successfully conducted not once, but on five separate occasions. The NCPS captured the national 'mood' of each period at a time when the state and political leadership struggled to maintain basic command and communication links with the population outside of urban centers. Through that process, the NCPS has built a solid inventory of national opinion on key issues to which political and policy leadership can turn to in the course of identifying, debating, refining and implementing key aspects of the agenda for a "New Nepal."

But this assumes that Nepali political and intellectual leaders are populists in the positive sense of the term rather than elitist at heart who have learned to use populism for tactical gain. For true populists, direct communications with the masses (with or without opinion polls) has always provided the means to challenge the power of the 'expert' elites who chronically mistrust the collective judgment and wisdom of the lay citizenry. However, a survey of the behavior of Nepali political and civil leadership over the past two years reveals a mixed pattern. On issues such as pursuing peace and ending the direct rule of the King, the political leadership was fully in sync with the general popular opinion of the time. However, on issues like secularism, ethnic federalism, and on the specifics of what is entailed in catch phrases like 'New Nepal,' the NCPS provides ample grounds to conclude that Nepali political and intellectual leadership relied on elitist prerogative rather than on a populist mandate in forming and articulating its agenda.

On the elitism and populism continuum, therefore, Nepali leaders and politicized intellectuals appear to want to have it both ways.

Polls to elect a new constitution making body are only days away. And in the months and years following the April 10, 2008 vote, Nepali political and intellectual leadership will not shy away from attempting to actively remake the nation and its whole institutional base. This push to renew and reinvent the nation is not in and of itself an unwelcome venture. However to succeed, endure, and gain legitimacy the remaking of Nepal needs to be undertaken in partnership with and in full view of the public. The long term support and legitimacy needed for such a project can only come from seeking out rather than bypassing the opinions of the common masses. NCPS surveys have catalogued an excellent and impressive inventory of national sentiment on many of the issues that the new constitution making body will surely revisit. And there will be many more agendas where the new body will want to examine detailed and nuanced information before inscribing them onto the nation's new supreme law. Here again, elected leaders, activists, and concerned citizens and agencies will want to rely less on their respective ideological baggage and more on viable popular mandates in the course of crafting and delivering a "New Nepal."

The legacy of scientific and replicable national opinion gathering capacity that is behind the successive NCPS surveys (as well as other parallel national bodies) will prove invaluable in the coming days for leaders who are concerned with seeing the true national colors reflected in the new institutional framework of the nation. Those who insist on practicing a disguised elitism in the name of the "people" will probably continue to disparage not only the message but also the messenger. But leaders who embark on ambitious ventures that potentially impact millions of common citizens' lives ignore at their own peril the true collective opinions and interests of those they claim to represent. Just like the balance sheet eventually humbles profligate banking, the logic and weight of popular opinion ultimately catches up with leadership that deploys its dwindling populist collateral in the service of old-fashioned elitism.

**Anup Pahari, Ph.D**  
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# Preface

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As we began our fifth in the series of political opinion polls, we continued with our tradition of engaging with politicians and political parties; and to this end we held an interaction program on 9 January 2008 as we had done during previous surveys. Our purpose was two-fold: to help them understand the science behind the exercise as well as to solicit their views regarding the relevance or otherwise of the questions we were seeking answers to. The objectivity of the survey depends upon a host of factors, including the neutrality of the questions which should not pre-prompt any particular answer that would constitute a bias. The response of party leaders across the political spectrum during the interaction was a great help in honing our survey skills.

In an earlier instance, a senior politician had reacted bluntly saying that, since political leaders already knew what the people's views were, our exercise was pointless for them. It was a classic case of Big Brother knowing what is best for the masses, an unfortunate hubris that has permeated the political class far deeper than desirable. This time around, however, the interaction was characterized by a refreshing degree of inquisitiveness regarding both the scientific methodology and the questionnaire. That the science does allow a small sample, if it is sufficiently statistically representative, to be used to make generalized conclusions across a wider population – “similar to a polyclinic's drawing a drop of blood to conclude what disease is infecting the whole body”, as one politician perspicaciously put it – was thankfully well understood by most of the participants.

A remark by another wizened veteran, however, accurately described what our own efforts meant and what the political reactions might be. He first described our efforts as pioneering, that bringing out this kind of scientifically measured mass public opinion was sorely needed in order to elevate the quality of public discourse in a democracy. He then warned us to be prepared to take the flak: our measurements, no matter how scientifically objective, were bound to unearth mass views that would be contrary to politically-correct shibboleths. How very prophetic that warning has been!!

Since our releasing publicly the primary findings of this NCPS-V at the end of February 2008, a section of broadsheet opinion writers, mostly from the literary circles, have taken umbrage at our findings, specifically the data which shows that, even while King Gyanendra is rated low as a political leader (Table 5.3), monarchy as an institution was still preferred by more people than republicanism (Chart 5.10) with a small minority undecided. (At the press conference, we did not, however, release the data on the popularity, or more importantly the lack thereof, of various political parties and personages: the election code of conduct had been announced and, although technically we still had a week or so of leeway till they came into effect, we voluntarily restrained ourselves in order not to be charged with vitiating the atmosphere. These findings are all included in this report which is being released into the bookstalls after the voting has been completed.)

One senior literary figure called our findings “data terrorism”, while another saw hidden grand designs to prop up what (to borrow Karl Popper’s phrase) historicism has destined to sweep away. It does require deeper analysis to understand why a section of Nepali intelligentsia believes fervently that what writers imagine sitting in a closed room reflects social reality more accurately than what dozens of surveyors fanning across the country measure. Is it just due to a lack of scientific culture? Is it reverse narcissism of upper caste modernism-inspired guilt?

As we have mentioned in our previous reports, the findings of our surveys have surprised us no less in the past. Our approach, however, is to identify those surprises as problems to be further investigated, but using statistical means and in the spirit of science. The contradiction between individual unpopularity of the incumbent and the institution of the monarchy is one among many that we see. Why is it that the support for a Hindu state, as opposed to secular one, is that consistently high, and more so in the adhesh, across surveys done in different periods? How will that feeling translate into votes for different parties, or conversely, what political acrobatics will the parties indulge in, or what strains will they face internally, to capture those sentiments? How will the search for ethnic identity play out in the restructuring of the state in the various constituencies around the country? Just based on a review of this as well as our past surveys, one can come up with a long list of interesting questions that beg urgent answers.

Hopefully, we can provide measured data on mass views in future surveys that will allow a healthy democratic political discourse to tackle these and many other such questions. With a view to furthering public understanding of the science behind the psephology, from this report onwards, we hope to invite independent scholars to contribute an introductory discussion piece on poll related topics. What we look forward to from all our readers will be critical feedback regarding our methodology as well as the newer questions that our questions so far have generated. A better Nepal of tomorrow, a democratic and peaceful Nepal, will perforce require such a science contributing to the formation of enlightened public opinion.

**Dipak Gyawali**  
*Chairman*  
**Interdisciplinary Analysts**

# Acknowledgement

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Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) is fortunate to have received continuous support from The Asia Foundation (TAF) for conducting periodical public opinion surveys in Nepal. 'Nepal Contemporary Political Situation V' is the fifth in the series of political opinion polls that IDA has been conducting during the last several years and which The Asia Foundation (TAF) has generously supported. This time around, IDA has had the privilege of being co-supported by the Enabling State Programme (ESP). Without ESP coming in, the sample size for the survey would not have been large enough to enable generalization nor would it have been possible to publish this report. I am grateful to both TAF and ESP for supporting us in this endeavour.

I am grateful to the following organizations and individuals:

To all the Nepalis spread across the country for sharing with us their views on contemporary politics. Without their consent to be interviewed, the survey wouldn't even have begun.

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The co-author of this study, Mr. Pawan Kumar Sen, Consultant Statistician at IDA for putting in significant inputs in designing the sampling frame and in data analysis, interpretation and report writing (and absolve him of shortcomings remaining in the report by taking them upon myself).

The Election Commission's code of conduct proscribed making public the results of public opinion polls particularly as these pertained to the popularity of political parties and leaders. This restriction was valid from the time when the candidates filled-in their nominations up to the completion of the constituent assembly elections. To comply with the stricture, the results that were shared with the international community on January 28, 2008 and with the media on February 1, 2008 deliberately omitted the portions on the popularity of political parties and leaders. The stricture also affected the publication of this report.

**Sudhindra Sharma, PhD**  
*Principal Investigator & Director, IDA*



# Nepal

# Contemporary Political Situation-IV

## Opinion Poll Report

Sudhindra Sharma  
Pawan Kumar Sen



*interdisciplinary Analysts*

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# Contents

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	3
	4
	5
	5
	8
<b>Sample Characteristics</b>	
2.1 Social composition	10
2.2 Demographic Composition	13
<b>The National Mood</b>	
3.1 Country's overall situation	14
3.2 Country's Major Problems at the National and local levels	17
3.3 Poverty and Development	19
3.4 Public's trust towards various institutions	21
3.5 Assessment of the Present Government	21
3.6 Political Environment	23
3.7 Public's perceptions on safety	25
3.8 Women's Issue	30
3.9 Agitation Movements	31
3.9.1 The Madhesi Agitation Movement	32
3.9.2 The Janajati Agitation Movement	36
<b>Constituent Assembly</b>	
4.1 The Public's Knowledge of the Constituent Assembly	38
4.2 Public's Confidence towards	44
<b>State Restructuring</b>	
5.1 People's perception towards New Nepal	46
5.2 Trust towards the Political Parties	47
5.3 Legitimate Rule	49
5.4 Fundamental Rights	51
5.5 Restructuring the state	51
5.5.1 Monarchy	51
5.5.2 State and Religion	55
5.5.3 The Language issue	58
5.5.4 Identity	60
5.5.5 Electoral System	62
5.5.6 Unitary or Federal System	63
5.6 The legislature parliament	65
5.7 Popularity of political parties and leaders	67
<b>Conclusion</b>	
<b>References</b>	
<b>Annexes</b>	
<b>Annex I: Sample Districts in Map of Nepal</b>	
<b>Annex II: Frequency Tables and Cross-Tabulation</b>	
<b>Annex III: Sample Distribution</b>	
<b>Annex IV: Research Team</b>	
<b>Annex V: Questionnaire</b>	

# Executive Summary

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## General Background

Nepal Contemporary Political Situation (NCPS) is a longitudinal, nation-wide series of opinion surveys that maps changes and continuities in the political opinions of the public. To date, Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), a Kathmandu-based research organisation, has carried out five opinion surveys, including the present one.

This poll, NCPS V was carried out by IDA with the financial support of The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Enabling State Programme (ESP). The survey was designed in November and December 2007 and administered between 23 December, 2007, and 12 January, 2008. After data was processed and analysed in January 2008, preliminary results were released to the international community on 28 January, 2008 and to the press on 1 February, 2008. This report was prepared in February and March 2008.

The Election Commission's code of conduct proscribed making public the results of public opinion polls pertaining to the popularity of political parties and leaders. This restriction was valid from the time when the candidates filled-in their nominations up to the completion of the constituent assembly elections. To comply with the stricture, the results that were shared with the international community and the media deliberately omitted the portions on the popularity of political parties and leaders. This is also the reason why this report has come out only after the completion of the constituent assembly elections.

## Rationale and Objectives

As Nepal begins to gear up for the long-delayed and repeatedly postponed constituent assembly elections, at this crucial historical juncture it is important to understand the political opinions of the people. NCPS V seeks to map trends in the public's opinions about contemporary political issues, whether changes or continuities.

The main objective of NCPS V is to gauge Nepalis perceptions of contemporary political events, including the re-structuring of the state, and to identify changes and continuities in those perceptions. It also attempts to document how much faith the public has in the present government and various state organisations and institutions and to ascertain the public's attitude towards two agitation movements, those of the Madhes and of the Janajati.

## Methodology

Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were adopted. In terms of the quantitative approach, a pre-coded structured questionnaire was formulated, tested in the Kathmandu Valley and then fine-tuned for administration in the field.

The survey collected the views of 3,010 respondents aged 18 and above by employing a random (probability) sampling technique. Sampling was done in five stages. In the first stage, 30 of Nepal's 75 districts were selected using a stratified random sampling technique. In the second, proportional numbers of village development committees (VDCs) and/or municipalities were selected from each sample district using a simple random sampling technique. Then in the third stage, a number of wards from each the VDC were selected. In the fourth stage, households were selected randomly from each sample ward by employing the right-hand-rule. Finally, in the fifth stage, a member from each selected household was identified using a kish-grid.

The margin of error is +/- 1.8 percent at a 95 percent confidence level at the national level. The survey does not claim the same level of precision at the regional or district levels.

To round out the quantitative data with qualitative data and gain additional insight in-depth interviews were conducted with 38 individuals from across the country. They were selected purposively so that they would represent various ideological persuasions, age -groups, development and geographic regions, sex, caste/ethnicity and urban-rural settlements. Using an open-ended questionnaire respondents were asked to express their views in greater depth. The interviews were recorded on tape recorders and later transcribed.

Thirteen field supervisors and 46 interviewers with sufficient experience in conducting surveys and in-depth interviews conducted the fieldwork. These were, in turn, monitored by five field monitors. Data was processed and analysed using the software programmes FoxPro, SPSS and MS Excel.

## **Country's Overall Situation**

Asked about Nepal's overall situation forty percent responded that the country was moving in the wrong direction and only 25 percent said that it was moving in the right direction. Eight percent thought that the country was moving in both the right and the wrong direction, depending on the issue.

## **Country's Major Problems at the National and Local Levels**

What the people perceive as major problems at present are not conflict-related problems. Instead people identified poverty, price hike and lack of employment in that order as the major challenges facing the country. Development related issues are seen as the main challenges at the local level. The lack of roads, domestic water and electricity in that order were identified as the main challenges.

## **Public's Trust towards Various Institutions**

The public place a great deal of faith in religious and ethnic organisations and media persons. State organs such as the Nepali Army and Nepal Police are also trusted. Institutions such as the Legislature Parliament and the Cabinet receive conspicuously little trust. Surprisingly, Nepali public trust non-political organisations like religious and ethnic organisations and civil society more than they do state institutions.

## **Assessment of the Present Government**

People are divided with regard to their assessment of the government. Thirty-seven percent believe that the present government is performing well while 29 percent say that it is not. Twenty-four percent had no opinion or did not know.

## **Political Environment**

A simple majority, 50 percent, said that they can express their political views without intimidation while 23 percent said that they cannot. A significant proportion, 27 percent, did not know or could not say definitively.

## **Public's Perceptions of Safety**

Most of the Nepalis report that they feel safer now than they did before the People's Movement of April 2006.

In response to a question about the incidence of crimes that occurred in their locality during the past one year, respondents claimed that the misbehaviour of drunkards and theft were the two most prevalent types of crime (at 35 and 34 percent respectively), followed by robbery (15 percent), fights between gangs (11 percent), extortion/forced donation (10 percent), threats (10 percent), drug abuse (8 percent) and physical assault/beating (7 percent)..

Fifty-four percent people reported the occurrence of at least one type of crime during the past year.

## **Women's Issues**

In response to the question 'Do you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems in our country?' the overwhelming majority, 87 percent said "yes". The lack of access to education, the lack of freedom, domestic violence and unemployment were identified as the major problems of women.

## **The Madhesi Agitation - Movement**

The survey found that a majority, 69 percent, had heard of the Madhesi movement but that, only 23 percent thought that they know what the demands of the movement are. Nine percent strongly agreed with the demands. The overwhelming majority of the people think that the movement should be resolved by the government negotiating with the leaders of the movement.

## **The Janajati Agitation - Movement**

The survey found that a majority, 53 percent, had heard of the Janajati movement but that, only 19 percent thought that they know what the demands of the movement are. Six percent people strongly agreed with the demands. As in the case with the Madhesi movement, an overwhelming majority of the Nepalis think that the movement should be resolved by the government negotiating with the leaders of the movement.

## **Public's Knowledge about the Constituent Assembly**

Sixty-seven percent of Nepalis had heard about the constituent assembly and 26 percent reported that they have some idea of what the constituent assembly is, but only 21 percent of all Nepalis genuinely understand what a constituent assembly is.

The Nepali people think that the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists are jointly responsible for not holding the constituent assembly election as scheduled.

Many Nepalis think that elections for constituent assembly will probably not be held within the next six months. This response can probably be attributed to the fact that the constituent assembly has been postponed two times.

## **People's Perceptions of 'New Nepal'**

Most Nepalis, 59 percent, have heard of 'New Nepal' and 45 percent people show some degree of agreement with the concept. They anticipate that 'New Nepal' will bring development, law and order, equal opportunities for all and employment.

## **Trust towards Political Parties**

In aggregate terms, about 39 percent of Nepalis have some level of trust towards CPN (UML) while 42 percent do not. Some 25 percent people have some level of trust towards CPN (Maoists), while 57 percent do not. About 31 percent have some level of trust towards the Nepali Congress, while 50 percent do not.

## **Legitimate Rule**

In response to the question 'Who should rule the country for the rule to be legitimate?' most people (42 percent) said that a prime minister responsible to the Parliament was a legitimate ruler. About one-third said they did not know.

## **Fundamental Rights**

The survey results reveal that the public rated the right to equality as most important with a score of 8.6 out of 10. The right to freedom of opinion and expression (8.4) and the right to assemble peacefully and without arms (8.3) were ranked second and third.

## **Monarchy**

Forty-nine percent of Nepalis said that monarchy should have a place in the Nepal of the future but 38 percent said it should not. Around 12 percent said they do not know or cannot say. Most of the people think that the decision on the monarchy should be made through a referendum.

## **State and Religion**

Fifty-nine percent of Nepalis thought that the Nepal of the future should be a Hindu state while 31 percent favoured a secular state. Around 10 percent had no opinion.

## **The Language Issue**

A simple majority of Nepali people (50 percent) think that languages other than Nepali should be also adopted as official languages at the local level while a significant proportion, 41 percent, think that Nepali should be the only official language.

## **Identity**

Fifty-two percent of the people like to be identified exclusively as a Nepali while another 41 percent like to be identified simultaneously as a Nepali and as someone belonging to a particular ethnicity/region.

## **Electoral System**

More than half of Nepal's population (56 percent) have not heard the terms "first-past-the-post system" and "proportional system", only 30 percent had heard of these electoral systems.

## **Unitary or Federal System**

Sixty-five percent had not heard of the terms "unitary system" and the "federal system"; only 23 percent had heard of them.

The public's perceptions of state restructuring agenda vary by caste/ethnicity. Hill caste groups are in favour of abolishing the monarchy. A majority of hill Janajatis and Muslims favour secularism. A majority of all Madhesi groups favour a multi-official language policy while all non-Madhesi groups oppose such a policy. A majority of all hill groups like to be identified as Nepali only while a majority of all Madhesi groups like to be identified as both a Nepali and a Madhesi simultaneously.



## **The Legislature Parliament**

Sixty-three percent do not know or cannot say whether the Legislature Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of Nepal and only 24 percent said that it was the right body. Twelve percent said that it is not the right body to decide on the future of the country.

## **Popularity of Political Parties and Leaders**

Some 13 percent said that they would vote for the CPN (UML), 11 percent said they would vote for the Nepali Congress and another 8 percent said they would vote for the CPN (Maoist). Forty-three percent said they did not know or could not say who they would vote for and 15 percent did not want to disclose their choice. From such limited commitment it is not possible to predict the outcomes of the constituent assembly elections scheduled for 10 April 2008.

No political leader is rated highly by the people. Most political leaders received scores of less than five, which was the average on a scale from 0 to 10. The public rated Girija Prasad Koirala (5.2) as the most popular leader followed by Madhav Kumar Nepal (4.9), Dr. Baburam Bhattarai (4.4), Prachanda (4.4) and Mahanta Thakur (4.3). King Gyanendra received an unfavourable rating (2.8) from the public.

# I. Introduction

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## 1.1 General background

Nepal Contemporary Political Situation (NCPS) is a longitudinal, nation-wide opinion survey that maps changes and continuities in the political opinions of the public. To date, Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) has conducted a series of five opinion polls (including the present one). While the first four were supported solely by The Asia Foundation (TAF), the present one was co-supported by Enabling State Programme (ESP)<sup>1</sup>. This survey, the fifth, was conducted between December 23, 2007 and January 12, 2008.

The forces that came to the centre stage in Nepali politics subsequent to the people's movement of April 2006, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), reached a consensus on how to overcome the constitutional and political crises facing the country. They agreed to have an elected constituent assembly draft and then ratify new constitution.

While holding elections to the constituent assembly was deemed a necessary condition for resolving the twin crises, that election has been postponed twice. The government was unable to hold the election as first planned in April 2007 because in part, the time for preparation was insufficient and in part because of events in the Tarai.

Soon after the Legislature-Parliament endorsed the interim constitution on January 15, 2007, some Madhesi political leaders demanded that it be amended to take into account the concerns of the Madhesi people. Non-violent Madhesi groups such as the Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum (MJF), groups espousing violence such as Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) and the Madhesi leaders of dominant political parties called for mass action demanding proportional representation, the re-delineation of election constituencies on the basis of population and a federal state structure.

Other factors which delayed the election included the non-cooperation of both Madhesi and Maoist MPs and the resultant stalling of proceedings in the Legislature Parliament.

Bandhs declared by groups such as the Indigenous Janajati Federation to pressure the government to heed to their demands regarding issues related to federalism complicated matters, especially as the Madhesi demand for self-determination is more radical than the position of the hill and Tarai Janajati groups (International Crisis Group, July 2007).

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<sup>1</sup> ESP is a programme under Department for Foreign International Development (DFID).

In response a bill was tabled on February 18, 2007, to amend the interim constitution to incorporate the issues raised by Madhesi and Janajati activists. On March 9, 2007 the Legislature-Parliament approved the bill creating Electoral Constituency Delimitation Commission (ECDC) in order to revise constituencies. This amendment guaranteed federalism, a mixed electoral system, the re-delineation of constituencies to suit the increased population in Tarai, and the proportional representation of all marginalised communities, including Madhesis, Janajatis, Dalits and women at all levels of the government and in all sectors of the state. A new date for the elections to constituent assembly was set for early November 2007.

Madhesi MPs rejected the ECDC's recommendations on April 18, 2007. They demanded that a new census be conducted and blocked the functioning of the Legislature-Parliament for over a month.

The Legislature-Parliament approved a second amendment of the interim constitution on 13 June, 2007. This amendment empowered the Legislature Parliament to abolish the monarchy and to remove the prime minister by a two-thirds vote in the House (Hachhethu et. al. 2008).

The 22-point agreement reached between the government and the agitating MJF on 30 August, 2007, ensured that the Madhesi people and other marginalised groups would be represented in the constituent assembly, that states in the federal system would be autonomous and that the constituent assembly election would employ a mixed electoral system.

On 5 October, 2007, the SPA decided to suspend the constituent assembly election that had been re-scheduled for November 2007 as they failed to break the deadlock that emerged after the Maoists refused to compromise on their demands to change the electoral system to one fully proportional and to have the interim parliament declare the country a republic.

The political deadlock lasted several weeks as both the government and the Maoists stuck to their respective positions. They did, however, continue to try to forge a consensus, and after considerable negotiation reached a 23-point agreement on December 22, 2007. They agreed in part to have the interim parliament declare the country a republic subject to endorsement by the constituent assembly, to hold elections to 601-member constituent assembly by mid-April 2008, to elect 60 percent members through proportional representation, and to have the Maoists rejoin the government.

In the meantime, the MJF in response to the second postponement, ended the 22-point agreement with the government on 6 October, 2007, and announced peaceful protests in several districts in the Tarai demanding an all-party 'election government', the dissolution of the Legislature Parliament and a proportional representation electoral system.

On 28 December, 2007 the Legislature Parliament amended the interim constitution for a third time. It declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, subject to be endorsed at the first meeting of the constituent assembly. It also gave the prime minister all the rights and responsibilities of the head of the state until the constituent assembly election and while retaining a mixed electoral system, accorded greater weight to proportional representation.

## 1.2 Political Events during Field Survey

While the field survey was being conducted between 23 December 2007 and 12 January 2008, the following political events took place:

- December 23, 2007 – Top leaders of the SPA and the Maoists reached a 23-point agreement to end the political deadlock and to hold constituent assembly elections by mid-April 2008.
- December 27, 2007 – United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) said that during the process of verification the joint monitoring team had ascertained that 12,648 Maoist combatants were not, in fact, members of the Maoists People’s Liberation Army.
- December 28, 2007 – (i) The interim parliament approved a bill to amend the interim constitution for the third time. This amendment declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, to be implemented at the first meeting of the constituent assembly. The amendment also cleared the way for holding constituent assembly elections in mid-April. (ii) Resigning as senior cabinet minister and Nepali Congress lawmaker, Mahantha Thakur announced the launch of a new political party called Tarai-Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP) for safeguarding ‘the identity, rights and dignity’ of the Madhesi people.
- January 4, 2008 – (i) The SPA decided to hold joint mass meetings in cities across the country to create a conducive environment for the constituent assembly elections. (ii) TMDP handed an 11-point memorandum to Prime Minister Koirala and gave him an ultimatum to fulfill their demands by January 18.
- January 10, 2008 – Prime Minister Koirala expanded his cabinet by nominating three new ministers and five state ministers.
- On January 11, 2008 – (i) The government decided to hold the constituent assembly elections on April 10, 2008. (ii) The Cabinet also decided to send the Maoists who did not qualify as PLA combatants home by mid-February.

The political events described above undoubtedly affected the minds of the public during the survey. In contrast to the period preceding it or following it, the period when the field survey was undertaken saw breakthroughs, which could only have created a favorable impression in the minds of the public and affected their responses.

Before 23 December, 2007, the SPA and the Maoists met repeatedly but were unable to resolve their differences including settling on a date for constituent assembly elections. The period after 12 January, 2008, was similarly tumultuous: it was characterized by the agitation in Tarai and created uncertainty over the fate of the constituent assembly elections.

## 1.3 Rationale

When the survey was conceived in November 2007, the intimacy between the SPA and the Maoists had cooled over the previous several months and distrust between the two forces that had ushered in the people's movement of 2006 had grown.<sup>2</sup> Each accused the other of not adhering to the 12-point agreement signed in Delhi in November 2005. While the mood of the people following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2007 was euphoric, with the repeated postponement of the constituent assembly and the chill in the relationship between the SPA and the Maoists, people had grown apprehensive. They feared that the political consensus among the parties and the Maoists would break down and give way once more to open hostilities.

An unexpected breakthrough occurred on 23 December, 2007, when the top leaders of the SPA and Maoists reached a 23-point agreement to end political deadlock and to hold the constituent assembly elections by mid-April 2008. Since then the mood of the country has gradually shifted back to one of cautious optimism.

As the country begins to gear up for a long-delayed and repeatedly postponed constituent assembly election, it is important to understand people's political opinions at a crucial historical juncture. How do people assess the overall direction of the country? What do they think are the nation's biggest problems? What do they identify as the biggest problems at the local level? How much do they trust various state organisations and institutions? How do they assess the present government and what do they see as its strengths and its weaknesses? Do they think the political environment is free of fear and intimidation? What is their perception of safety? Do they feel more or less safe than they did before April 2006? How much do the people trust the main political parties? What is their view of issues associated with state re-structuring, including a republic versus a monarchy, the relationship between the state and religion, identity, the electoral system and the state system (whether unitary or federal). What are their thoughts about the Madhesi and Janajati movements? How popular are various political parties and political leaders? As it did in the past, NCPS in its fifth survey measures the changes and continuities in the opinions of the public.

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<sup>2</sup> We have retained the popularly used term SPA (i.e., Seven Party Alliance). Though the actual number of parties in the alliance has been reduced such as when the Nepali Congress and Nepali Congress (Democratic) reunited, how many parties are there currently in the alliance is far from definitive. For instance, the status of Nepal Sadhbhavana Party (Anandidevi), one of the partners in alliance, is ambivalent. In order to avoid the confusion over the actual number of partners in the alliance, we have retained the term SPA. Moreover 'SPA' has tended to stick in public discourses, which further justifies retaining it. The current interim government is referred to as SPA and Maoists.

## 1.4 Objectives

The main objective of this opinion poll is to gauge perceptions of the Nepali public towards contemporary political events. The specific objectives were as follows:

- To identify what the public perceives as the major challenges facing Nepal.
  - To identify what the public perceives as the major challenges at the local level.
  - To ascertain how much trust the public has in the present government.
  - To ascertain how much trust people have in the various state organisations and institutions.
  - To ascertain how much trust people have in the main political parties, namely, the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists).
  - To ascertain the public's perception of various movements, including those of the Madhesi and the Janajati and state's response to them.
  - To document the public's perception of various issues related to state re-structuring.
- To suggest to the government, various political parties, donors and other stakeholders what their priorities should be during this transition period.

## 1.5 Methodology

Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were employed.

### 1.5.1 Quantitative Approach

#### 1.5.1.1 Questionnaire Formulation

A pre-coded, structured questionnaire that sought to fulfil the aforementioned objectives was formulated by consulting a wide range of experts. It was first formulated in Nepali, the version used in the field. In regions and communities where the mother tongue was other than Nepali, the interviewer translated the questions before administering it. A pilot test was carried out in the Kathmandu Valley on December 16, 2007, before it was administered in the field. The questionnaire was fine-tuned on the basis of feedback from the pilot test.

#### 1.5.1.2 Sampling Design

A nation-wide opinion poll with a sample size of 3,010 respondents aged 18 and above was conducted by employing a random (probability) sampling technique. Sampling was done in five stages.

Nepal can be divided into three ecological regions: the mountains, the hills and the Tarai. For administrative purposes, it is divided into five development

regions (DR): the eastern, central, western, mid-western and far-western. Together the two parameters divide the country into 15 distinct eco-development regions, namely eastern mountain, eastern hill, eastern Tarai, etc. The Kathmandu Valley is considered a sixteenth region on the basis of its being home to the capital and to a substantial population<sup>3</sup>. Each of the 16 eco-development regions is a stratum with distinct physical, cultural-linguistic and social features. Within a stratum there is a high degree of homogeneity, while across strata there is generally a high degree of heterogeneity.

In the first stage, 30 of Nepal's 75 districts were selected using a stratified random sampling technique (representing all 16 strata). The number of districts selected from each stratum was decided through proportional allocation. Total sample size of 3,010 respondents was proportionally distributed across these sample districts (i.e., through a method known as probability proportionate to size (PPS)).

In the second stage, proportional numbers of village development committees (VDCs) and/or municipalities were selected from every sample district using a simple random sampling technique. The numbers of sample VDCs varied according to the size of the sample districts. One VDC was selected for every 20 respondents: for example, if a sample district required that 40 respondents to be selected, two VDCs, each with around 20 respondents, were selected.

In the third stage, the VDC sample size was further distributed into wards. For a VDC sample size of 20, two wards were selected by employing simple random sampling<sup>4</sup>, and then for each ward, 10 respondents were identified. Urban respondents were selected from all the municipalities in each of the sample districts (see Annex III for a detailed breakdown of the sample).

In the fourth stage, households in each sample ward were selected randomly by employing the random walk technique<sup>5</sup>.

Finally in the fifth stage, a member in the selected household was selected using a Kish grid. In this method, one individual is randomly selected to interview from a list of all household members above 18 years of age. Using the grid ensures that each eligible member in a selected household has an equal chance of being selected.

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3 The population of combined Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur districts is 1,645,091 and it constitutes 7.1 percent of the total population of Nepal (CBS, 2004).

4 Even though wards within a sample VDC were randomly selected, field supervisors were instructed to check whether the sample wards were widely distributed within a sample VDC. If two randomly selected wards were adjacent, field supervisors were allowed to select a non-contiguous ward.


5 The starting points for a random walk are recognizable locations such as schools, crossroads, chautaras and bazaars. First, interviewers walk in any direction counting the number of households. If it is less than 20, an interviewer will select the first 10 households on his/her right. If it is between 20 and 29, the interviewer will select the first household and then select every third household on his/her right until he/she has covered 10 households. If the number is 30 or more, the interviewer will select the first household and then each fourth household on his/her right until he/she covers 10 households.

In addition to randomly selected respondents, respondents belonging to marginal caste ethnic groups were deliberately selected from the sample VDCs and municipalities to make sure they were not excluded.

The margin of error is +/- 1.8 percent at a 95 percent confidence level at the national level. The poll does not claim the same level of precision at the regional level analysis.

### 1.5.1.3 Fieldwork Management and Data Collection

Field supervisors and interviewers with sufficient experience in survey methods were employed to carry out the fieldwork. Local people well conversant in the local language were given preference and districts, ecological regions, local ethnic-caste makeup and gender balance were considered. The interviewers were supervised by field supervisors.



Before deploying the field supervisors and interviewers in the field, two-day training was conducted on 18 and 19 December 2007, to inform them about the objectives of the research, survey research methodology and to explain their roles and responsibilities. They learned about 'right-hand-rule' and Kish grid sampling techniques and were briefed about administering the structured questionnaire, including how to clarify a question and how to encourage respondents who were confused or hesitant. To test their capacity, all participants conducted a mock-survey amongst themselves. The field supervisors were then provided a special briefing on field supervision. Altogether 13 field supervisors and 46 interviewers conducted interviews across the country between December 23, 2007 and January 12, 2008. (See Annex IV for the list of researchers).

The ethics of research was explained to the supervisors and interviewers: they were instructed to follow the norms and values of research, and to respect local cultures. All the questionnaires and checklist clearly mentioned why and on behalf of whom the team was in the field. All the information was obtained with the consent of the respondents and is true to the extent that the respondents expressed their true political opinions.

An additional five field monitors were deployed separately to observe the works of the interviewers and supervisors. In accordance with international norms, the monitors spot-checked five percent of the entire sample.



#### 1.5.1.4 Database Management and Analysis

Data was processed and analysed using the software programmes Visual Basic, SPSS and MS Excel. Using Visual Basic a data entry programme with legal codes, and authorized range, consistency and extreme case check systems to keep the data clean was developed. After it was entered, the data was imported in the SPSS software to further manage and analyse and present it in tabular form. Then MS Excel was used to produce charts and graphs. Cross-tabulations of all the questions and demographic variables such as age group, educational status, sex, caste/ethnicity, urban-rural settlement, development region, ecological region and others were carried out. Those that showed significant relationships as expressed through specific statistical tests like chi-square are presented in the main text of the report. The write-up uses as much visual aid as possible (The tables that show the cross tabulations between the dependent and independent variables are presented in Annex II. Since Annex II takes up considerable space, this is available only in digital form).

#### 1.5.2 Qualitative Approach

In-depth interviews were conducted with 38 individuals from across the country representing people of different age groups, education, caste/ethnicity, development-geographic regions, sex, religions and occupations. Two to four respondents were selected from every eco-development region for in-depth interviews. Sufficient time was spent to build rapport before the actual one-to-one interview commenced. The interviews were conducted in a private setting. Respondents were asked to express their views on the open-ended questions. The interviews were recorded on tape recorders, and later transcribed in Nepali. The findings from the in-depth interviews are presented as quotations in the chapter on survey findings.

### 1.6 Organisation of the Report

Chapter 1 discusses the current political situation in Nepal, identifies the rationale of the study and delineates its objectives. In addition, it describes the methodology employed in the survey and outlines database management techniques.

Chapter 2 highlights the characteristics of the sample. It describes the demographic, geographic and social compositions of the sample, its distribution across educational status and occupation and, where applicable, compares its composition with that of the general population.

Chapter 3 discusses the national mood of the country. It presents the country's overall situation as the public sees it. It identifies the major problems the people think the country faces at national and local levels. It also discusses the public's assessment of the present government, the political environment, safety, women's issue and ongoing agitation movements.

Chapter 4 discusses the people's knowledge about the constituent assembly. This chapter also discusses their confidence in the constituent assembly elections.

Chapter 5 discusses state re-structuring. It presents the public's perception of state re-structuring agendas such as abolishing the monarchy, secularism, a multi-language policy, identity, the electoral system and federalism. It also discusses the public's assessment of the main political parties and leaders, and the public's perception of 'New Nepal'.

Findings obtained from the analysis of both single and multiple response questions are presented in terms of percentages. Findings obtained from questions where the public expresses its feelings through numerical ratings are presented in terms of scores on a scale of 0 to 10. In addition to providing general proportions, the report examines the public's response by disaggregating responses across several variables, such as development region, ecological region, urban-rural settlement pattern and caste/ethnic groups if a significant relationship exists. Findings obtained from the in-depth interviews are also integrated. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 also discuss the trends in the public's perceptions by comparing the main findings of this poll with those of previous polls conducted by IDA.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusions.

In addition, the report includes several annexes.

Annex I contains a map of Nepal identifying the sample districts.

Annex II contains frequency tables of the public's view on every question as well as cross tabulations across different dependent variables.

Annex III shows the distribution of the sample VDCs and municipalities included in the opinion poll.

Annex IV lists the names of researchers who were involved in the research.

Annex V contains the questionnaire that was administered.

## II. Sample Characteristics

### 2.1 Social Composition

Most of the caste/ethnic groups of the country are proportionately represented in the sample. However, some groups, like Chhetris, Bahuns, Magars and Newars, are slightly over-represented while other groups in the hills and the Tarai, including Muslims, are under-represented. In order to correct this, a weighting factor is assigned to every caste/ethnic group in order to make their proportions consistent with those of the general population<sup>1</sup>.


TABLE 2.1 Caste/Ethnic Group Composition (in percent)

Caste/ Ethnicity	Population	Actual Sample	Weighted Sample	Caste/ Ethnicity	Population	Actual Sample	Weighted Sample
Chhetri	15.80	16.45	15.80	Kanu	0.42	0.53	0.42
Bahun	12.74	15.12	12.74	Rajbansi	0.42	0.27	0.42
Magar	7.14	8.41	7.14	Sunuwar	0.42	0.13	0.42
Tharu	6.75	4.15	6.75	Sudhi	0.40	0.93	0.40
Tamang	5.64	4.75	5.64	Lohar	0.36	0.76	0.36
Newar	5.48	7.24	5.48	Tatma	0.34	0.40	0.34
Muslim	4.27	2.62	4.27	Khatwe	0.33	0.37	0.33
Yadav	3.94	5.68	3.94	Majhi	0.32	0.56	0.32
Biswokarma	3.94	3.09	3.94	Dhobi	0.32	0.07	0.32
Rai	2.79	2.49	2.79	Nuniya	0.29	0.56	0.29
Gurung	2.39	2.82	2.39	Kumhar	0.24	0.20	0.24
Damai/Pariyar	1.72	1.76	1.72	Danuwar	0.23	0.50	0.23
Limbu	1.58	1.76	1.58	Chepang	0.23	0.23	0.23
Thakuri	1.47	2.43	1.47	Haluwai	0.22	0.10	0.22
Sarki/Mijar	1.40	0.63	1.40	Rajput	0.21	0.03	0.21
Teli	1.34	1.66	1.34	Kayastha	0.20	0.17	0.20
Chamar	1.19	0.56	1.19	Satar	0.19	0.10	0.19
Koiri	1.11	0.70	1.11	Marwadi	0.19	0.03	0.19
Kurmi	0.94	0.83	0.94	Barahi	0.16	0.37	0.16
Sanyasi	0.88	0.23	0.88	Bantar	0.16	0.07	0.16
Dhanuk	0.83	1.23	0.83	Kahar	0.15	0.10	0.15
Musahar	0.76	0.96	0.76	Rajbhar	0.11	0.03	0.11
Sherpa	0.76	0.13	0.76	Dhimal	0.09	0.03	0.09
Dusadh	0.70	0.50	0.70	Bhediya	0.08	0.03	0.08
Sonar	0.64	0.47	0.64	Darai	0.07	0.07	0.07
Kewat	0.60	0.37	0.60	Thakali	0.06	0.20	0.06
Tarai Brahman	0.59	0.93	0.59	Tajpuriya	0.06	0.13	0.06
Baniya	0.55	0.53	0.55	Mali	0.05	0.03	0.05
Bhujel	0.52	0.70	0.52	Badi	0.02	0.13	0.02
Mallah	0.51	0.90	0.51	Meche	0.02	0.03	0.02
Kalwar	0.51	0.70	0.51	Sikh	0.01	0.03	0.01
Kumal	0.44	0.23	0.44	Others	3.28	0.96	3.28
Hajam	0.43	0.80	0.43	Total	100.00	100.00	100.00


<sup>6</sup> If a sample is not perfectly consistent with the population, weight is adopted to make it consistent. In order to adjust this, a weight of the value less than 1 is adopted for Chhetris, Bahuns, Magars and Newars while a weight of the value more than 1 is adopted for those groups who are under-represented. This adjustment makes caste/ethnic groups perfectly consistent with the population. In the present study further analysis has been done on the basis of weighted sample composition.

These caste/ethnic communities can be divided into eight broad groups: hill caste groups (Chettri, Bahun, Thakuri, Sanyasi, etc.), hill ethnic group (Magar, Tamang, Rai, Gurung, etc.), hill Dalits (Kami, Sarki, Damai, etc.), Newars, Madhesi castes (Yadav, Teli, Tarai Brahman, Rajput, etc.), Madhesi ethnic groups (Tharu, Rajbanshi, etc.), Madhesi Dalits (Chamar, Musahar, Dusadh, etc.), and Muslims. The proportions of these eight aggregated caste/ethnic groups are as follows:

**CHART 2.1 Broad group of caste/ethnicity of the respondents**



**CHART 2.2 Caste/ethnicity of the respondents by origin**



Since one important comparison made in subsequent chapters is that between Madhesi and non-Madhesi groups, all Madhesi groups are aggregated and juxtaposed with non-Madhesi groups. In the sample as a whole, 65 percent are non-Madhesi and 35 percent are Madhesi.

In terms of religious affiliations, the sample broadly matches that of the general population as recorded in the census of 2001.

**TABLE 2.2 Religion composition (in percent)**

Religious Affiliation	Population	Weighted Sample
Hinduism	80.7	84.1
Buddhism	10.7	7.3
Islam	4.2	4.3
Christianity	0.5	1.1
Kirat	3.6	3.1
Atheism	0.0	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The sample is also consistent with the general population in terms of rural/urban composition.

## 2.2 Demographic Composition

Of the 3,010 respondents interviewed, 1,506 (50.0 percent) were female and 1,504 (50.0 percent) were male. The sex composition of the sample closely matches the population census of 2001.

About 23 percent of respondents represent the young generation (between the ages of 18 and 25), while 28 percent belong to the old generation (above 45). The rest (49 percent) fall between.

To compare the age distribution of the sample with the age distribution of the general population, the proportion respondents in age groups at 10-year intervals starting from the age of 20 was adjusted and compared to the population census of 2001. This arrangement reveals a close semblance between the sample and the population.

## 2.3 Geographic Composition

The distribution of the sample across the five development regions shows that most of the development regions are proportionately represented though the central development region is slightly over-represented and the east and west slightly under represented.

In terms of ecological regions, 50 percent of respondents live in the Tarai, 45 percent in the hills and 6 percent in the mountains. This distribution closely matches that of the general population.

**TABLE 2.8 Ecological region composition (in percent)**

Ecological Region	Population	Weighted Sample
Mountain	7.3	5.5
Hill	44.3	44.6
Tarai	48.4	49.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 2.3 Settlement pattern composition (in percent)**

Settlement	Population	Weighted Sample
Rural	86.1	86.2
Urban	13.9	13.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 2.4 Sex composition (in percent)**

Sex	Population	Weighted Sample
Female	50.1	50.0
Male	49.9	50.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 2.5 Age group composition of the sample (in percent)**

Age Group	Weighted Sample
18 – 25	22.5
26 – 35	28.1
36 – 45	21.1
Above 45	28.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 2.6 Adjusted age group composition of the sample and the population (in percent)**

Age Group	Population	Weighted Sample
20-29	33.9	29.0
30-39	24.7	26.8
40-49	17.4	19.1
50-59	11.9	14.3
60-69	7.5	7.8
70-79	3.6	2.5
80+	1.0	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 2.7 Development region composition (in percent)**

Development Region	Population	Weighted Sample
East	23.1	21.5
Central	34.7	39.9
West	19.7	15.4
Mid-West	13.0	13.2
Far-West	9.5	10.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2.4 Educational Status

In terms of educational status, the illiterate (40 percent) dominate the sample - a proportion largely corresponding to the illiteracy rate in the country, which is about 37 percent. Only 2 percent of respondents reported having a Bachelor's degree or higher.

## 2.5 Occupation

The majority of respondents (almost 59 percent) are involved in agriculture, while 13 percent are house wife/husband and 10 percent are industrialists/business persons.

**TABLE 2.9 Educational status composition (in percent)**

<b>Educational Status</b>	<b>Weighted Sample</b>
Illiterate	40.2
Literate	14.3
Primary level	13.2
Lower secondary level	9.2
Secondary level	5.4
SLC completed	10.7
Intermediate level	5.1
Bachelor's level and above	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**TABLE 2.10 Occupation composition (in percent)**

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Weighted Sample</b>
Agriculture	58.8
House wife/husband	13.3
Industry/Business	10.0
Labour	5.9
Student	4.7
Service	4.6
Unemployed	1.7
Retired	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## III. The National Mood

The report compares the findings of this opinion survey, Nepal Contemporary Political Situation V or NCPS V with various other opinion surveys that Interdisciplinary Analysts has conducted. Undertaking scientific surveys at regular intervals has made mapping trends in the public's opinions possible. Such a trend helps reveal the shifts and continuities in the opinions of the public.

The various surveys with whom the results of NCPS V are compared are: NCPS I (whose survey fieldwork was done in December 2004), NCPS II (January 2006), NCPS III (September 2006), NCPS IV (January 2007), People's Perception of Safety in Nepal (May 2007) and NCPS V (January 2008). The figure within the bracket indicates the time when the fieldwork was underway; it does not indicate the date of the publication of the concerned reports.


All the reports excluding portions of People's Perception of Safety in Nepal (May 2007) are available in the public domain. Among these surveys, due to constraints in funding, NCPS IV was not able to adopt random sampling in all stages of the survey. For this reason – in principle - its findings cannot be generalized. The results of NCPS IV have, nevertheless, been put alongside others surveys since it was undertaken at an important time interval and omitting it would leave a hiatus. Moreover caste/ethnicity, which constituted the main basis for purposive selection, largely corresponds to the actual population figures.

### 3.1 Country's Overall Situation

The poll attempted to understand people's perceptions of the country's overall situation. In response to the question 'Generally speaking, do you think the country is moving in the right direction, or do you think that it is moving in the wrong direction?'


Most people were found to be pessimistic: 40 percent said the country was moving in the wrong direction and only 25 percent claimed it was moving in the right direction. Eighteen percent felt that the country was moving in the right direction in some areas and in the wrong direction in others.

**CHART 3.1 Generally speaking, do you think the country is moving in the right direction, or do you think that it is moving in the wrong direction? (Q11, Base = 3010)**




The response to this question varies in terms of caste/ethnicity, development region and urban/rural settlement pattern. More Madhesi people (63 percent) than the national average thinks that the country is moving in the wrong direction. In terms of development regions, compared to the national average, more people in the central (60 percent) and eastern (44 percent) regions believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction.

**CHART 3.2 Generally speaking, do you think the country is moving in the right direction, or do you think that it is moving in the wrong direction? (Q11, Base = 3010)**



**CHART 3.3 Generally speaking, do you think the country is moving in the right direction, or do you think that it is moving in the wrong direction? (Q11, Base = 3010)**




A follow-up question, 'If you think the country is moving in the right direction, then why?' was asked of 25 percent of the total respondents. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons<sup>7</sup>. Forty-four percent cited the improvement in law and order while 37 percent cited the end of the 10-year armed conflict. A significant proportion, 17 percent, thought the country was heading in the right direction because the Maoists have entered into open politics.

<sup>7</sup> Though up to two responses were allowed for this and all other multiple-response questions some gave only one response. Since this type of question elicits multiple responses, it is obvious that responses do not add up to 100 percent; instead, they exceed it.




**CHART 3.4 If you think the country is moving in the right direction, then why? (Q12, base = 764, percentages based on multiple responses)**




Another follow-up question 'If you think the country is moving in the wrong direction, then why?' was asked to 40 percent of the total respondents. Again, respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons. Forty percent of them cited the lack of improvement in law and order while 33 percent of them cited the lack of unity among the main political parties. A significant proportion, 20 percent were pessimistic about the overall direction of the country because of price hikes.

**CHART 3.5 If you think the country is moving in the wrong direction, then why? (Q13, base = 1202, percentages based on multiple responses)**




Responses to this question vary in terms of caste/ethnicity and development region. Relatively more Madhesi people think that the country is moving in the wrong direction, a perception they attribute primarily to the absence of law and order. In terms of development region, those who think the country is moving in the wrong direction because there has been no improvement in law and order are 50 percent and 41 percent in the eastern and central regions respectively. Some 43 percent of people in the western region are pessimistic because of lack of unity among the main political parties, while 44 percent in the mid-west think the delay of the constituent assembly elections is the main reason. Among people living in the far-western region, most think that the country is headed in the wrong direction either because there is no improvement in law and order (30 percent) or because constituent assembly election have not taken place (28 percent).

**CHART 3.6 If you think the country is moving in the wrong direction, then why? (Q13, base = 1202, percentages based on multiple responses)**



**CHART 3.7 If you think the country is moving in the wrong direction, then why? (Q13, base = 1202, percentages based on multiple responses)**

"The country is moving in the wrong direction because the country has fallen into the hands of wrong kind of politicians leaders say one thing and do something else."




**-A 30 years old Thakali man with a Master's degree from Mustang**

### 3.2 Country's Major Problems at the National and Local Levels

The survey attempted to understand what the public thinks are the country's major problems. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two problems. In response to the question 'In your view, what are the two major problems facing Nepal as a whole?' most people (25 percent) cited poverty as the country's major problem and 22 percent said they did not know. Other major problems in order of priority were price hike (17 percent), unemployment (17 percent), lack of development (15 percent) and *bandhs/strikes/chakkajams* (10 percent).


**CHART 3.8 In your view, what are the two major problems facing Nepal as a whole? (Q14, base = 3010, percentages based on multiple responses)**



The results indicate that the major problems are not seen as conflict-related. The problems of *bandhs*, strikes and *chhakkajams*, which are, in some ways, connected to conflict are not at the fore. What is prominent are conventional development-related issues such as poverty, inflation and lack of employment.

The poll attempted to understand the public's views about the major problems people face at the local level. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two problems. In response to the question 'What are the two major problems at the local level?' most people (41 percent) mentioned lack of roads while 25 percent mentioned lack of domestic water. Other major local-level problems in order of priority were lack of electricity (24 percent), poverty (16 percent), lack of irrigation (13 percent) and unemployment (11 percent).


**CHART 3.9 What are the two major problems at the local level? (Q15, base = 3010, percentages based on multiple responses)**



Just as was the case at the national level, at the local level too, development-related issues, like roads, domestic water, electricity, poverty, irrigation and employment are on the top of the list, not problem associated with conflict.

The response to this question varies significantly by ecological region. Though lack of roads appears to be the most pronounced local-level problem in all three ecological regions, lack of domestic water is the second most-pronounced local-level problem in the mountains and hills while lack of electricity is the second most-pronounced local-level problem in the Tarai.

**CHART 3.10 What are the two major problems at the local level? (Q15, base = 3010, percentages based on multiple responses)**




"Since people of my area have no access to roads they have to transport goods on the back of mules which takes long time and cause excessive price hike of the commodities in the local area."

**-A 40 years old Serpa woman from Sankhuwasabha**

### 3.3 Poverty and Development


The poll attempted to gauge the public's views on poverty and development through two questions. One was 'Do you agree or disagree that poverty and lack of development are the major problems faced by the country today?' A simple majority, 49 percent, strongly agreed with the statement while another 27 percent agreed somewhat. A significant proportion, 18 percent, said they did not know. The response to this question corroborates the findings of the previous question (see chart 3.9).

**CHART 3.11 Some people also believe that poverty and lack of development are the main challenges faced by the country. Do you agree or disagree that poverty and lack of development are the major problems faced by the country today? (Q15a, Base = 3010)**




Then a follow-up question was asked: ‘In our country today there is a debate going on about why Nepal is poor and undeveloped. In your opinion, why is Nepal poor and undeveloped?’ This question was asked to those respondents who strongly agreed and somewhat agreed that poverty and lack of development were the major problems faced by the country today (i.e., 75 percent of the total respondents). Respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons. Thirty-three percent said that Nepal is poor and undeveloped because of its inability to overcome unemployment while 31 percent blamed it on the rulers. A significant proportion, 23 percent, did not know. Other important reasons in order of priority were inappropriate educational policies (14 percent) and the geo-politics of the country (10 percent). The responses reveals that Nepalis people do not blame any particular political party and leader for Nepal being poor and undeveloped. If anyone is to be blamed at all, it is all the rulers, collectively, who have ruled the country. The people by and large attribute Nepal’s poverty and underdevelopment to structural features such as the inability to overcome unemployment or a flawed educational system.

**CHART 3.12 In our country, today there is a debate going on about why Nepal is poor and undeveloped. In your opinion, why is Nepal poor and undeveloped? (Q15b, base = 2265, percentages based on multiple responses)**



The response to this question varies across communities. Most of the Madhesi people (43 percent) blame all the rulers to date for Nepal becoming poor and underdeveloped while most the non-Madhesi people (33 percent) attribute this to the country’s inability to overcome unemployment.

**CHART 3.13 In our country, today there is a debate going on about why Nepal is poor and undeveloped. In your opinion, why is Nepal poor and undeveloped? (Q15b, base = 2265, percentages based on multiple responses)**



### 3.4 Public's Trust towards Various Institutions

"Nepal is poor and underdeveloped because corruption is rampant and leaders have no idea of utilizing available resources properly"

- A 25 years old Thakali female from Mustang

The poll endeavoured to understand how much the public trusts various state organisations and institutions. All of the respondents were asked to identify their level of trust – trust very much, trust somewhat, not much trust or no trust at all towards various institutions one by one. People have a lot of faith in religious organisations, media persons, and ethnic organisations. People have some faith in state organs such as the Nepali Army and the Nepal Police. Institutions such as the Legislature Parliament and the cabinet are conspicuous for receiving high levels of 'no trust at all'. Surprisingly, Nepalis trust non-political organisations like religious, ethnic and civil society organisations more than they do state organizations.

**Table 3.1: What is the level of trust towards these organisations and associations - trust very much, trust somewhat, not much trust or no trust at all? (Q16, base = 3010)**

"Poverty, lack of skilled manpower and political instability are the major causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Nepal."


-A 30 years old Teli woman with a Bachelor's degree from Siraha

Institution	Trust very much	Trust somewhat	Not much trust	No trust at all	Don't know
Legislature Parliament	3	22	16	22	37
The present cabinet	3	22	16	28	31
Civil service	8	29	19	16	29
Nepal Police	12	37	20	19	12
Nepali Army	15	38	17	17	14
Judiciary	13	34	16	13	23
NGOs	10	33	18	10	30
Human rights activists	14	34	13	8	32
Media persons	20	37	13	6	24
Religious organisations	21	33	13	9	23
Ethnic organisations	18	34	13	11	24
Civil society	16	33	12	6	33

### 3.5 Assessment of the Present Government


The poll endeavoured to understand how the public assessed the performance of the present government. In response to the question 'Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present government – very good, good, bad, very bad?' some 37 percent mentioned that the government is performing well, another 29 percent mentioned that the government is performing badly and 24 percent were not in a position to say.

**CHART 3.14 Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present government - very good, good, bad, very bad? (Q17, Base = 3010)**




The response to this question varies significantly by caste/ethnicity. Most of Madhesi people (39 percent) think that the government is performing badly while most non-Madhesi people (42 percent) think that it is performing well. Forty-one percent of people living in the central region assess the performance of the government negatively: while most people living in other regions think otherwise.

**CHART 3.15 Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present government - very good, good, bad, very bad? (Q17, base = 3010)**



**CHART 3.16 Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present government - very good, good, bad, very bad? (Q17, base = 3010)**



**“The government has failed to govern the country. Law and order has deteriorated. Coalition partners of the government do not think of the people; they think only of themselves.”**

**-A 30 years old Muslim woman from Mahottari**

**“To declare the country as a federal republic is a positive achievement of the present government.”**

**-A 30 years old Tamang man from Rasuwa**


**“People are suffering from extreme poverty; they have no food to eat but the government is not giving heed to it.”**

**- A 32 years old Dalit man from Achham**

### 3.6 Political Environment


In response to the question 'Do people express their political views without intimidation in the area where you live?' a simple majority, 50 percent, said that they do, while 23 percent said that they do not. A significant proportion, 27 percent, could not give definitive answer.

**CHART 3.17 Do people express their political views without intimidation in the area where you live? (Q20, base = 3010)**



A follow-up question 'Why do you think people express their political views without feeling intimidated?' was asked to those respondents who said that people express their political views without intimidation (50 percent of the total). Respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons. Forty-eight percent hold this opinion because they think that the conflict has declined while some 28 percent hold this view because they think that the state guarantees the freedom of speech. A significant proportion - 26 percent -thinks people are free to express themselves because Maoists have entered into open politics.


**CHART 3.18 Why do you think people express their political views without feeling intimidated? (Q21, base = 1505, percentages based on multiple responses)**






Another follow-up question ‘Why do you think people are hesitant to express their political views?’ was asked to those respondents who said that people do not express their political views without intimidation (23 percent of the total). Respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons. Thirty-three percent could not give definitive answer while some 29 percent of them think people are intimidated because the conflict has not ended permanently and 21 percent blamed the increase in the activities of armed groups.

**CHART 3.19 Why do you think people are hesitant to express their political views? (Q22, base = 679, percentages based on multiple responses)**



There is a significant difference between the views of the Madhesi and non-Madhesi communities. Most Madhesi people blame no permanent end to the conflict (43 percent) and the increase in activities of armed groups (41 percent) while most non-Madhesi people (42 percent) could not give a definitive answer.

**CHART 3.20 Why do you think people are hesitant to express their political views? (Q22, base = 679, percentages based on multiple responses)**



### 3.7 Public's Perceptions on Safety

The survey asked several questions pertaining to safety with reference to various localities and activities. When asked 'How safe do you feel today in your locality compared to pre Jana Andolan II – safer than before, same as before, more unsafe than before?', the overwhelming majority, 80 percent, said that they felt safer than before.

**TABLE 3.2 How safe do you feel today compared to pre Jana Andolan II - safer than before, same as before, more unsafe than before? (Q23, base = 3010)**

	Safer than before	Same as before	More unsafe than before	Don't know/cannot say
In your locality	80	11	8	1
In travelling from one part to another	58	14	21	7
In talking to people you do not know	59	15	21	5
With other communities	61	19	14	7
In localities other than your own	49	13	20	18

When asked 'How safe do you feel today in travelling from one part of the country to another compared to before Jana Andolan II – safer than before, same as before, more unsafe than before?' most respondents (58 percent) said that they felt safer than before, but a significant proportion, 21 percent, mentioned that they felt more unsafe.

In response to the question 'How safe do you feel today in talking to people you do not know compared to pre Jana Andolan II – safer than before, same as before, more unsafe than before?' 59 percent said 'safer than before' while 21 percent said 'more unsafe than before'.

Sixty-one percent said they felt safer today with other communities compared to before Jana Andolan II – but 14 percent said they felt less safe. Another 19 percent said they felt the same as before.

A final question about safety– 'How safe do you feel today in localities other than your own compared to before Jana Andolan II – safer than before, same as before, more unsafe than before?'-elicited a 'safer than before' response from 49 percent while 20 percent said 'more unsafe than before'.

In short, respondents in general feel safer now than they did before the People's Movement of April 2006. Compared to May 2007, the proportion of those who said 'safer than before' in their localities has significantly increased in January 2008 (70 percent vs. 80 percent).

The proportion of those who feel 'safer than before' in travelling from one part of the country to another was almost the same in January 2008 as it was in May 2007. There is little change in the case of talking to people they do not know and in localities other than their own.

People generally consider things to be safer now than they were before Jana Andolan II. Ironically, people reported in January 2008 that crimes of all kinds had increased dramatically.

TABLE 3.3 How safe do you feel today in the following areas compared to before the Jana Andolan II ?

	Safer than before (%)	
	2007 May	2008 Jan
In your locality	70	80
In travelling from one part of the country to another	61	58
In talking to people you do not know	57	59
In localities other than your own	52	49

The survey asked respondents whether there had been incidences of crimes such as theft, robbery, extortion/forced donation, kidnapping, murder, threats, sexual assault/rape, shootings/fighting with guns, violence related to smuggling, physical assault/beatings, political violence, drug abuse, misbehaviour of drunkards and fights between gangs in their localities in the last year. The misbehaviour of drunkards and theft were the most prevalent types of crime cited (35 percent of the respondents mentioned the former and 34 percent the latter), followed by robbery (15 percent), fights between gangs (11 percent), extortion/forced donation (10 percent), threat (10 percent), drug abuse (8 percent) and physical assault/beatings (7 percent).

TABLE 3.4 Occurrence of various types of crime in public's perception (in percent) (Q24, base = 3010)


Type of Crime	National	Non-Madhesi	Madhesi	EDR	CDR	WDR	MWDR	FWDR
Misbehaviour of drunkards	35	30	44	35	43	21	22	40
Theft	34	27	48	31	47	21	18	29
Robbery	15	9	26	20	21	4	4	11
Fights between gangs	11	11	11	15	16	2	4	5
Extortion/forced donation	10	5	20	20	11	3	3	6
Threat	10	4	20	16	13	2	2	5
Drug abuse	8	9	5	10	11	5	2	6
Physical assault/beatings	7	5	12	11	8	7	4	4
Murder	7	3	14	12	10	1	1	2
Political violence	6	3	13	12	8	3	1	1
Kidnapping	5	2	11	14	4	1	1	1
Violence related to smuggling	5	3	8	8	5	2	2	7
Shootings/fighting with guns	4	1	8	8	5	0	0	1
Sexual assault/rape	2	1	3	5	2	1	1	1

More Madhesi people than non-Madhesi people reported the occurrence of all types of crimes except 'fights between gangs' and 'drug abuse', during the past year. Public perception varies significantly across the five development

regions: the reported incidence of crimes is higher in the central and eastern regions than the three western regions, but the misbehaviour of drunkards, theft and violence related to smuggling are also significant in the far-west region.

Fifty-four percent of respondents said that there had been incidences of at least one of these crimes during the past year.

CHART 3.21 Q24. Have there been incidences of any crime in your locality in the last one year? (Q24, base = 3010)



Compared to the survey of May 2007, Nepalis report much higher incidences of crimes, especially theft and robbery.

Paradoxically, people consider themselves to be safer today than they were before Jana Andolan II (before-April 2006), though they report a dramatic increase in all kinds of crimes.

When people say they feel safer, they are referring to the cessation of hostilities between the state security

TABLE 3.5 Occurrence of Various Types of Crime in the Public's Perception (in Percent)

Type of Crime	Occurrence of Crime	
	2007 May	2008 Jan
Misbehaviour of drunkards	NA	35
Theft	22	34
Robbery	9	15
Fights between gangs	NA	11
Extortion/forced donation	7	10
Threat	7	10
Drug abuse	7	8
Physical assault/beating	6	7
Murder	4	7
Political violence	3	6
Kidnapping	4	5
Violence related to smuggling	3	5
Shootings/fighting with guns	3	4
Sexual assault/rape	2	2

forces and the Maoists formalised with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The unintended effect of the confinement of the Nepal Army to the barracks and the Maoists to cantonments coupled with the low morale of the police force was the creation of a security vacuum at local level. Because the somewhat demoralised police force has been unable to deal with the flux of the post-conflict transition, various armed groups and criminal elements have sought to take advantage of the situation. Thus it is no surprise that people report a dramatic increase in local crime.


Another question pertaining to safety was 'Compared to pre Jana Andolan II,

how many bandhs have been organised in your locality these days?’ Most of respondents (43 percent) said ‘not so much’ followed by those who said ‘not at all’ (26 percent) and ‘some’ (18 percent). A very few respondents, 9 percent, said ‘very much’.

**“Bandhs and strikes are organized in his locality about 4/5 times in a month.”**


**-A 20 years old Musahar man from Siraha**

**CHART 3.22 Compared to pre Jana Andolan II, how much bandhs have been organised in your locality these days? (Q25, Base = 3010)**



Ecological and development region and rural/urban settlement have a significant influence on people’s opinions. More people living in the Tarai (16 percent) said that there had been more bandhs in their localities than their counterparts in other ecological regions. Similarly, people in the eastern (17 percent) and central (12 percent) regions think that there are more bandhs than their counterparts living in other development regions.


**CHART 3.23 Compared to pre Jana Andolan II, how much bandhs have been organised in your locality these days? (Q25, base = 3010)**



**“Villagers have not experienced any bandh and chakkajam here because there is no road access.”**

**-A 35 years old Limbu man from Panchthar**

**CHART 3.24 Compared to pre Jana Andolan II, how much bandhs have been organised in your locality these days? (Q25, base = 3010)**




**“The police should hold dialogue with strike/bandh organisers and try to address their demands if they are genuine ones.”**

**-A 24 years old Magar man from Kanchanpur**

For several years, various groups and organisations have held bandhs and chakka jams when they make demands on the state. The poll asked respondents what they think police officials should do in such situations. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two answers. Most respondents (56 percent) said that police officials should convince the concerned groups not to shut down the country, but 28 percent said they didn't know, 24 percent said that they should open roads by using force and 14 percent said that they should control the anarchists.


**CHART 3.25 Since last several years, various groups and organizations have been holding bandhs and chakkajam when putting forth their demands to the state. In this situation, what should the police officials do? (Q26, base = 3010, percentages based on multiple r.)**



### 3.8 Women's Issue


The poll attempted to gauge the public's views about the problems facing women. In response to the question 'Do you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems in our country?' the overwhelming majority, 87 percent, responded by saying that women do face specific kinds of problems.

**CHART 3.26 Do you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems in our country? (Q50, Base = 3010)**




The respondents who mentioned that women had to face specific kinds of problems in Nepal (i.e., 87 percent of the total respondents) were further asked what the two biggest problems were. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two problems. Most (46 percent) mentioned the lack of access to education as the biggest problem while 37 percent mentioned the lack of freedom. The proportions of those who mentioned domestic violence (24 percent) and unemployment (23 percent) were also significant.

**CHART 3.27 If you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems, what are the two biggest problems? (Q51, base = 2618, percentages based on multiple responses)**



The public's view on this matter varies significantly across the two major communities of the country. Even though the majority of both Madhesi people (51 percent) and non-Madhesi people (44 percent) mentioned the lack of access to education as the biggest problem, unemployment was the next biggest problem among the Madhesi people (41 percent) whereas the lack of freedom was identified as the next biggest problem among non-Madhesi people (41 percent).

**CHART 3.28 If you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems, what are the two biggest problems? (Q51, base = 2618, percentages based on multiple responses)**




It is worth mentioning that the views of men and women on the problems of women do not differ significantly.

## 3.9 Agitation Movements

### 3.9.1 The Madhesi Agitation Movement

Because the Madhesi people have been agitating for the past few months respondents were asked, 'Have you ever heard of the Madhesi agitation movement?' A majority, 69 percent, said that they had heard.


**CHART 3.30 The Madhesi movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this? (Q52, Base = 3010)**





Caste/ethnicity seems to exert a significant influence on the public’s awareness of this matter. More Madhesi people (84 percent) were found to have heard about the movement than non-Madhesi (61 percent).

**CHART 3.31 The Madhesi movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this? (Q52, Base = 3010)**




"Since all citizens of Nepal are equal, there should no be discrimination against Madhesi people. Madhesi people should have authority to exercise their rights without any interference from outside."

-A 38 years old woman Yadav from Sarlahi


Development region, too, has a significant influence on the public’s awareness of this matter. The proportions of people who had heard of the movement were significantly higher in the eastern (81 percent), central (82 percent) and western (62 percent) development regions, where the movement is strong than those living in other two regions, where the movement is weaker.

**CHART 3.32 The Madhesi movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this? (Q52, Base = 3010)**




The respondents who had heard of the movement (69 percent of the total) were further asked whether they knew what the demands put forth by the movement are. Fifty-eight percent said that they did not know and 33 percent said they did. Of all Nepali people, only 23 percent think that they know what the demands of the movement are.

**CHART 3.33** If you have heard of the Madhesi movement, do you know the demands put forth by the movement? (Q53, Base = 2075)




Caste/ethnicity seems to exert a significant influence on the public’s awareness of this matter. Even though the majority of both Madhesi and non-Madhesi people said that they could not identify the demands, the survey reveals that more Madhesi (40 percent) than non-Madhesi (27 percent) people are informed.

**CHART 3.34** If you have heard of the Madhesi movement, do you know the demands put forth by the movement? (Q53, Base = 2075)




**CHART 3.35** If yes, do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Madhesi movement? (Q54, Base = 677)



A follow-up question ‘Do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Madhesi movement?’ was asked to those respondents who said that they knew what the demands are (23 percent of the total). About 40 percent of them strongly agreed with the demands and 24 percent somewhat agreed. Twenty-five percent strongly disagreed. With respect to all Nepali people, only 9 percent strongly agreed with the demands of the Madhesi movement.

A large majority of Madhesi people (73 percent) strongly agreed with the demands of the Madhesi movement while most non-Madhesi people (49 percent) strongly disagreed.

**CHART 3.36** If yes, do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Madhesi movement? (Q54, Base = 677)




"Madhesi leaders may have thought they can do something better for Madhes and its people. If so, they have to be provided the opportunity."

**-A 36 years old-years old Sherpa man from Sankhuwasabha**

Another follow-up question 'In your opinion, how can the Madhesi movement be resolved?' was asked of those respondents who said that they had heard of the movement (69 percent of the total). The overwhelming majority of them, 79 percent, said that the movement could be resolved if the government negotiated with the leaders of the movement. Eleven percent said that the government should fulfil their demands unconditionally. Eleven percent said that the government should fulfil their demands unconditionally.

**CHART 3.37** In your opinion, how can the Madhesi movement be resolved? (Q55, Base = 2075)



"If the demands of movement are not addressed the movement will take a violent mode just as the 10-year Maoist war had taken."

**- A 21 year old Thakuri woman from Kalikot**

"The state underestimated the potentiality of Madhes and Madhesi people, it did not give due consideration to Madhesi issues and did not give equal opportunities to Madhesi people in employment and politics. That's why the Madhesi movement emerged."


**-A 39 years old Teli man from Siraha**

Irrespective of a respondent's caste/ethnicity, ecological or development region, there seems to be a widespread consensus that negotiation between the concerned parties is the best way out of the impasse.

### 3.9.2 The Janajati Agitation - Movement


Like the Madhesi agitation - movement, the Janajati agitation movement has been going on for the past few months. Thus the poll asked some questions about it too. In response to the question, 'Have you ever heard of the Janajati agitation movement?' simple majority, 53 percent, said that they had heard of the movement but a significant proportion, 42 percent, said that they had not.

**CHART 3.38 The Janajati movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this? (Q56, Base = 3010)**




Caste/ethnicity does not seem to exert a significant influence on the public's awareness of this matter, but development region does. The proportion of people who had heard of the movement was significantly higher in the eastern (40 percent) than in the other four regions.

**CHART 3.39 The Janajati movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this? (Q56, base = 3010)**



The respondents who said that they have heard about the movement (53 percent of the total) were further asked whether they knew the demands of the movement. Some 57 percent of them mentioned that they did not know while 36 percent said they did. Only 19 percent of all Nepali people think that they know what the demands of the Janajati movement are.


**CHART 3.39 If you have heard of the Janajati movement, do you know the demands put forth by the movement? (Q57, Base = 1579)**



Caste/ethnicity does not seem to exert a significant influence on the public's awareness of this matter.


A follow-up question 'Do you agree or disagree with the demands of the janajati movement?' was asked to those respondents who said that they knew what the demands of the movement are (19 percent of the total). About 33 percent of them strongly agreed with the demands and 49 percent somewhat agreed. In terms of the total sample, only six percent strongly agreed with the demands.

**CHART 3.40 If yes, do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Janajati movement? (Q58, Base = 568)**




Caste/ethnicity has a significant influence on the public's views on this issue. The proportion of those who strongly agreed to the demands is significantly higher among Madhesi (54 percent) than non-Madhesi (22 percent) people.

**CHART 3.41 If yes, do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Janajati movement? (Q58, base = 568)**



Another follow-up question 'In your opinion, how can the Janajati movement be resolved?' was asked of those respondents who said that they had heard of the movement (53 percent of the total). The overwhelming majority of them, 83 percent, said that the movement could be resolved by the government negotiating with the leaders of the movement, but 10 percent said that the government should fulfil their demands unconditionally.

**CHART 3.42 In your opinion, how can the Janajati movement be resolved? (Q59, Base = 1579)**




Irrespective of the respondent's caste/ethnicity, ecological or development region, there was widespread agreement that negotiation between the government and the leaders of the Janajati movement is the best way to break the deadlock.

# IV. Constituent Assembly

## 4.1 The Public’s Knowledge of the Constituent Assembly


The poll was designed to document the public’s knowledge of the constituent assembly. It first asked all respondents if they had heard of the constituent assembly. It was found that 67 percent had while 30 percent had not. The remaining 3 percent said they could not say.

**CHART 4.1 Have you ever heard about constituent assembly? (Q27, Base = 3010)**




Fewer people living in the mid-west (47 percent) and far-west (52 percent) regions than those living in other regions have heard of the constituent assembly.

**CHART 4.2 Have you ever heard about constituent assembly? (Q27, base = 3010)**



Fewer rural residents (66 percent) than urban dwellers (76 percent) had heard about constituent assembly. Likewise, fewer females (53 percent) had heard about it than males (81 percent).


**CHART 4.3 Have you ever heard about constituent assembly? (Q27, base = 3010)**



The educational level of people has a bearing on the issue: the higher the educational level, the greater the percentage of people who reported having heard of the constituent assembly.

In terms of caste/ethnicity more Newars, hill caste groups and Madhesi caste groups have heard of constituent assembly than other groups.

**CHART 4.4 Have you ever heard about constituent assembly? (Q27, base = 3010)**






Those respondents who reported having heard of constituent assembly (i.e., 67 percent of the total respondents) were asked if they knew what it is about. About 39 percent of them claimed that they knew very well or somewhat well about the constituent assembly, while 61 percent said that they had only heard about it but did not know what it was. This means that only 26 percent of all Nepalis think that they have some idea of what the constituent assembly is.

Respondents who stated that they know about the constituent assembly very well or somewhat well (26 percent of the total) were asked a follow-up question: 'In our country's context, what is the process for going to the constituent assembly?' The purpose of asking the question was to ascertain whether in fact people do correctly understand what the constituent assembly is. About 83 percent of the respondents actually understood that the constituent assembly is an assembly of representatives elected to draft a new constitution. The rest gave incorrect answers. What may be surmised from the responses as a whole is that only 21 percent of all Nepalis genuinely understand what a constituent assembly is. In other words, although the idea of a constituent assembly has gained significant currency in public discourse, only a small proportion actually understands it.

**CHART 4.5 Public's understanding of constituent assembly**




In May 2007, the proportion of respondents who had heard about the constituent assembly was 60 percent. This figure had increased to 70 percent in January 2007. The proportions of knowledgeable respondents in December 2004 September 2006 and January 2006 were 49, 55 and 59 percent respectively, demonstrating that more people have come to hear about constituent assembly over the time.

The proportion of those who claimed to have understood the constituent assembly has also risen, from 24 percent in May 2007 to 26 percent in January 2008.

While in January 2008, 21 percent correctly understood what a constituent assembly is, the proportions who understood correctly earlier were 18 percent, 25 percent, 18 percent, 14 percent and 14 percent in May 2007, January 2007, September 2006, January 2006 and December 2004 respectively. These trends suggest that more people have heard the term and that more understand it correctly.

**CHART 4.6 Public's understanding of the constituent assembly**



An obvious anomaly in the chart above is people's response in January 2007. If 70 percent had already heard of constituent assembly in January 2007, how could it have dropped to 60 percent in May 2007? Likewise if 25 percent had understood it in January 2007, how could those who understand constituent assembly have dropped to 18 percent in May 2007?

Close scrutiny of the sample design of the January 2007 survey reveals some shortcomings in how the sample was selected<sup>8</sup>. If the data of January 2007 or NCPS IV is overlooked, then the rest of the chart falls in place. For instance, the proportion who had heard about the constituent assembly was 59 percent in September 2006 and 60 percent in May 2007. Eighteen percent understood it in September 2006 and that figure had not increased eight months later in May 2007. If one overlooks the January 2007 data, the trend makes perfect sense.

Disaggregating the public's understanding of the constituent assembly across different variables reveals significant variations. More people living in the mid-west and the far-west development regions not only have not heard about constituent assembly, they do not know what it means.


<sup>8</sup> Due to constraints in funding, NCPS IV was not able to undertake random sampling in all stages; instead, it purposively selected districts and VDCs. In particular the VDC where the district headquarters is located was chosen. For this reason, the proportion of those who had heard or know about the constituent assembly was higher in January 2007.

**CHART 4.7 Percentage of those who understand the constituent assembly (Q29, base = 3010)**



Fewer women than men understand the constituent assembly.

**CHART 4.8 Percentage of those who understand the constituent assembly (Q29, base = 3010)**




Fewer people living in rural areas understand the constituent assembly than those living in urban areas.

The educational level of people has a significant bearing on their understanding: the higher the educational level, the greater the percentage of people who understand the constituent assembly.


In terms of caste/ethnicity, the proportions of a Madhesi caste groups, Muslims, Newars and hill caste groups who understand the constituent assembly are higher than those of other groups.

**CHART 4.7 Percentage of those who understand the constituent assembly (Q29, base = 3010)**




Those respondents who reported having heard of constituent assembly (67 percent of the total) were asked who they thought was responsible for constituent assembly election’s not taking place. The reason this question was asked was because the constituent assembly election was postponed two times; it was first scheduled for April 2007 then for November 2007. Respondents were allowed to give up to two answers. About 38 percent mentioned the SPA and Maoists were jointly responsible while 36 percent blamed CPN (Maoist) exclusively. A significant proportion, 29 percent, said they didn’t know.

**CHART 4.10 In your opinion, who is guilty for Constituent Assembly election not taking place? (Q30, base = 2016, percentages based on multiple responses )**



Caste/ethnicity has a bearing on this issue. Most Madhesi people (49 percent) blame CPN (Maoist) for the election’s not taking place while most non-Madhesi people (44 percent) blame it on the SPA and the Maoists jointly.


**CHART 4.11 In your opinion, who is guilty for Constituent Assembly election not taking place? (Q30, base = 2016, percentages based on multiple responses)**



## 4.2 Public's Confidence towards Constituent Assembly Election

To ascertain the public's confidence that the constituent assembly election would take place, those respondents who reported having heard of constituent assembly (67 percent of the total) were asked 'Do you think that elections for the constituent assembly can be held within the next six months?' Most (41 percent) said that elections would probably not be held and 36 gave no definitive answer. Only 22 percent said that elections could be held. As a whole then only 15 percent of all Nepalis think that elections for constituent assembly will be held within the next six months.

CHART 4.12 Do you think that elections for constituent assembly can be held within the next six months? (Q31, Base = 2016)




The public's confidence in the constituent assembly elections seems to have decreased between May 2007 and January 2008. In May 2007, 28 percent of the people who had heard of constituent assembly thought that election could be held within the next six months, while the corresponding figure in January 2008 was just 22 percent. With the second postponement, of the scheduled November 2007 election confidence declined.

"The elections should be held within six months otherwise the country would be mired in crises."


- A 27 years old Rajbansi man from Jhapa

CHART 4.13 Do you think that elections for constituent assembly will be held within the next six months? (Q31, base = 2016)




Ecological region has a bearing on the public’s confidence too. While 47 percent of people living in the Tarai (47 percent) think that the elections can be held within the next six months, only 24 percent in the mountains 38 percent in the hills believe this.

**CHART 4.12 Do you think that elections for constituent assembly will be held within the next six months? (Q31, base = 2016)**



Respondents who thought that elections could be held within the next six months (15 percent of the total) were further asked, ‘Some people think the constituent assembly elections will be free and fair, some think it will not be free and fair, and some are not sure. How about you?’ Most (56 percent) think that they will be free and fair while 24 percent think it will not. As a whole, only 8 percent of all Nepalis think that elections to the constituent assembly will be free and fair.

**CHART 4.15 Some people think constituent assembly election will be free and fair, some think it will not be free and fair, and some are not sure. How about you? (Q32, Base = 446)**




# V. State Restructuring

## 5.1 People’s Perception towards ‘New Nepal’

The poll endeavoured to uncover people’s perception towards ‘New Nepal’. All respondents were first asked whether they had heard of ‘New Nepal’. Most (59 percent) had but 36 percent had not.

**CHART 5.1 Have you ever heard about ‘New Nepal’? (Q32a, Base = 3010)**




"Nothing new is happening in the country; people are still compelled to survive in a hand-to-mouth existence. So we cannot agree with the phrase 'New Nepal'."

- A 29 year old Bhujel man from Sindhuli.

Rural/urban settlement and sex seem to exert an influence on this matter. More urban dwellers have heard about ‘New Nepal’ than rural residents (72 percent vs. 57 percent). Similarly, more men than women have heard about it (73 percent vs. 45 percent).

Respondents who said they had heard of ‘New Nepal’ (59 percent of the total) were further asked whether they agree or disagree with the phrase. About 40 percent said that they somewhat agreed and 37 percent said that they strongly agreed. Collectively, about 77 percent agreed with the phrase ‘New Nepal’. With respect to all Nepali people, about 45 percent people show some degree of agreement towards ‘New Nepal’.

**CHART 5.2 If you have heard about ‘New Nepal’, do you agree or disagree with(Q32b, Base = 1778)**



"People want peaceful and prosperous Nepal, not 'New Nepal'."

- A 34 year old Yadav man from Sarlahi


**“In ‘New Nepal’, I hope there would be equality among people and no discrimination will remain.”**

**-A 36 year old Tharu woman from Dang**

Caste/ethnicity has a significant bearing on this issue. More Madhesi than non-Madhesi people express positive feelings about the phrase (53 percent vs. 30 percent).

Respondents who strongly agree or somewhat agree with the phrase ‘New Nepal’ (45 percent of the total) were asked what they expect from ‘New Nepal’. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two answers. Most (48 percent) said there will be development in ‘New Nepal’ while 29 percent said that in ‘New Nepal’ the law and order will be good. The proportion of those who think that there will be equal opportunities for all is also significant (25 percent) as is the proportion of those who think that the unemployment problem will be solved (22 percent).

**CHART 5.3 If you strongly agree or somewhat agree with the phrase ‘New Nepal’, what do you expect from ‘New Nepal’? (Q32c, base = 1365, percentages based on multiple responses)**



**“There would be sustainable peace and security in ‘New Nepal’ and people of rural areas will have access to basic services like health and education.”**


**-A 30 years old women from Mahottari**

## 5.2 Trust towards the Political Parties

The poll attempted to understand how much the public trusts the three main political parties: the CPN (UML), the CPN (Maoist) and the Nepali Congress. Their views have a bearing on another question we asked: which party they would vote for in the forthcoming constituent assembly elections. Responses to the two questions are largely similar.


Respondents were first asked ‘What is your level of trust towards CPN (UML)?’ About 13 percent said that they trust this party very much and 26 percent said that they trust the party a little. The proportions of those who do not trust the party much and those who do not trust it at all are 19 percent and 23 percent respectively. In aggregate terms, about 39 percent people have some trust in this party while 42 percent have little or no trust.



**CHART 5.4 What is your level of trust toward CPN (UML)? (Q33, base = 3010)**

Among those who said they trust UML a little, i.e., 25 percent, we had asked a complementary question: Though you may trust CPN (UML) a little, what are the chances that you might support the UML in the constituent assembly elections. Some 6 percent reported a fair chance. Taking this into consideration and adding it to those who say they trust UML very much (i.e., 13 percent), we may infer that those who are likely to vote for UML are 14 percent.


Respondents were then asked 'What is your level of trust towards CPN (Maoist)?' About 5 percent said that they trust this party very much and 20 percent said that they trust the party a little. The proportions of those who do not trust the party much and those who do not trust it at all are 23 percent and 34 percent respectively. In aggregate terms, about 25 percent people have some trust in this party while 57 percent have little or no trust.

**CHART 5.5 What is your level of trust toward CPN (Maoist)? (Q35, base = 3010)**

Among those who said they trust Maoists a little, i.e., 20 percent, we had asked a complementary question: Though you may trust Maoists a little, what are the chances that you might support the Maoists in the constituent assembly elections. Some 4 percent reported a fair chance. Taking this into consideration and adding it to those who say they trust the Maoists very much (i.e., 5 percent), we may infer that those who are likely to vote for the Maoists are 6 percent.

Respondents were next asked ‘What is your level of trust towards the Nepali Congress?’ About 9 percent said that they trust this party very much and 22 percent said that they trust the party a little. The proportions of those who do not trust the party much and those who do not trust it at all are 23 percent and 27 percent respectively. In aggregate terms, about 31 percent people have some trust in this party while 50 percent have little or no trust.

**CHART 5.6 What is your level of trust toward Nepali Congress? (Q37, base = 3010)**




Among those who said they trust Nepali Congress a little, i.e., 22 percent, we had asked a complementary question: Though you may trust Nepali Congress a little, what are the chances that you might support the NC in the constituent assembly elections. Some 5 percent reported a fair chance. Taking this into consideration and adding it to those who say they trust NC very much (i.e., 9 percent), we may infer that those who are likely to vote for NC are 10 percent.

The responses to this question may reflect the proportion of committed voters in each of the major political parties. The proportion of those who trust the UML, the NC and the Maoists very much, we may assume, are committed voters.

### 5.3 Legitimate Rule


The poll attempted to understand people’s perceptions about legitimate government. In response to the question ‘Who should rule the country for the rule to be legitimate?’ most people (42 percent) said that a prime minister responsible to the Parliament was a legitimate ruler. About one-third said they did not know.

**CHART 5.7 Who should rule the country for the rule to be legitimate? (Q39, Base = 3010)**



The proportions of people who thought that a prime minister responsible to the Parliament was legitimate ruler were 47, 42 and 52 percent in September 2006, January 2006 and December 2004 respectively. The proportion of people who see the king as a legitimate ruler dropped significantly from 26 percent in January 2006 to 11 percent in January 2008. Clearly, Nepali people prefer a democratic system of government in which the ruler is the prime minister, not the king. The fact that the proportion of people who have no definitive view in this regard has risen up from 10 percent in December 2004 to 33 percent in January 2008 is a matter of concern as it reflects the growing ambivalence of the people towards a crucial democratic norm.

**CHART 5.8 Who should rule the country for the rule to be legitimate? (Q39, Base = 3010)**



Education is seen to exert a significant influence on perceptions: the higher a respondent's educational attainment, the more likely s/he was to identify rule by a prime minister responsible to the Parliament as the most legitimate form of government.

## 5.4 Fundamental Rights

The survey endeavoured to rate the public's feelings towards some fundamental rights on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning very important, 0 meaning very unimportant and 5 meaning not particularly important or unimportant. Respondents were allowed to skip questions if they had not heard about it or they could not understand.

The public accorded the right to equality the greatest importance with a score of 8.6. Slightly less important were the right to freedom of opinion and expression (8.4), the right to freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms (8.3), the right to freedom to practise any profession (8.2) and the right to property (8.1).

**TABLE 5.1 Public's rating of some fundamental rights**

Fundamental Right	2007 Jan	2008 Jan
The right to equality	9.3	8.6
The right to freedom of opinion and expression	9.1	8.4
The right to freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms	8.8	8.3
The right to freedom to practise any profession	8.8	8.2
The right to property	9.2	8.1
The cultural and linguistic rights	8.8	8.0
The right to religion	8.8	8.0
The right to information	9.0	7.9
The right to select political party	8.6	7.8
The right to freedom to form unions and associations	8.4	7.6

The right to equality was seen as most important in January 2007 too, but the right to property was second most important then, while it is in fifth position in January 2008.


The public rated fundamental rights on average 0.8 points lower in January 2008 than in January 2007.

## 5.5 Restructuring the State

### 5.5.1 Monarchy

In response to the question 'Should there be a place for monarchy in the Nepal in the future?' the public slightly favoured monarchy: 49 percent said that there should be a place for the monarchy in the Nepal of the future while 38 percent thought that there should not be. Around 12 percent had no opinion or did not know.

**CHART 5.9 Should there be or should there not be a place for monarchy in the Nepal of the future? (Q41, Base = 3010)**




"There should be place for monarchy because it is this institution that consolidated the different principalities and formed the present Nepal."

- A 31 years old Gurung man from Lamjung

Longitudinal data reveals distinct trend. From a high of 81 percent in December 2004, the proportion of those supporting monarchy came down sharply to an all-time low of 45 percent in January 2007. Likewise, those who thought there should be no place for monarchy increased sharply from 5 percent in December 2004 to 43 percent in January 2007. From January 2007 onwards both opinions have levelled off and do not show a sharp trend of decline or increase. One could say that people are almost divided over whether there should be monarchy in the Nepal of the future or not.

Caste/ethnicity has an influence on a person’s opinion on monarchy. Among the hill castes a higher proportion favour abolishing the monarchy, while in other castes a higher proportion favour retaining the monarchy. The proportion of those who favour retaining the monarchical institution is relatively higher among Newars, Madhesi castes, Madhesi dalits and Muslims.

**CHART 5.10 Public’s stand on monarchy**




"Since people overthrew the monarchy through mass movement ther is now no need of reviving it."

- A 37 years old Bahun woman from Nawalparasi

The public’s response on this matter also varies across development region. People living in the central region are overwhelmingly in favour of retaining monarchy while a higher proportion of people living in other regions think that it should be abolished.


**CHART 5.11 Should there be or should there not be a place for monarchy in the Nepal of the future? (Q41, Base = 3010)**



Among men and women too there is a difference of opinion. Most men want to abolish the institution while most women want to retain it.


The educational level of people has a big influence on the public’s views on this issue: the higher the education level, the greater the percentage of people who preferred no role for the monarchy in the Nepal of the future. However this is only a general trend and among those with Bachelors degree and higher, though more want to abolish it, those who want to retain it is also substantial.

**CHART 5.12 Should there be or should there not be a place for monarchy in the Nepal of the future? (Q41, base = 3010)**




In order to gauge the public’s opinions of the process of making a decision on the fate of the monarchy, all of the respondents were asked the question ‘There is a debate going on whether decision on the fate of the monarchy should be made through a referendum or a constituent assembly or the Interim Parliament. In your opinion, which is a suitable process to make decision on the fate of the monarchy?’ About 39 percent said that the decision should be made through a referendum while another 35 percent said they did not know. Some 24 percent mentioned a constituent assembly as a suitable process for making a decision about the fate of the monarchy, while those who thought the interim parliament was a suitable body for this purpose was only 3 percent.

**CHART 5.13 Should there be or should there not be a place for monarchy in the Nepal of the future? (Q41, base = 3010)**




Development region has a significant influence on the public’s views on this matter. Most people in the central (45 percent), western (55 percent) and far-west (47 percent) mentioned a referendum while most people in the eastern (39 percent) and mid-west (63 percent) professed ignorance.

**CHART 5.14 In your opinion, which is a suitable process to make decision on the fate of monarchy? (Q42, base = 3010)**




**CHART 5.15 In your opinion, which is a suitable process to make decision on the fate of monarchy? (Q42, base = 3010)**



### 5.5.2 State and Religion

The poll attempted to measure the public's views regarding the relationship between the state and religion. In response to the question 'Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state?', some 59 percent thought that the Nepal of the future should be a Hindu state while 31 percent favoured Nepal being a secular state in the future. Around 10 percent professed ignorance on this matter.

**CHART 5.16 Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? (Q43, Base = 3010)**



The series of opinion polls reveal that the public's support towards Nepal to be a Hindu state is stable (with the exception of January 2007, which is explained due to sampling limitations). It was 59 percent in January 2008, May 2007 and September 2006<sup>9</sup>.

If the data of January 2007 or NCPS IV is overlooked, then the rest of the chart falls in place. For instance, those who favour Nepal being a Hindu state


<sup>9</sup> Due to constraints in funding, NCPS IV could not adopt random sampling in all stages, and districts and VDCs had to be purposively selected. From every sample district, a VDC where the district headquarter is located was chosen for the sample (though this did not constitute the only sample in the district). Those who reside in district headquarters tend to have medium-level educational attainments which influences their opinion on the relationship between state and religion. Because of this reason, proportion of those who favour a secular state is higher in NCPS IV or January 2007.



was 59 percent in September 2006 and again 59 percent in May 2007. Thus if one overlooks the January 2007 data, it is seen that those who favour Nepal being a Hindu state is consistently at 59 percent.


The public’s view on this matter varies significantly across two major communities of the country. More Madhesi people (72 percent) want the country as a Hindu state than the national average compared to their non-Madhesi counterparts (52 percent).

**CHART 5.17 Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? (Q43, Base = 3010)**




The majority of people living in the central, western, mid-western and far-west regions are in favour of Nepal’s being a Hindu state. Only those living in the eastern region are in favour of a secular state.

**CHART 5.18 Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? (Q43, base = 3010)**




Education significantly affects the public’s views on the relationship that should exist between the state and religion; the sentiment that the country should be a Hindu state is high among those with less educational attainment.

**CHART 5.19 Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? (Q43, base = 3010)**




Caste/ethnicity also significantly affects the public's views on this matter. The majority of hill ethnic groups and Muslims want Nepal to be a secular state while the majority of other groups want Nepal to be a Hindu state.

**CHART 5.20 Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? (Q43, base = 3010)**



Not surprisingly, religious affiliation has a significant influence on the public's views on this matter. While a majority of those who identify themselves as Hindu (65 percent) think that the Nepal of the future should be a Hindu state, a majority of those who identify themselves as other than Hindu favour a secular state.


**CHART 5.21 Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? (Q43, base = 3010)**



### 5.5.3 The Language Issue


There is a debate going on whether Nepali should be the only official language or if other national languages should be accorded the status of official language. Survey reveals that a simple majority of Nepali people (50 percent) think that other national languages should be also adopted as official languages at local level while a significant proportion, 41 percent, think that Nepali should be the only official language.

**CHART 5.22 What should be the language policy of the Nepal of the future? (Q44, Base = 3010)**




The public’s support for multi-official language policy has grown significantly. The support for this policy was 38 and 43 percent in September 2006 and May 2007 respectively. As of January 2008 it was 50 percent. It is worth mentioning that more Nepali people are in the favour of multi-official language policy than that of single official language policy.

**CHART 5.23 What should be the language policy of Nepal of the future?**




The public’s view on this matter varies significantly across two major communities of the country. Majority of the Madhesi people (82 percent) think that other national languages should be also adopted as official languages while majority of the non-Madhesi people (56 percent) think that Nepali should be the only official language.

**CHART 5.24 What should be the language policy of the Nepal of the future? (Q44, Base = 3010)**



The urban/rural settlement has also a significant bearing on this matter. Most of the urban dwellers (55 percent) want only Nepali language as the official language while most of the rural residents (52 percent) want other national languages as official language at local level.

**CHART 5.25 What should be the language policy of the Nepal of the future? (Q44, base = 3010)**




**“I do not understand Nepali language properly, so Maithili should also be adopted as official language.”**  
**-A 28 years old illiterate Musahar man from Siraha**


### 5.5.4 Identity

All of the respondents were asked, ‘How do you like to identify yourself?’ The poll revealed that 52 percent of Nepali people liked to be identified exclusively as a Nepali while another 41 percent liked to be identified simultaneously as Nepali and as someone belonging to particular ethnicity/region.


**CHART 5.26 How do you like to identify yourself? (Q45, Base = 3010)**



The public’s orientation towards this issue is somewhat stable. While 54 percent liked to be identified exclusively as Nepali as of May 2007, in January 2008, 52 percent liked to be identified as such as of January 2008.

**CHART 5.27 How do you like to identify yourself? (Q45, Base = 3010)**

The public's view on this matter varies significantly across two major communities of the country. Majority of the Madhesi people (76 percent) liked to be equally identified as Nepali and as 'Madhesi' while majority of the non-Madhesi people (70 percent) liked to be identified exclusively as Nepali. What is also significant and bears highlighting is that, while overall those who want to identify themselves only with their ethnic or regional identity is low, it is also very low among the Madhesi people. This is perhaps the strongest indicator that at the time of the survey, there was no support for secession.


**CHART 5.28 How do you like to identify yourself? (Q45, Base = 3010)**

The educational level of an individual significantly affects his/her orientation on this matter; the higher the level of education, the higher the preference to be identified exclusively as Nepali.

### 5.5.5 Electoral System


There is a debate going on about whether Nepal should adopt a proportional electoral system or First-Past-the-Post system. In this context, all of the respondents were asked whether they had ever heard about various electoral systems like First-Past-the-Post System and Proportional System. It was found that more than half of the Nepal's population (56 percent) had not heard of these terms; only 30 percent had heard about them.

**CHART 5.29 Have you ever heard about various electoral systems like First-Past-the-Post System and Proportional System? (Q46, Base = 3010)**



Longitudinal analysis reveals that the proportion of those who have heard of terms related to various electoral systems has increased significantly from 13 percent in September 2006 to 30 percent in January 2008. However, it is important to highlight that a majority of Nepali people still have not heard about these terms.

**CHART 5.30 Have you ever heard about various electoral systems like First- Past-the-Post System and Proportional System?**




The urban/rural settlement has a significant bearing on this matter. Most of the rural residents (58 percent) have not heard about them while many more of the urban dwellers (44 percent) have heard about them.

The proportion of female who have not heard about them is significantly higher than their male counterparts (65 percent vs. 46 percent).

The respondents who said that they had heard about various electoral systems (i.e., 30 percent of the total respondents) were further asked to mention which type of electoral system Nepal should adopt in the future. A simple majority, 50 percent, mentioned that the country should adopt proportional system while 21 percent mentioned First-Past-the-Post system. In other words, among Nepali people as a whole, 15 percent people explicitly favour proportional electoral system.


**CHART 5.31 If you have heard about various electoral systems, which type of electoral system should Nepal adopt in future? (Q47, Base = 896)**



### 5.5.6 Unitary or Federal System

The survey attempted to gauge the public's awareness with regards to state system. All of the respondents were asked whether they had ever heard about the unitary system and the federal system. It was found that 65 percent people had not heard of these terms; only 23 percent had heard about them.


**CHART 5.32 Have you ever heard about the unitary system and the federal system? (Q48, Base = 3010)**





Trend analysis suggests that those who have heard about unitary and federal system has increased over time – it was 10 percent as of September 2006 while as of January 2008 it has reached 23 percent. Unfortunately as in the case with electoral system, a majority of Nepali people still have not heard about the terms.

**CHART 5.33 Have you ever heard about the federal system?**




The urban/rural settlement has a significant bearing on this matter. Proportion of rural residents who have not heard about them is significantly higher than that of urban dwellers (67 percent vs. 55 percent).

The proportion of females who have not heard about them is significantly higher than among males (73 percent vs. 58 percent).

The respondents who said that they had heard about unitary system and federal system (i.e., 23 percent of the total respondents) were further asked to mention which type of system Nepal should adopt in the future. Most people (69 percent) mentioned federal system while another 20 percent mentioned unitary system. With respect to all Nepali people as a whole, only 16 percent explicitly mention their support for the federal system.

**CHART 5.34 If you have heard about the unitary system and the federal system, which type of system should the Nepal of the future adopt? (Q49, Base = 698)**



Public's perceptions towards state restructuring agenda vary by caste/ethnicity. First with regards to monarchy, hill caste group is the group where a majority favours abolishing the monarchy. With regards to secularism, hill Janajatis and Muslims are the groups where a majority favour this agenda. With regard to multi-official language policy, all of the groups within Madhesi community stand in its favour while all of the hill groups stand against it. In respect of identity, all of the hill groups like to be identified as Nepali only while all of the Madhesi groups like to be equally identified as Nepali and with particular region.

It is not possible to have a similar analysis with regard to where people stand in regards to electoral system (First-Past-the-Post versus Proportional) and state system (unitary versus federal) because less than 50 percent have ever heard of these terms.


**TABLE 5.2 State restructuring agendas by majority caste/ethnicity views**

State Restructuring Agenda	Hill Caste	Hill Janajati	Hill Dalit	Newar Caste	Madhesi Caste	Madhesi Janajati	Madhesi Dalit	Muslim
Abolish Monarchy	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Secular	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Multi-official language policy	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Identity	Nepali only	Nepali only	Nepali only	Nepali only	Nepali & regional	Nepali & regional	Nepali & regional	Nepali & regional

## 5.6 The Legislature Parliament


The poll attempted to measure public's views towards the Legislature Parliament. In this regard, the poll asked all of the respondents whether they thought the Legislature Parliament was the right body to decide on the future of the country. Most of the people are ambivalent on the issue as 63 percent said they do not know or cannot say. Only 24 percent mentioned that it was the right body to decide on the future of the country while 12 percent said that it is not the right body to decide on the future of the country.

**CHART 5.35 Do you think the Legislature Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country? (Q60, Base = 3010)**




Even though majority of both the Madhesi people and non-Madhesi people were not in a position to say anything definitive in this matter, proportion of those who said 'no' is higher among the Madhesi people (18 percent) than among the non-Madhesi people (9 percent).

**CHART 5.36 Do you think the Legislature Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country? (Q60, Base = 3010)**



The respondents who thought that the Legislature Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country (i.e., 24 percent of the total respondents) were further asked why they thought so. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons. Twenty-seven percent of them thought so because the Legislature Parliament has been established by the people’s movement while almost same number of people professed ignorance. Some 25 percent thought so because the Legislature Parliament is the legitimate body as defined by the laws while some 17 percent thought it is the right body because it has come through a struggle.

**CHART 5.37 If you think the Legislature Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country, why do you think so? (Q61, base = 732, percentages based on multiple responses)**



**“The Interim Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country because it is the main body constitutionally authorised to deal with overall issues of the nation.”**


**-A 37 years old Bahun woman from Nawalparasi**

**“There is no norm in the world that establishes Parliament without elections though this happened in our country. The present Legislature Parliament therefore has no legitimacy to decide on the future of the country.”**

**-A 34 years old Yadav man from Sarlahi**

The respondents who thought that the Legislature Parliament is not the right body to decide on the future of the country (i.e., 12 percent of the total respondents) were further asked why they thought so. Respondents were allowed to mention up to two reasons. Sixty-one percent of them thought so because it has not been elected by the people while 29 percent thought so because the concerned parties have formed the parliament by themselves. Some 26 percent thought so because it has been formed to fulfil certain objectives for a certain period only, while some 17 percent professed ignorance in this matter.


**CHART 5.38 If you think the Legislature Parliament is not the right body to decide on the future of the country, why do you think so? (Q62, base = 368, percentages based on multiple responses)**



## 5.7 Popularity of Political Parties and Leaders

All respondents were asked a hypothetical question ‘If the elections for the constituent assembly were to be held today, whom would you vote for?’ Forty-three percent said that they did not know or could not say while 15 percent refused to disclose their views on the matter. Together these two categories make up 58 percent. About 13 percent said that they would vote for CPN (UML), another 11 percent said they would vote for Nepali Congress and another 8 percent CPN (Maoist). Other political parties received only a little support. Since a very high proportion of people (58 percent) were either unwilling to disclose their preference or undecided, it would be misleading to state with certitude the popularity, or lack thereof, of the political parties.

CHART 5.39 If the election for constituent assembly were to be held today, whom would you vote for?(Q64, Base = 3010)



The parties people would like to vote for, correlates strongly with the political parties that people have high trust towards. For instance if 14 percent say they have high trust towards the UML, 13 percent say that they will vote for UML. Likewise if 10 percent say they have high trust towards the NC, 11 percent say they will vote for NC. For the Maoists, however, there seems to be a little exception - 6 percent say they have high trust towards the Maoists, while 8 percent say they will vote for the Maoists. While a preceding section had asked in a round-about way which political party people are likely to vote for, the present question had asked it in a straight-forward way. The response to both the questions is highly correlated.


However, given the extremely high proportion of undecided voters (most of who, we need to emphasize, will probably vote for one or the other party, and will abstain only if the level of pre-poll violence will be high) it would be impossible to predict the electoral outcomes.

It is difficult to predict electoral outcomes, among others, because the gap between the period of survey (i.e., 23 December 2007 and 12 January 2008) and the actual election date (i.e., 10 April 2008) is considerable. At this stage, it is also wholly unclear what impact regional and ethnic parties (which jumped into the fray after the survey was conducted) will have on voting behaviour. There could be many political events during the interregnum that could affect election outcome as also many local or regional issues.

It needs to be highlighted that this survey methodology is based on an assessment of individual voting preferences. Many undecided voters could be swayed by group decisions of clan, religious identities as well as ethnic groupings.

It also needs to be emphasized that the figure cited above relates to the voting pattern of proportional electoral system and not the First-Past-the-Post system. It is beyond the scope or indeed the methodological capacity of the present exercise to interpolate the pattern of the First-Past-the-Post system with the required degree of confidence.

**CHART 5.40 If the election for constituent assembly were to be held today, whom would you vote for?**



Over time those who say 'do not know/cannot say' has increased dramatically (from 16 percent in September 2006 to 43 percent in January 2008), while those who did not want to disclose has declined (from 30 percent in September 2006 to 15 percent in January 2008). Those who say they will vote for Maoists has decreased by 50 percent between September 2006 and January 2008, while those who say they will vote for Nepali Congress and UML has not declined.

Towards the end of the poll, all of the respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards political leaders on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning 'very favourable', 0 meaning 'very unfavourable' and 5 meaning 'not particularly favourable or unfavourable'. Respondents were allowed to skip the question if they had not heard about the leaders named or could not understand.

The survey reveals that no political leader is rated highly by the people. This is evident from the fact that most political leaders received scores of less than five, which is the average. However, the public did rate Girija Prasad Koirala (5.2), Madhav Kumar Nepal (4.9), Dr. Baburam Bhattarai (4.4), Prachanda (4.4) and Mahanta Thakur (4.3) at the upper end of this average political grouping. King Gyanendra received very low rating from the public as a political leader.


In terms of caste/ethnicity, the public's choice of leader varies significantly. Girija Prasad Koirala is the most popular among non-Madhesi groups while Mahanta Thakur is the most popular leader among Madhesi groups.

TABLE 5.3 Public's rating towards the political leaders (Q65, base = 3010)

Political Leader	National	Non-Madhesi	Madhesi
G. P. Koirala (Nepali Congress)	5.2	5.3	5.0
Madhav Kumar Nepal (CPN UML)	4.9	4.9	4.8
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai (CPN Maoist)	4.4	4.9	3.2
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) (CPN Maoist)	4.4	5.0	3.0
Mahanta Thakur (Tarai Madhesh Loktantric Party)	4.3	2.5	6.3
Bamdev Gautam (CPN UML)	4.3	4.4	4.0
Sher Bahadur Deuba (Nepali Congress)	4.2	4.2	4.2
Pasang Sherpa (Janajati Federation)	4.2	4.3	3.8
Hridesh Tripathi (Tarai Madhesh Loktantric Party)	4.0	2.5	5.9
Upendra Yadav (Madhesi Jana adhikar Forum)	3.9	2.1	5.8
K. P. Oli (CPN UML)	3.9	3.9	3.7
Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) (CPN Maoist)	3.9	4.4	2.6
Ram Chandra Paudel (Nepali Congress)	3.8	3.8	3.7
Narayan Man Bijekchhe (NMKP)	3.6	3.7	3.3
Surya Bahadur Thapa (RJP)	3.5	3.6	3.5
C. P. Mainali (CPN ML)	3.4	3.5	3.2
Amik Sherchan (Jana Morcha)	3.1	3.1	3.4
Lokendra Bahadur Chand (RPP)	3.1	3.1	3.0
Pashupati Shamsheer Rana (RPP)	3.1	3.1	3.0
King Gyanendra	2.8	2.8	2.8
Kamal Thapa (RPP Nepal)	2.3	2.4	2.2

As mentioned above, the public – especially the Madhesis – have rated Madhesi leaders highly. Political leaders such as Mahanta Thakur, Hridesh Tripathy and Upendra Yadav have received higher ratings from the Madhesi people, who have also rated the Maoist leaders lower than the national average.

CHART 5.40 Popularity of leaders



The trend with regards to political leaders' popularity is that all of the leaders are declining in people's esteem. Among them, the popularity of Prachanda is declining more rapidly than that of other political leaders. He was the most liked political leader in January 2007, but he came down to the third position in May 2007 and January 2008. Girija Prasad Koirala had secured the second position in January 2007, but rose to the first position since then. Madhav Kumar Nepal had secured the third position in January 2007, but rose to the second position since then. King Gyanendra's popularity continues to be at the rock-bottom. The decline in the popularity of party leaders has not translated as an increase in King Gyanendra's popularity.



## VI. Conclusion

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**Overall direction:** The general mood of the Nepali people is one of pessimism. A majority feels that the country is not headed in the right direction. The two main reasons people say the country is not headed in the right direction is because they do not perceive an improvement in law and order and because they sense a lack of unity among political parties. Pessimism is especially discernible among the Madhesis and in the central and eastern regions of the country, but the people of the hills and those living in the western, mid-western and far-western development regions, are optimistic because they sense an improvement in law and order and because the 10-year conflict has come to an end.

**Little trust in core state institutions:** Core state institutions are not rated positively, particularly, the Legislature Parliament and the Cabinet. Only one out of four Nepalis country-wide thinks that the Legislature Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country and an exceptionally high proportion of people are ambivalent. Among the Madhesis, a substantial portion thinks that it is not the right body to decide on the future of the country and ambivalence is high among this group as well.

Though most people continue to regard a prime minister responsible to the parliament as the legitimate ruler of the country, the proportion of those who do not know or cannot say has shot up considerably, a fact further underscoring the ambivalence of the people.

**Trust in political parties:** Thirteen percent say they will vote for the UML, 11 percent say they will vote for the NC and 8 percent say they will vote for the Maoists. These proportions are correlated with the proportions of people who have a high level of trust in the political parties: 13 percent for the UML, 9 percent for the NC and 5 percent for the Maoists. It could be presumed that these individuals are committed voters. From this limited information, it is not possible to predict the outcome of the constituent assembly election because as many as 43 percent say they do not know or cannot say, while another 15 percent refused to answer. The undecided could vote any political party, thus making it impossible to predict the outcome. In addition, in the three months between the completion of the survey (i.e., 12 January 2008) and the scheduled election date (i.e., 10 April 2008) people's opinions may change.

How people actually vote in the constituent assembly elections will depend on how the political parties conduct their campaigns. People will wish to see which candidate's political parties field and will consider whether election manifestos resonate with their own concerns or not. Voting patterns greatly depend on whether the political parties are able to build up the election crescendo until it climaxes on the actual election day and the extent to which they are able to convince ordinary people to go to polling stations to cast their votes.

Political leaders are not rated positively. The highest rating, for G.P. Koirala is just 5.2. out of 10. M.K. Nepal received 4.9 and Prachanda 4.4. When seen longitudinally, the ratings of all political leaders are sliding.

The relatively low ratings that leaders have received from the people are no surprise given that people think that things are not moving in the right direction. Had they believed the nation was headed in the right direction political leaders probably would have received more favorable ratings.

What are people expecting?: One of the reasons political parties are not able to earn high levels of trust could be because their rhetoric does not resonate with the people's expectations. While political parties accord primacy to state re-structuring and the constituent assembly, people expect the state to address poverty, price hikes and unemployment. People also expect the government to address local-level development issues. As people's concerns shift, the gap between the priorities of the political parties and the people's expectations of those parties is growing. The leaders of political parties seem not to have noticed that the priorities of the people have changed. If they fail to take into cognizance the expectations of the people, it may further distance them from the people.

A silver lining in what the people identify as the major challenges facing the country is the fact that conflict-related issues do not figure prominently at either the national or the local level. People's identification of major challenges at the national and local levels seems to be predicated on the belief that active hostility between the state security forces and the Maoists has ended now that the Maoists have joined the government. People believe that now that a resolution has been reached, conventional activities like eradicating poverty, overcoming unemployment and promoting development should be prioritised.

There is another silver lining; more than 50 half of the respondents think that there is no political intimidation in the area where they live. A similarly high proportion thinks that they are safer than they were before April 2006. These findings underscore the fact that the ordinary Nepali sees the 10-year conflict as having effectively ended. The views of the Madhesi people however, are a major exception: they report a deterioration in law and order, an increase in the activities of armed groups and the occurrence of bandhas at regular intervals as some of the activities that has made the political environment less safe. They see these activities as having exacerbated political intimidation.

**State re-structuring and people's preferences** : State re-structuring has been a major concern of the political parties since April 2006. When state re-structuring is examined in terms of the preferences of specific caste/ethnic communities (a significant variable), a variegated picture emerges. While some groups are favorably-disposed to some agenda, they are ill-disposed to agenda that others espouse. Getting all caste/ethnic groups to agree on the state restructuring may be very difficult.

Abolishing the monarchy and declaring the country secular is high on the state re-structuring agenda of the political parties. However, a high proportion of the Madhesi people are for retaining the monarchy and for declaring the country a Hindu state. Other groups favor abolishing the monarchy and secularism. Political parties will have to achieve some sort of compromise agreeable to all caste/ethnic groups. Bridging the gap among groups so that none feel left out will be a major challenge.

Forging agreement will be a challenge but the political parties also must remember that re-structuring the state is not a priority. The people are more concerned about eradicating poverty, controlling inflation, providing unemployment and promoting development.

What people expect from 'New Nepal' further substantiates this finding. The 'New Nepal' rhetoric, in many ways, is a proxy for the state re-structuring agenda. One could say that 'New Nepal' is the stage the state will reach after it has been fully restructured. Thus, assessing what people expect from a 'New Nepal' is an indirect means of understanding how they perceive the state-restructuring agenda. The survey reveals that 70 percent have heard of this term and of them three-fourths approve of it. When asked what they expect from 'New Nepal', development tops the list, improved law and order and equal opportunities falling second and third in priority respectively. Ironically, people expect re-structuring to deliver the conventional functions of the state (i.e., development and improved law and order) and do not see eye to eye with political parties.

**Post-conflict transition and safety** : People believe they are safer now than they were during before April 2006. People believe that with the cessation of active hostilities, they are safer. Paradoxically, people also report that crimes of all kinds have increased dramatically over the last year. With the cessation of hostilities between the state security forces and the Maoists, an event formalised with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, levels of violence in society went down dramatically. This is why people say they feel much safer today than they were before April 2006. However, since the agreement relegated the Nepal Army to the barracks and the Maoists to cantonments, a security vacuum was created at the local level. Various armed groups and criminal elements seem to have taken advantage of local security vacuum. This is why people report dramatic rise in the number of crimes that have occurred in their localities.

**Monarchy and King Gyanendra** : Support for the monarchy, which was at an all-time low in January 2007, seems to have increased marginally. Support for the monarchy was 45 percent in January 2007, 46 percent in May 2007, and 49 percent in January 2008. Even so, by and large, people are divided on the issue. In January 2008, 49 percent wanted to see a role for the monarchy in the Nepal of the future, 38 percent did not, and 13 percent were undecided.

Though support for the monarchy recorded a marginal increase, the popularity of King Gyanendra did not increase. King Gyanendra continues to remain unpopular when rated against other well-known political figures. Though the popularity of all political leaders is waning, this has not translated into an increase in King Gyandendra's popularity.

**The core message of the survey** : At this particular juncture in history Nepalis seem to have set a premium on equality: the right to equality is valued over other fundamental rights. This spirit of egalitarianism is also related to a decline in support for hierarchical institutions.

Another desire of the people at this historical juncture seems to be "let us get on with our lives". People believe that active hostility between the state security forces and the Maoists has ended now that the Maoists have entered the government and so believe that the conventional activities of the state like overcoming poverty, eradicating unemployment and promoting development should be prioritised. What the people are telling their leaders is to overcome poverty, control inflation, generate employment and promote development in order to receive their support.

People attribute Nepal's lack of development to structural features and not to any agent or agency. If a ruler is to be blamed, people rest the blame on all the rulers who have ruled the country to date. However, rather than any specific ruler, they see the inability to generate employment and faulty educational policies as having led to Nepal's under-development and poverty.

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
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# Annex I: Sample Districts in the Map of Nepal



## **Annex II: Frequency Tables and Cross-Tabulation**

Annex II is available only in digital form,  
in the CD included with this report

## Annex III: Sample Distribution

Eco-Dev Region	Sample District (1st-Stage)	Sample VDC/Mun (2nd-Stage)	Sample Size
Eastern Mountain	Sankhuwasabha	Nundhaki	18
		Num	18
		Khandbari Mun.	13
Eastern Hill	Bhojpur	Boya	22
		Pyauli	22
		Kudak Kaule	21
	Panchthar	Chokmagu	22
		Phidim	22
		Sarang Danda	20
	Khotang	Kharpa	24
		Linkuwapokhari	24
		Mangaltar	24
Eastern Tarai	Jhapa	Lakhanpur	22
		Shivaganj	22
		Pathamari	22
		Jalthal	22
		Topgachchi	20
		Dharampur	20
		Kohabara	20
		Shantinagar	20
		Bhadrapur Mun.	14
		Damak Mun.	16
		Mechinagar Mun.	16
		Siraha	Bhokraha
	Belaha		20
	Bhaganpur		20
	Laxmipur Patari		20
	Hanumannagar (Pra. Dha.)		20
	Mahadeva Portaha		20
	Inarwa		20
	Lahan Mun.		20
	Siraha Mun.	20	
Central Mountain	Rasuwa	Chilime	14
Central Hill	Sindhuli	Ratnawati	24
		Jinakhu	24
		Khangsang	24
		Kamalamai Mun.	18
	Dhading	Sangkos	22
		Tharke	22
		Chainpur	22
		Kumpur	20
Salyankot	20		
Kathmandu Valley	Lalitpur	Thecho	22
		Malta	22
		Tikathali	22
		Lalitpur Mun.	36
	Kathmandu	Bajrayogini (Sankhu)	24
		Futung	22
		Ramkot	22



		Dachhinkali	22
		Naikap Purano Bhanjyang	22
		Sangla	22
		Thankot	22
		Baad Bhanjyang	22
		Ichang Narayan	22
		Sheshnarayan	22
		Kathmandu Mun.	100
		Kirtipur Mun.	16
Central Tarai	Sarlahi	Harakthawa	22
		Parsa	22
		Haripur	22
		Basantapur	22
		Narayan Khola	22
		Batraul	20
		Shreepur	20
		Sundarpur	20
		Malangawa Mun.	20
	Dhanusa	Mahuwa (Pra. Ko.)	22
		Andupatti	22
		Lohana	22
		Paudeswor	16
		Ghodghans	22
		Sakhuwa Mahendranagar	20
		Lakkad	20
		Jhatiyahi	20
		Singyahi Maidan	20
	Janakpur Mun.	20	
	Mahottari	Bathanaha	22
		Ekarahiya	22
		Khopi	22
		Bhatauliya	22
		Gaidaha Bhelpur	22
		Sahasaula	22
		Sundarpur	20
		Bharatpur	6
		Jaleswor Mun.	20
	Western Mount	Mustang	Kowang
Western Hill	Syangja	Pauwegaude	24
		Birgha Archale	22
		Sworek	22
		Putalibazar Mun.	16
		Waling Mun.	16
	Lamjung	Ghermu	18
		Karapu	18
		Tarku	27
	Gulmi	Shantipur	20
		Hunga	20
		Purkotdaha	18
		Foksing	18
	Myagdi	Hastichaur	18
		Okharbot	18
		Baranja	18

Western Tarai	Nawalparasi	Narsahi	22
		Dedgaun	20
		Rajahar	20
		Gaidakot	20
		Kawaswoti	20
		Thulo Khairatawa	20
		Bulingtar	20
		Dhaubadi	20
		Ramgram Mun.	14
MW Mount	Kalikot	Syuna	16
		Ramnakot	16
	Dolpa	Saldang	10
MW Hill	Dailekh	Jambukandh	20
		Mairi Kalikathum	18
		Seri	18
		Narayan Mun.	14
	Rukum	Sobha	20
		Mahat	20
		Pokhara	20
	Rolpa	Jaimakasala	23
		Kotgaun	22
Talawang		21	
MW Tarai	Dang	Dharna	22
		Shantinagar	22
		Gangapraspur	20
		Hansipur	20
		Saudiyar	20
		Lalmatiya	21
		Tribhuwan Nagar Mun.	20
FW Mount	Bajhang	Pauwagadhi	18
		Sainpasela	18
		Kotbhairab	18
FW Hill	Dadeldhura	Ashigram	20
		Amargadhi Mun.	20
	Achham	Jalapadevi	24
		Rahaph	24
		Bhagyaswori	24
FW Tarai	Kanchanpur	Dodhara	20
		Tribhuwanbasti	20
		Kalika	20
		Parasan	20
		Raikawar Bichawa	20
		Mahendranagar Mun.	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>125 VDCs/20 Mun.</b>	<b>3010</b>

## Annex IV: Research Team

### **Principal Survey Researchers**

Dr. Sudhindra Sharma  
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5. Ms. Arunima Nepal
6. Ms. Jhala Maya BK

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9. Ms. Madhu Poudel
10. Ms. Ranjita Chaudhari
11. Ms. Sarita Dewan
12. Ms. Saru Nepali
13. Ms. Sharita Dhakal
14. Ms. Shila Chaudhari
15. Ms. Shreesty Shah
16. Ms. Sunita Bhatta
17. Mr. Ambika Prasad Joshi
18. Mr. Bajra Kishor Shah
19. Mr. Bharat Bhattarai
20. Mr. Chandra Bam
21. Mr. Debendra Nirola
22. Mr. Hari Shankar Chaudhari
23. Mr. Himal KC
24. Mr. Jagat Ram Chaudhari
25. Mr. Jay Prakash Bhatta
26. Mr. Kamal Shahi
27. Mr. Khagendra Shahi
28. Mr. Khem Raj Bhatta
29. Mr. Lal Babu Shah
30. Mr. Madhu Sapkota
31. Mr. Nabin Bhatta
32. Mr. Nagendra Shah
33. Mr. Nanda Kumar Shah
34. Mr. Narad Nepal
35. Mr. Prabin Khadka
36. Mr. Pratap Sen
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5. Mr. Binod Malla

## Annex V: Questionnaire

### Opinion Poll on Nepal Contemporary Political Situation V (December 2007)

Questionnaire No: .....

Household No: .....

#### Instruction for Interviewer:

Conduct the interview in an informal, conversational manner, asking questions gently in a soft tone. Put the respondent at ease. Do not proceed in an interrogative manner or intimidate the respondent in any way. Give sufficient time to the respondent to reflect and answer the questions without rushing through. If the respondent does not understand the question, ask whether he/she wants it to be repeated.

**Initial Screen: Respondents must be Nepali citizens over 18 and must be a permanent resident of the locality.**

**Namaskar! I am ..... and I am from an organization called..... It is an independent research organisation based in Kathmandu. We are conducting a nationwide opinion poll on contemporary political situation of Nepal.**

In this survey, we are not asking you to disclose your name. There is no 'correct answer' to the questions we are asking. Whatever may be your response to each question, will be the correct answer for us.

QA. Are you a permanent resident of this locality?

1. Yes (proceed for the interview)

2. No (stop the interview)

#### QB. Address:

District: .....

VDC/Municipality: .....

Ward No: .....

Development Region: .....

Ecological Region: .....

Q1. Residence:

1. Rural

2. Urban

**Please, tell me the number of male/female family members aged 18 and above in descending order.**

S. No.

Relationship

Age

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8

No. of Persons Aged 18+	Take Last Digit of HH No.									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2
5	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
6	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5
7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3
8	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	6	7	8	9	1	2	3	4	5	6
10	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6



There is a possibility of having an election for CA	1.8
Monarchy has ended	1.7
The country is now democratic	0.9
Refused	0.5

**Q13. If you think the country is moving in the wrong direction, then why? [Multiple response] (Base = 1202)**

Q13	Percent
There is no improvement in law and order	40.4
There is lack of unity among the main political parties	33.3
Price hike	20.4
Development activities have come to a halt	15.4
CA election has not taken place	14.8
The country's situation has not become normal	12.6
Maoists are still involved in violent activities	9.4
There is ethnic/communal strife in the country	9.3
The 10-year armed conflict has not ended permanently	8.8
Don't know/cannot say	5.0
Monarchy has ended	0.5
Unemployment has increased	0.5
Corruption	0.5
Lack of proper leadership	0.2
Govt. not responding to the demand of the agitation-movements	0.2
Poverty has increased	0.1
Refused	0.1

**Q14. In your view, what are the two major problems facing Nepal as a whole? [Multiple response] (Base = 3010)**

Q14	Percent
Poverty	24.9
Don't know/ cannot say	22.4
Price hike	17.2
Unemployment	16.7
Lack of development	14.6
Bandh/Strike/Chakka-Jam	10.4
Political uncertainty	9.3
Lack of security	9.2
Inability to hold CA election on time	9.1
Corruption	7.4
Lack of education	5.8
Lack of supply of essential commodities	4.3
Various agitations-movements	3.9
Lack of effective leadership	3.3
Status-quo oriented government	2.0
Maoist's unruly behaviour	1.9
Ethnic/communal strife	1.5
Lack of presence of government	1.0
Foreign interference	0.2
Refused	0.2
Gender inequality	0.1
Border encroachment	0.1

**Q15. What are the two major problems at the local level? [Multiple response] (Base = 3010)**

Q15	Percent
Lack of roads	41.1
Lack of domestic water	25.4
Lack of electricity	23.6
Poverty	15.5
Lack of irrigation	12.9
Unemployment	11.0
Price hike	8.4
Lack of education	8.3
Don't know/cannot say	6.9
Lack of health facilities	6.3
Lack of supply of essential commodities	3.6
Bandh/Strike/Chakka-Jam	3.0
Insecurity of life	2.5
Nature induced disaster	2.5
Insecurity of property	2.4
Lack of proper waste management	1.7
There is no problem	1.5
Absence of local government	1.1
Lack of sanitation	0.9
Lack of presence of government	0.5
Ethnic/communal strife	0.5
Lack of market	0.4
Forestry related problem	0.4
Inequitable distribution of resources	0.2
Drug abuse	0.2
Lack of communication facilities	0.1
Refused	0.1

**Poverty and Development**

**Q15a. Some people also believe that poverty and lack of development are the main challenges faced by the country. Do you agree or disagree that poverty and lack of development are the major problems faced by the country today? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q15a	Percent
Strongly agree	48.8
Somewhat agree	26.5
Somewhat disagree	3.2
Strongly disagree	3.6
Refused	0.0
Don't know/cannot say	17.9
Total	100

**Q15b. In our country today there is a debate going on about why Nepal is poor and undeveloped. In your opinion, why is Nepal poor and undeveloped? [Multiple response] (Base = 2265)**

Q15b	Percent
Because of inability to overcome unemployment	32.8
Because of all the rulers to date	31.0
Don't know/ cannot say	22.5
Because of inappropriate educational policy	14.4
Because of the geo-politics of the country	10.0
Because of dependence on foreign aid	8.0
Because of the govts. that have come after 2063 B.S.	5.6
Because of the govts. that have come after 2046 B.S.	5.0
Because of corruption	3.6
Because of the King's rule (direct/indirect)	3.5
Because of Rana regime	0.8
Because of lack of capable workforce	0.7
Because of 30-year old Panchayati rule	0.6
Because of Maoists	0.4
India	0.3
China	0.3
Because of fatalism	0.2
Because of population growth	0.2
Gender inequality	0.1
Refused	0.1

**Q16. I am going to ask you about some of the organizations and associations of our country. What is the level of trust towards these organizations and associations – trust very much, trust somewhat, not much trust or no trust at all? [Single response for each] (Base = 3010)**

Q16	Trust very much	Trust somewhat	Not much trust	No trust at all	Refuse	Don't know
Legislative Parliament	3.4	22.0	15.5	22.2	0.1	36.8
Cabinet	3.2	21.5	16.4	28.0	0.1	30.8
Civil service	8.0	28.5	19.1	15.5	0.0	28.9
Nepal Police	11.8	36.9	19.7	19.2	0.0	12.4
Nepali Army	14.5	38.1	17.2	16.6	0.0	13.6
Judiciary	13.1	34.3	16.0	13.2	0.1	23.4
NGOs	10.1	32.9	17.5	9.7	0.1	29.7
Human rights activists	13.5	34.0	12.7	8.2	0.1	31.5
Media persons	20.1	37.4	12.5	6.1	0.0	23.8
Religious organizations	20.8	33.2	13.2	9.4	0.0	23.4
Ethnic organizations	17.8	34.0	13.2	11.4	0.0	23.5
Civil Society	16.4	32.6	12.0	6.0	0.1	32.8

#### The Present Government

**Q17. Generally speaking, how do you assess the performance of the present government – very good, good, bad, and very bad? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q17	Percent
Good	36.6
Bad	29.4
Don't know/cannot say	24.2
Very bad	6.2
Very good	3.5
Refused	0.2
Total	100



**Q18. What are the strengths of the present government? [Multiple response] (Base = 3010)**

Q18	Percent
Don't know/ cannot say	38.7
There is no positive feature	31.3
Prospects for lasting peace has increased	13.8
It is negotiating with agitations-movements	10.2
The government has made daily life normal	5.9
Administration has improved	4.1
Post-conflict reconstruction activities are moving ahead	3.9
It has sidelined the king	3.4
The government has fulfilled basic needs	1.8
The government is lawful	1.1
Possibility of haveing a CA election has increased	0.6
Refused	0.5

**Q19. What are the weaknesses of the present government? [Multiple response] (Base = 3010)**

Q19	Percent
Don't know/ cannot say	33.6
It has not controlled price hike	25.0
It has not held Constituent Assembly election	20.6
The government has not fulfilled basic needs	12.1
It has not fulfilled the demands of agitations - movements	10.1
Prospects for lasting peace has declined	9.3
The government has not made daily life normal	8.2
Administration has weakened	7.3
Post-conflict reconstruction activities have not moved ahead	5.9
There is no negative feature	3.5
The government is unlawful	2.8
It has sidelined the king	1.7
Lack of unity among parties in the government	1.1
Refused	0.4
The government is not nationalist	0.3
Unemployment has increased	0.3
Corruption has increased	0.2

**Political Environment****Q20. Do people express their political views without intimidation in the area where you live? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q20	Percent
Yes, they do	50.0
No, they do not	22.5
Don't know/cannot say	27.3
Refused	0.1
Total	100

**Q21. Why do you think people express their political views without feeling intimidated? [Multiple response] (Base = 1505)**

Q21	Percent
The conflict has declined	47.8
The state has guaranteed freedom of speech	28.0
Maoists have entered into open politics	25.8
Don't know/ cannot say	14.0
The people cannot take it any more	10.7
There is less interference from the administration	8.4

There is a new environment after the people's movement & people's revolt	7.6
Activities of political parties at the local level has increased	5.3
The media sector is vibrant	3.0
People are aware of their rights	1.1
The country is republic	0.3
Refused	0.3

**Q22. Why do you think people are hesitant to express their political views? [Multiple response] (Base = 679)**

Q22	Percent
Don't know/ cannot say	32.5
The conflict has not ended permanently	28.5
Activities of armed groups has increased	21.8
The state has not been able to guarantee freedom of speech	15.4
Violent behaviour persists among Maoists	15.4
Political parties have been inactive at the local level	12.2
The media sector is not vibrant	4.9
People are less interested in politics	1.1
Refused	0.6
The government is becoming interventionist	0.2

**Views Pertaining to Safety**

**Q23. [Jana Andolan Second: Chaitra 24, 2062 – Baishakh 11, 2063] How safe do you feel today compared to pre Jana Andolan II – safer than before, same as before, more unsafe than before? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q.23	Safer than before	Same as before	More unsafe than before	Don't know/ cannot say	Refused
In your locality	79.8	10.7	8.2	1.3	0.0
In travelling from one part of the country to another	58.0	13.9	21.2	6.9	0.0
In talking to people you don't know	58.7	15.3	20.8	5.1	0.1
With other communities	60.7	18.8	13.9	6.5	0.0
In localities other than your own	48.9	13.4	20.0	17.6	0.0

**Q24. Have there been incidences of the following types of crime in your locality in the last one year? [Single response for each] (Base = 3010)**

Q24	Yes	No	Don't know/ cannot say
Misbehaviour of drunkards	34.6	64.0	1.4
Theft	34.1	64.2	1.8
Robbery	14.9	83.5	1.6
Fights between gangs	10.9	86.1	3.0
Extortion/forced donation	10.0	87.2	2.8
Threat	9.5	86.2	4.3
Drug abuse	7.9	86.1	6.1
Physical assault/beatings	7.4	89.3	3.2
Murder	6.9	90.2	2.9
Political violence	6.4	88.9	4.8
Kidnapping	5.0	92.4	2.6
Violence related to smuggling	4.8	87.8	7.4
Shootings/fighting with guns	3.6	93.9	2.4
Sexual assault/rape	2.0	95.2	2.8

**Q25. Compared to pre Jana Andolan II, how many bandhs have been organised in your locality these days? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q25	Percent
Not so much	42.5
Not at all	25.9
Some	17.8
Very much	8.7
Don't know/cannot say	5.0
Total	100

**Q26. Since last several years, various groups and organizations have been holding bandhs and traffic closure (chakkajam) when putting forth their demands to the state. In this situation, what should the police officials do? [Multiple response] (Base = 3010)**

Q26	Percent
They should convince the concerned groups	55.8
Don't know/ cannot say	28.3
They should open the road by applying force	23.9
They should control the anarchic elements	14.2
They should do what the government ask them to do	8.1
More police officials should be deployed	7.7
They should do nothing/let the protesters hold bandhs	2.0
Refused	0.4

#### Constituent Assembly

**Q27. Have you ever heard about constituent assembly? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q27	Percent
Have heard about it	67.0
Have not heard about it	29.8
Don't know/cannot say	3.3
Total	100

**Q28. If you have heard about it, how much do you think you know about it? [Single response] (Base = 2016)**

Q28	Percent
Have heard but do not know	60.7
Know somewhat	31.2
Know very well	7.4
Don't know/cannot say	0.7
Total	100

**Q29. If you think you know about it, in our country's context what is the process for going to the constituent assembly? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 777)**

Q29	Percent
Assembly of elected representatives that will draft a new constitution	82.5
Assembly of elected representatives that will amend present constitution	6.4
Assembly of selected representatives that will draft a new constitution	4.6
Assembly of selected representatives that will amend present const.	2.0
Assembly of king-appointed experts that will draft a new constitution	0.5
Assembly of king-appointed experts that will amend present constitution	0.2
Don't know/cannot say	3.9
Total	100

**Q30. In your opinion, who is guilty for Constituent Assembly election not taking place? [Multiple response] (Base = 2016)**

Q30	Percent
Seven Party Alliance and Maoists Jointly	37.5
CPN (Maoist)	35.7
Don't know/ cannot say	29.1
Nepali Congress	17.2
King	7.5
Madhesi movement	6.0
CPN (UML)	3.3
Janajati movement	1.7
Foreign power	1.6
Prime Minister	0.4
Refused	0.4
RPP	0.1

**Q31. Do you think that elections for constituent assembly can be held within the next six months? [Single response] (Base = 2016)**

Q31	Percent
No	41.3
Don't know/cannot say	36.3
Yes	22.1
Refused	0.2
Total	100

**Q32. Some people think constituent assembly election will be free and fair, some think it will not be free and fair, and some are not sure. How about you? [Single response] (Base = 446)**

Q32	Percent
It will be free and fair	56.3
It will not be free and fair	24.3
Don't know/cannot say	19.2
Refused	0.2
Total	100

#### People's Perception towards 'New Nepal'

**Q32a. Have you ever heard about 'New Nepal'? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q32a	Percent
Yes	59.1
No	36.3
Don't know/cannot say	4.6
Refused	0.0
Total	100

**Q32b. If you have heard about 'New Nepal', do you agree or disagree with the phrase? [Single response] (Base = 1778)**

Q32b	Percent
Strongly agree	36.9
Somewhat agree	39.8
Somewhat disagree	6.2
Strongly disagree	5.6
Refused	0.2
Don't know/cannot say	11.3
Total	100

**Q32c. If you strongly agree or somewhat agree with the phrase 'New Nepal', what do you expect from 'New Nepal'? [Multiple response] (Base = 1365)**

Q32c	Percent
There will be development	48.3
The law and order situation will be good	28.6
There will be equal opportunities for all	24.9
The unemployment problem will be solved	22.2
There will be equal development in all regions	17.7
The govt. will work according to the wishes of the people	8.2
All will have equal access to education	6.7
Don't know/cannot say	6.0
There will be no corruption	5.0
The country will be republic	4.6
The citizens will be prosperous	4.0
There will be no armed conflict	3.5
There will be no caste/ethnic discrimination	2.9
Refused	0.2
There will be greater human rights	0.1
The country will be secular	0.1

#### Trusts towards the Political Parties

**Q33. What is your level of trust toward CPN (UML)? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q33	Percent
Trust very much	12.6
Trust a little	25.7
Not much trust	18.9
Do not trust at all	23.0
Refused	0.5
Don't know/cannot say	19.3
Total	100

**Q34. Though you may trust CPN (UML) a little, what are the chances that you might support it in the elections of constituent assembly? [Single response] (Base = 772)**

Q34	Percent
Fair chance	5.6
Small chance	65.5
Not much chance	9.9
No chance at all	3.8
Refused	1.4
Don't know/cannot say	13.7
Total	100

**Q35. What is your level of trust toward CPN (Maoist)? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q35	Percent
Trust very much	5.2
Trust a little	19.8
Not much trust	23.0
Do not trust at all	33.6
Refused	0.6
Don't know/cannot say	17.7
Total	100



Q40	N	Mean
The right to equality	2688	8.6
The right to freedom of opinion and expression	2661	8.4
The right to freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms	2610	8.3
The right to freedom to practise any profession	2712	8.2
The right to property	2695	8.1
The cultural and linguistic rights	2548	8.0
The right to religion	2676	8.0
The right to information	2510	7.9
The right to select political party	2580	7.8
The right to freedom to form unions and associations	2434	7.6

### Restructuring the State

#### Monarchy

**Q41. Should there be or should there not be a place for monarchy in the Nepal of the future? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q41	Percent
There should be	49.3
There should not be	37.8
Refused	0.7
Don't know/cannot say	12.2
Total	100

**Q42. There is a debate going on whether decision on the fate of monarchy should be made through a referendum or a constituent assembly or the Interim Parliament. In your opinion, which is a suitable process to make decision on the fate of monarchy? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q42	Percent
Through a referendum	38.5
Don't know/cannot say	34.5
Through a constituent assembly	23.9
Through the Interim Parliament	2.9
Refused	0.3
Total	100

#### State and Religion

**Q43. Should the Nepal of the future be a secular state or a Hindu state? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q43	Percent
It should be a Hindu state	59.1
It should be a secular state	31.0
Don't know/cannot say	9.8
Refused	0.1
Total	100

### The Language

**Q44. There is a debate going on whether Nepali language should be the only official language or if other national languages should be also adopted as official languages. What should be the language policy of the Nepal of the future? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q44	Percent
Other national languages should be adopted as official languages at local level	50.1
Nepali language should be the only official language	40.9
Don't know/cannot say	6.4
Besides Nepali, English should also be an official language	1.4
Besides Nepali, Hindi should also be an official language	1.2
Total	100

### Identity

**Q45. How do you like to identify yourself? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q45	Percent
I like to be identified as Nepali only	52.2
I like to be equally identified as Nepali & belonging to particular ethnicity/region	40.6
Don't know/cannot say	4.4
I like to be identified with particular ethnicity/region only	2.4
I like to be identified as a religious minority	0.4
Total	100

### Electoral System

**Q46. Have you ever heard about various electoral systems like First-Past-the-Post System and Proportional System? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q46	Percent
Have not heard	55.7
Have heard	29.8
Don't know/cannot say	14.5
Total	100

**Q47. If you have heard about various electoral systems, which type of electoral system should Nepal adopt in future? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 896)**

Q47	Percent
Proportional system	50.2
First-Past-the-Post system	21.4
Don't know/cannot say	14.2
Combination of both systems	13.7
Refused	0.5
Total	100

### Unitary or Federal System

**Q48. Have you ever heard about the unitary system and the federal system? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q48	Percent
Have not heard	65.5
Have heard	23.2
Don't know/cannot say	11.3
Total	100



**Q49. If you have heard about the unitary system and the federal system, which type of system should the Nepal of the future adopt? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 698)**

Q49	Percent
Federal system	69.2
Unitary system	20.3
Don't know/cannot say	10.5
Total	100

#### Gender Issue

**Q50. Do you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems in our country? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q50	Percent
Yes	87.0
No	6.9
Don't know/cannot say	6.1
Refused	0.0
Total	100

**Q51. If you think that women have to face specific kinds of problems, what are the two biggest problems? [Multiple response] (Base = 2618)**

Q51	Percent
Lack of access to education	46.1
Lack of freedom	37.2
Domestic violence	23.8
Un-employment	23.2
Lack of control over one's body	10.5
Don't know/cannot say	7.8
Dowry system	6.8
Trafficking	6.4
Lack of access to inherited property	4.6
Sexual harassment	4.3
Lack of access to politics	4.1
Citizenship certificate related problems	1.5
Polygamy	0.2
Accusation of witchcraft	0.1
Refused	0.1

#### Movements

##### Madhesi Movement

**Q52. The Madhesi movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q52	Percent
Yes	68.9
No	27.8
Don't know/cannot say	3.3
Total	100

**Q53. If you have heard of the Madhesi movement, do you know the demands put forth by the movement?**  
[Single response] (Base = 2075)

Q53	Percent
No	58.1
Yes	32.6
Don't know/cannot say	9.2
Total	100

**Q54. If yes, do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Madhesi movement?** [Single response]  
(Base = 677)

Q54	Percent
Strongly agree	39.7
Somewhat agree	23.8
Somewhat disagree	10.8
Strongly disagree	24.5
Don't know/cannot say	1.2
Total	100

**Q55. In your opinion, how can the Madhesi movement be resolved?** [Read out, Single response]  
(Base = 2075)

Q55	Percent
By the govt negotiating with leaders of Madhesi movement	79.3
By the government fulfilling their demands unconditionally	10.5
Don't know/cannot say	8.6
By suppressing Madhesi movement through state security force	1.0
By not doing anything	0.5
Refused	0.0
Total	100

#### Janajati Movement

**Q56. The Janajati movement has been going on for the past few months. Have you ever heard of this?**  
[Single response] (Base = 3010)

Q56	Percent
Yes	52.5
No	42.1
Don't know/cannot say	5.4
Total	100

**Q57. If you have heard of the Janajati movement, do you know the demands put forth by the movement?**  
[Single response] (Base = 1579)

Q57	Percent
No	57.0
Yes	36.0
Don't know/cannot say	7.0
Total	100

**Q58. If yes, do you agree or disagree with the demands of the Janajati movement?** [Single response]  
(Base = 568)

Q58	Percent
Strongly agree	32.6
Somewhat agree	48.7
Somewhat disagree	8.8
Strongly disagree	9.7

Don't know/cannot say	0.2
Total	100

**Q59. In your opinion, how can the Janajati movement be resolved? [Read out, Single response] (Base = 1569)**

Q59	Percent
By the govt negotiating with leaders of Janajati movement	82.7
By the government fulfilling their demands unconditionally	9.7
Don't know/cannot say	6.6
By suppressing Janajati movement through state security force	0.6
By not doing anything	0.2
Refused	0.1
Total	100

#### Legislative Parliament

**Q60. Do you think the Legislative Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q60	Percent
Don't know/cannot say	63.2
Yes	24.3
No	12.2
Refused	0.2
Total	100

**Q61. If you think the Legislative Parliament is the right body to decide on the future of the country, why do you think so? [Single response] (Base = 732)**

Q61	Percent
Because it has been established by the people's movement	27.4
Don't know/ cannot say	27.0
Because it is the legitimate body as defined by the laws	24.9
Because it has come through a struggle	17.3
Because this has been provided for by Interim Constitution	16.3
Because it includes both the 1999 elected MPs and the Maoist	14.7
Because it has sidelined the king	6.8
Refused	1.1

**Q62. If you think the legislative parliament is not the right body to decide on the future of the country, why do you think so? [Single response] (Base = 368)**

Q62	Percent
Because it has not been elected by the people	61.4
Because concerned parties have formed the Parliament by themselves	28.9
Because it has a limited mandate	25.5
Don't know/ cannot say	16.9
Because it has sidelined the king	4.0
Because it includes the rebel group that has been fighting against the state	3.9
Refused	0.0

#### Popularity of Political Parties and Leaders

**Q63. Which party candidate had you voted for in the 1999 general election? [Single response] (Base = 3010)**

Q63	Percent
CPN (UML)	25.6
Nepali Congress	23.9
Was not old enough to vote	17.1



Pasang Sherpa (Janajati Federation)	988	4.2
Hridesh Tripathi (Tarai Madhesh Loktantric Party)	1052	4.0
Upendra Yadav (Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum)	1315	3.9
K. P. Woli (CPN UML)	1405	3.9
Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) (CPN Maoist)	1386	3.9
Ram Chandra Paudel (Nepali Congress)	1481	3.8
Narayan Man Bijekchhe (NMKP)	1064	3.6
Surya Bahadur Thapa (RJP)	1553	3.6
C. P. Mainali (CPN ML)	1217	3.5
Amik Sherchan (Jana Morcha)	913	3.1
Lokendra Bahadur Chand (RPP)	1420	3.1
Pashupati Shamsheer Rana (RPP)	1378	3.1
King Gyanendra	2609	2.8
Kamal Thapa (RPP Nepal)	1418	2.3

**Thank You!**

Name of Interviewer: .....

Date: .....